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UNODC is pleased to present the findings of the World Drug 
Report 2015, based on the best available data and our long-
standing research expertise in the many complex facets of 
drugs and crime. 
Member States are engaged in intensive discussions on the 
way forward to address the world drug problem, with the 
General Assembly special session on this topic to take place 
next year. This report is aimed at providing needed research 
input and informing collective responses to the challenges 
posed by the production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs.
The continuing discussions leading to the special session of 
the General Assembly have recognized the need for drug 
control policies that are balanced, comprehensive and inte-
grated, with a focus on health and carried out with respect 
for human rights.
Numerous Security Council and General Assembly resolu-
tions have emphasized the fact that the harm caused by illicit 
drugs has a significant impact on peace, security and 
development.
The ongoing debate on the post-2015 development agenda 
has further underscored the importance of promoting justice 
and the rule of law, and of addressing the threats that under-
mine them, including drugs, violence and organized crime. 
Risk factors and circumstances that can render people more 
vulnerable to illicit drugs, as well as facilitate the establish-
ment and expansion of illegal markets, are often related to 
issues of development, rule of law and governance. Policies 
can never be pursued in isolation, and drug control is no 
exception. 
The need for such integrated responses, encompassing robust 
criminal justice action to disrupt organized criminal net-
works, measures to ensure access to controlled medications 
for medical purposes, and evidence- and health-based 
approaches to prevention and treatment, is more evident than 
ever. 
The vulnerability of Africa to drugs and crime remains a grave 
concern, with increasing seizures of heroin indicating the 
region’s role as a key transit area for global drug trafficking 
routes. These illicit flows bring with them other forms of 
organized crime, and undermine security, health and devel-
opment in an already-fragile region. 
The nexus between organized crime and terrorism — in 
which illicit drug trafficking appears to play a role — poses 
a serious threat, as emphasized by recent Security Council 
resolutions calling for redoubled efforts to prevent terrorists 
from benefiting from transnational organized crime.  
Record opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan continues 
to present formidable challenges for the country and the 
international community. 
Global opium poppy cultivation in 2014 reached its highest 
level since the late 1930s. The increase in estimated opium 
and heroin production has not yet been reflected in an 
increase in heroin supply in most regions. But in some coun-
tries there have been signs of increases in heroin-related indi-
cators such as mortality and health emergencies, and in others 
indications of increased purity and lower prices. 
An unacceptable number of drug users worldwide continue 
to lose their lives prematurely, with an estimated 187,100 
drug-related deaths in 2013.
Only one out of six problem drug users globally has access 
to treatment. Women in particular appear to face barriers to 
treatment — while one out of three drug users globally is a 
woman, only one out of five drug users in treatment is a 
woman. 
Clearly more work needs to be done to promote the impor-
tance of understanding and addressing drug dependence as 
a chronic health condition requiring, like HIV/AIDS, long-
term, sustained treatment and care.
UNODC remains committed to working with Member 
States, as well as our United Nations and other partners, to 
further these efforts.  
The thematic chapter of this year’s report focuses on alterna-
tive development.
Alternative development presents many challenges, with pro-
grammes often undertaken in marginalized, isolated areas 
with limited government control, unclear land rights and lack 
of infrastructure, where few other development actors may 
be operating.
Nevertheless, the decades-long experience of UNODC has 
made it clear that alternative development can work, when 
initiatives are informed by a long-term vision, sustained with 
adequate funding and political support, and integrated into 
a broader development and governance agenda.
Approached holistically, alternative development has the 
potential to break the vicious cycle trapping poor farmers and 
to act as a catalyst for viable livelihoods that do not depend 
on illicit cultivation. 
The World Drug Report 2015 chapter on alternative develop-
ment, based on reviews of successful projects, highlights fac-
tors that have contributed to fostering a sustainable licit 
economy, including transfer of skills and access to land, credit 
and infrastructure, as well as marketing support and access 
to markets. 
The chapter further underlines the potential of alternative 
development to contribute to environmental protection, 
empower women and support communities affected by other 
forms of crime, including illegal mining or wildlife and forest 
crime. 
Unfortunately, the report also shows that widespread political 
support for alternative development has not been matched 
by funding. 
Member States have repeatedly endorsed alternative develop-
ment. There is also a welcome trend towards South-South 
cooperation, with the exchange of best practices and local 
experiences, as well as increased financial investments and 
iv
technical support from countries such as Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of ), Colombia, Peru and Thailand.
Nevertheless, overall gross disbursements of alternative devel-
opment funds from countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development accounted for just 0.1 
per cent of global development assistance in 2013.
The post-2015 development agenda and the process towards 
the special session of the General Assembly on the world drug 
problem to be held in 2016 can provide an important impe-
tus for alternative development efforts, as well as for broader 
interventions addressing supply and demand. 
Impoverished farmers growing coca and opium poppy to eke 
out an unsustainable living; fragile regions and communities 
reeling from the harm caused by the transit of illicit drugs, 
on their way to richer markets; women, men and children 
struggling with drug dependence, with nowhere to turn. Illicit 
drugs hurt so many people, in so many places, and they need 
our help. The international community must respond with 
determination and compassion, and I hope the World Drug 
Report 2015 will help to reinforce this message. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Member States 
for their help in producing this report, which relies on the 
willingness to share data, promote transparency and provide 
assistance. That is to say, it relies on the very spirit of open-
ness and shared responsibility needed to address the multidi-
mensional challenges posed by illicit drugs, and we count on 
your continued support.  
 
Yury Fedotov
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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The following abbreviations have been used in the present report:
ADHD attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
ATS amphetamine-type stimulants
CBD cannabidiol
CICAD Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission (Organization of  
American States)
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction
Europol European Police Office
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations
FWID females who inject drugs
GDP gross domestic product
GIZ German Agency for International 
Cooperation
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
INCSR International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report, of the United States 
State Department 
LSD lysergic acid diethylamide
MDA 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine 
MDMA 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
MWID males who inject drugs
3,4-MDP-2-P 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2- 
propanone
4-MEC mythylethcathinone
NPS new psychoactive substances
OECD Organization for Economic  
Cooperation and Development
PWID people who inject drugs
SAMHSA
Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Service Administration (United States)
THC ∆9-tetrahydrocannabinol
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS 
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development
UNFDAC United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control
UNDCP United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
The boundaries and names shown and the designations 
used on maps do not imply official endorsement or accept-
ance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents 
approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir 
agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the 
parties. Disputed boundaries (China/India) are represented 
by cross-hatch owing to the difficulty of showing sufficient 
detail. 
The designations employed and the presentation of the 
material in this publication do not imply the expression 
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat 
of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities or con-
cerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Countries and areas are referred to by the names that were 
in official use at the time the relevant data were 
collected.
All references to Kosovo in the present publication should 
be understood to be in compliance with Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999).
Since there is some scientific and legal ambiguity about 
the distinctions between “drug use”, “drug misuse” and 
“drug abuse”, the neutral terms “drug use” and “drug con-
sumption” are used in the present report.
All analysis contained in this report is based on the official 
data submitted by member States to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime through the annual report 
questionnaire unless indicated otherwise.
The data on population used in the present report are 
from: United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Pros-
pects: The 2012 Revision. 
References to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless 
otherwise stated.
References to tons are to metric tons, unless otherwise 
stated.
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The World Drug Report presents a comprehensive annual 
overview of the latest developments in the world’s illicit 
drug markets by focusing on the production of, traffick-
ing in and consumption of the main illicit drug types and 
their related health consequences. Chapter 1 of the World 
Drug Report 2015 provides a global overview of the supply 
of and demand for opiates, cocaine, cannabis, ampheta-
mine-type stimulants (ATS) and new psychoactive sub-
stances (NPS), as well as their impact on health, and 
reviews the scientific evidence on approaches to drug use 
prevention and addresses general principles for effective 
responses to treatment for drug use. Chapter 2 focuses on 
how alternative development, within the broader context 
of the development agenda, aims to break the vicious cycle 
of illicit crop cultivation by providing farmers with alter-
native livelihoods. 
According to the most recent data available, there has been 
little change in the overall global situation regarding the 
production, use and health consequences of illicit drugs. 
The health consequences of illicit drug use continue to be 
a matter of global concern, as the vast majority of problem 
drug users continue to have no access to treatment. Fur-
thermore, the increase in global opium poppy cultivation 
and opium production to record levels has yet to have 
major repercussions on the global market for opiates. This 
raises concerns about the size of the challenge to law 
enforcement posed by increasingly sophisticated and ver-
satile organized criminal groups.
Drug use and its health consequences
It is estimated that a total of 246 million people, or 1 out 
of 20 people between the ages of 15 and 64 years, used an 
illicit drug in 2013. That represents an increase of 3 million 
over the previous year but, because of the increase in the 
global population, illicit drug use has in fact remained 
stable. 
The magnitude of the world drug problem becomes 
more apparent when considering that more than 1 out of 
10 drug users is a problem drug user, suffering from drug 
use disorders or drug dependence. In other words, some 
27 million people, or almost the entire population of a 
country the size of Malaysia, are problem drug users. 
Almost half (12.19 million) of those problem drug users 
inject drugs, and an estimated 1.65 million of those who 
inject drugs were living with HIV in 2013. 
This places a heavy burden on public health systems in 
terms of the prevention, treatment and care of drug use 
disorders and their health consequences. Only one out of 
every six problem drug users in the world has access to 
treatment, as many countries have a large shortfall in the 
provision of services. The annual number of drug-related 
deaths (estimated at 187,100 in 2013) has remained rela-
tively unchanged. An unacceptable number of drug users 
continue to lose their lives prematurely, often as a result 
of overdose, even though overdose-related deaths are 
preventable.
Notwithstanding national and regional variations in trends 
in drug use, the limited data available indicate that the use 
of opiates (heroin and opium) has remained stable at the 
global level. Mainly as a result of trends in the Americas 
and Europe, cocaine use has declined overall, while the 
use of cannabis and the non-medical use of pharmaceuti-
cal opioids have continued to rise. Trends in ATS use vary 
Global trends in the estimated prevalence of drug 
use, 2006-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimates are for adults (aged 15-64), based on past-year use.
Global trends in the estimated number of drug 
users, 2006-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire.
Note: Estimated percentage of adults (aged 15-64) who have used 
drugs in the past year.
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xfrom region to region, and some subregions such as South-
East Asia have reported an increase in methamphetamine 
use.
There are also indications that the number of people 
requiring treatment for cannabis use is increasing in most 
regions. The evidence suggests that more drug users are 
suffering from cannabis use disorders, and there is grow-
ing evidence that cannabis may be becoming more harm-
ful. This is reflected in the high proportion of persons 
entering treatment for the first time for cannabis use dis-
orders in Europe, North America and Oceania. According 
to the limited information available, cannabis ranks first 
among the drug types for which people in Africa enter 
treatment for drug use.
Cannabis is by far the most frequently used drug in pris-
ons. Though data on the subject are limited, there are 
indications that one third of prisoners have used a drug at 
least once while incarcerated. Lifetime and recent (past-
month) use of heroin in prisons is much higher than that 
of cocaine, amphetamines or “ecstasy”. Prison is a high-
risk, controlled environment where drug use, including 
injecting drug use, often takes place in particularly unsafe 
conditions. This may explain why the prison environment 
can be characterized by high levels of infectious diseases, 
particularly HIV but also hepatitis C and tuberculosis, 
and by limited access to prevention and treatment, which 
increases the risk of contracting blood-borne viruses. 
The number of people requiring treatment for ATS use is 
also increasing globally. This is probably attributable to 
the sheer weight of numbers, as the prevalence of ATS use 
is relatively high in Asia, where there is high demand for 
treatment but the expertise in treating ATS use disorders 
is not at the same level of sophistication as the expertise 
in treating opiate use disorders. 
NPS are marketed as alternatives to internationally con-
trolled drugs and are purported to produce effects similar 
to those of their “traditional” counterparts. They have the 
potential to pose serious risks to public health and safety. 
Information and research on the potential harm caused by 
NPS are limited, but the proliferation of the estimated 500 
NPS, including mephedrone, poses a health threat to drug 
users and has increased demand for treatment for drug use. 
Global trends in the prevalence of use of various 
drugs, 2009-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Based on the estimated percentage of adults (aged 15-64) who 
have used the substance in the past year.
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Cocaine remains the primary drug of concern in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, whereas the use of opiates 
remains the most problematic form of drug use globally. 
This can be attributed to the relationship between the use 
of opiates and injecting drug use, HIV, AIDS and overdose 
deaths and to the fact that the use of opiates accounts for 
the majority of treatment admissions for drug use in Asia 
and Europe.
Public perceptions about the rehabilitation of drug-
dependent persons tend to oversimplify the magnitude of 
drug dependence. There is no quick and simple remedy 
for drug dependence. It is a chronic health condition and, 
as with other chronic conditions, the affected persons 
remain vulnerable for a lifetime and require long-term and 
continued treatment. There is a growing body of research 
showing that many interventions aimed at preventing the 
initiation of drug use (or the potential transition to drug 
use disorders) can be effective if they address the different 
personal and environmental vulnerabilities of children and 
young people — factors that are largely beyond a person’s 
control. 
A number of social and structural barriers clearly continue 
to hinder the access of women to treatment for drug use: 
globally, only one out of five drug users in treatment is a 
woman even though one out of three drug users is a 
woman. A large body of evidence has shown that social 
and biological factors relating to initiation of substance 
use, continued substance use and the development of 
problems related to substance use vary considerably 
between men and women. Men are three times more likely 
Ç
ÇÇÇÇÇ
Ç
ÇÇ
ÇÇ
Ç
Ç
Ç
% of PWID living with HIV
0.00-1.00  
1.01-10.00  
10.01-25.00  
25.01-50.00  
50.01-87.10  
No data provided
Prevalence of HIV among people who inject drugs, 2013 or latest year available
Note: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet 
been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning 
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). 
Even though one out of three drug users is a woman,  
only one out of five drug users in treatment is a woman.
xii
than women to use cannabis, cocaine and amphetamines, 
whereas women are more likely than men to misuse pre-
scription opioids and tranquillizers. As the likelihood that 
initiation of the misuse of tranquillizers and prescription 
opioids may lead to regular or current use is relatively high 
compared with other drugs, this remains an area of par-
ticular concern for women. Available data on HIV preva-
lence among people who inject drugs show that, in many 
countries, women who inject drugs are more vulnerable 
to HIV infection than their male counterparts and that 
the prevalence of HIV is higher among women who inject 
drugs than among their male counterparts.
Some progress has been made towards achieving the target 
set in the 2011 Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS 
of reducing by 50 per cent HIV transmission among 
people who inject drugs by 2015.1 Although the number 
of newly diagnosed cases of HIV among people who inject 
drugs declined by roughly 10 per cent, from an estimated 
110,000 in 2010 to 98,000 in 2013, this target is unlikely 
to be met. 
The transmission of infectious diseases such as HIV and 
hepatitis C and the occurrence of drug overdoses are only 
some of the risk factors that lead to the level of mortality 
among people who inject drugs being nearly 15 times 
higher than would normally be expected among people of 
comparable age and gender in the general population. 
Not all drug overdoses are fatal; different studies have esti-
mated that only 1 out of 20-25 overdose cases is fatal. 
1  Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: Intensifying Our Efforts 
to Eliminate HIV and AIDS (General Assembly resolution 65/277, 
annex).
Non-fatal overdoses are underreported and are a common 
experience among drug users; however, the cumulative risk 
of death increases with each successive overdose.
DRUG SUPPLY AND MARKETS
The production of cannabis resin continues to be confined 
to a few countries in North Africa, the Middle East and 
South-West Asia, whereas cannabis herb is produced in 
most of the countries in the world. South America con-
tinues to account for practically all global cultivation of 
coca bush, and South-West Asia (Afghanistan) and South-
East Asia (mainly the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and Myanmar) continue to account for the vast majority 
of illicit opium poppy cultivation. Although the manu-
facture of ATS is difficult to assess, there are reports of 
ATS manufacture in all regions worldwide. 
There may have been no major change in the regions in 
which illicit crop cultivation and drug manufacture take 
place, but the illicit drug markets and the routes along 
which drugs are smuggled continue to be in a state of flux. 
The “dark net”, the anonymous online marketplace used 
for the illegal sale of a wide range of products, including 
drugs, is a prime example of the constantly changing situ-
ation, and it has profound implications for both law 
enforcement and drug trafficking.
A more classic example of this dynamic aspect is the con-
tinued shift in the routes used for smuggling opiates and 
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the fact that Afghan heroin may be reaching new markets. 
The growing importance of Africa as a transit area for 
Afghan heroin bound for Europe and other regions has 
been reflected in increasing seizures of heroin reported in 
recent years in some African countries, particularly in East 
Africa. Recent seizures also suggest that it may have 
become more common for large shipments of Afghan 
heroin to be smuggled across the Indian Ocean into East 
and Southern Africa. Moreover, Africa continues to be 
used as a trans-shipment area for smuggling cocaine across 
the Atlantic into Europe, and Eastern Europe is emerging 
as a transit area and as a destination. The quantities being 
smuggled are small but this may be an indication that the 
cocaine market is moving eastwards.
West Africa appears to have become an established source 
of the methamphetamine smuggled into East and South-
East Asia via Southern Africa or Europe, with new traf-
ficking routes linking previously unconnected regional 
methamphetamine markets. The established market for 
methamphetamine in East and South-East Asia continues 
to grow, while there are also indications of increasing 
methamphetamine use in parts of North America and 
Europe.
As opiates originating in Myanmar may be unable to meet 
the demand in South-East Asia, the so-called “southern 
route” could be increasing in importance as a conduit for 
smuggling Afghan heroin southwards from Afghanistan 
through Pakistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran. Traffick-
ing networks using the Balkan route to smuggle Afghan 
heroin into Europe may be experimenting with a new 
route, leading through the Caucasus, and there are indica-
tions of heroin being trafficked from Iraq rather than from 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Not only are drug trafficking routes undergoing change, 
but there is also evidence that organized criminal groups, 
which in the past may have limited their trafficking activi-
ties to one drug type, are diversifying. For example, groups 
that previously focused on heroin trafficking appear to be 
increasingly engaging in trafficking in cannabis resin and 
methamphetamine. 
To a certain extent, there has also been a shift in the focus 
of the trafficking routes themselves. There is increasing 
evidence that routes traditionally used for smuggling one 
type of drug are now being used for smuggling other drug 
types. While there appears to be an evolution in the coun-
tries reported to be used as transit hubs for certain drugs, 
such as African countries being used as transit areas for 
heroin and cocaine, certain African countries are also 
increasingly being used as transit areas for different types 
of drugs. 
Opiates
According to the limited information available, global 
prevalence of the use of opioids (0.7 per cent of the world’s 
adult population, or 32.4 million users) and the use of 
opiates (0.4 per cent, or 16.5 million users worldwide) has 
remained stable, whereas global opium poppy cultivation 
in 2014 reached the highest level since the late 1930s. This 
was mainly attributable to the fact that opium poppy cul-
tivation reached historically high levels in the main coun-
try in which opium poppy is cultivated, Afghanistan, 
where potential production of opium also continued to 
increase. Global opium production reached 7,554 tons in 
2014, also the second highest level since the late 1930s, 
though global seizures of opium, heroin and illicit mor-
phine decreased by 6.4 per cent from 2012 to 2013.
The increase in estimated opium and heroin production 
has not yet been reflected in an increase in heroin supply 
in most regions. The destination of the additional quanti-
ties of heroin is unclear, but there are signs of increases in 
the availability of heroin and in heroin-related indicators 
such as mortality and medical emergencies in some 
countries. 
The prevalence of opioid use remains high in North Amer-
ica (3.8 per cent) in relation to the global average. In the 
United States of America, there are indications of a partial 
shift in the use of opioids towards heroin use, attributable 
in part to changes in the formulation of OxyContin, one 
of the main prescription opioids that are misused, as well 
as an increase in the availability of heroin and a decrease 
in its price in some parts of the country. With the number 
of heroin-related deaths increasing considerably (from 
5,925 in 2012 to 8,257 in 2013), reaching the highest 
level in a decade, the number of drug-related deaths con-
tinues to rise in the United States. 
There are signs of change in the supply of heroin in dif-
ferent regions. In North America, although 90 per cent of 
Global potential opium production, 1998-2014
Source: Period 1997-2002: UNODC; since 2003: national illicit 
crop monitoring system supported by UNODC.
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Flows of heroin from/to countries or regions
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. 
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). 
* The trafficking routes represented on the above map should be considered broadly indicative and based on data analysis rather than definitive route outlines. Such analyses are based upon on data related to official drug seizures along the trafficking routes as well as official country report and Annual Response Questionnaires. Routes may deviate to other countries along the routes and there are numerous secondary flows that may not be 
represented.
Sources: UNODC annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database. UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project.
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the heroin in Canada originates in Afghanistan, the United 
States continues to be supplied by heroin manufactured 
in Central and South America. However, analysis of sei-
zures indicates that while Afghan heroin currently accounts 
for relatively little of the heroin seized in the United States, 
this may be changing. In Oceania, there have been fluc-
tuations in the Australian market between the supply of 
Afghan heroin and heroin originating in the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic or Myanmar, but it seems that in 
2013 the latter was predominant. This underlines the fact 
that the reach of organized criminal networks continues 
to be global and that organized criminal groups are becom-
ing increasingly sophisticated and versatile. 
In Europe, the heroin market is also marked by variations, 
albeit at the subregional level. There are indications of a 
stable or downward trend in the use of heroin in Western 
and Central Europe, while heroin seizures have recently 
increased in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where the 
absence of new data prevents the assessment of recent 
trends in the prevalence of drug use. 
In the absence of any recent reliable data on the extent of 
the use of opioids in most parts of Asia, it is difficult to 
determine a trend, but the use of opioids is generally 
considered to be stable. Asia remains the world’s largest 
market for opiates, accounting for an estimated two thirds 
of all users of opiates, and the total number of registered 
heroin users in China is increasing. Data on Africa remain 
limited, but it is likely that the increasing importance of 
the region as a transit area for Afghan heroin bound for 
markets in other regions has had an impact on the use of 
opiates in Africa.
Cocaine
Not only did coca bush cultivation continue to decline in 
2013, reaching the lowest level since the mid-1980s, when 
estimates first became available, but the annual prevalence 
Main global trafficking flows of opiates
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.
Notes: The trafficking routes represented on this map should be considered broadly indicative and based on data analyses rather than definitive route 
outlines. Such analyses are based on data related to official drug seizures along the trafficking route as well as official country reports and responses 
to annual report questionnaires. Routes may deviate to other countries that lie along the routes and there are numerous secondary flows that may 
not be reflected. 
The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined 
boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status 
of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been 
determined.
Coca bush cultivation, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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of cocaine use (0.4 per cent of the adult population) also 
continued to decline in Western and Central Europe and 
North America. In those subregions, which, along with 
South America, have the world’s largest cocaine markets, 
the prevalence of cocaine use is highest. Supply reduction 
measures may have contributed to the decline in coca bush 
cultivation in the coca-producing countries, leading to a 
reduction in the availability of cocaine and the shrinking 
of some of the principal cocaine markets. 
In addition to the human cost of cocaine manufacture and 
trafficking, illicit coca bush cultivation and the transfor-
mation of coca into cocaine continue to cause serious envi-
ronmental damage even though coca bush cultivation has 
decreased. In Colombia alone, roughly 290,000 hectares 
of forest were lost as a direct result of coca crop cultivation 
between 2001 and 2013, while the slash-and-burn method 
used to clear new plots has led to increased erosion. Fur-
ther environmental damage has been caused by the her-
bicides and fertilizers used in coca bush cultivation and 
the chemicals employed in the transformation of coca into 
cocaine.
Cannabis
Cannabis use is increasing and continues to be high in 
West and Central Africa, Western and Central Europe and 
Oceania, as well as in North America, where the most 
recent data available indicate an increase in the prevalence 
of cannabis use in the United States. Europe is still one of 
the world’s largest markets for cannabis resin, but its use 
is concentrated in a few countries. The use of cannabis 
herb is more evenly spread across European countries, and 
the market in Western and Central Europe is shifting from 
cannabis resin to cannabis herb. 
Advances in cannabis plant cultivation techniques and the 
use of genetically selected strains have led to an increase 
in the number of cannabis harvests, as well as in the yield 
and potency of cannabis. The potency of cannabis, 
commonly measured in terms of the concentration of 
THC (Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol, the main psychoactive 
ingredient in cannabis), has been increasing in many 
markets over the past decade, leading to growing concern 
about the potential of cannabis to cause serious health 
problems. Despite the fact that increasing professionalism 
and sophistication have enhanced the capacity of cannabis 
plant growers to avoid detection by law enforcement 
authorities, data for 2013 show an increase in the quantities 
of cannabis herb and cannabis resin seized worldwide.
Synthetic drugs: amphetamine-type 
stimulants and new psychoactive  
substances 
The global market for synthetic drugs continues to be 
dominated by methamphetamine. The increasingly diver-
sified market for methamphetamine is expanding in East 
and South-East Asia, where it accounts for a large share 
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of the people receiving treatment for drug use in a number 
of countries, and use of crystalline methamphetamine is 
increasing in parts of North America and Europe. Surging 
seizures since 2009 also point to a rapid expansion in the 
global ATS market, with the total quantity of seized ATS 
almost doubling to reach over 144 tons in 2011 and 2012, 
the highest level since the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) began systematic monitoring, and 
remaining at a comparatively high level in 2013. 
According to seizure data, the global “ecstasy” market is 
smaller than the global market for amphetamine and 
methamphetamine and remains confined to a few regions. 
East and South-East Asia and Oceania may be emerging 
as a driver of the global market for “ecstasy”, while the 
market seems to be on the decline in the Americas, where 
“ecstasy” seizures dropped by 81 per cent between 2009 
and 2012. The largest “ecstasy” markets continue to be 
East and South-East Asia and Oceania, although seizures 
of “ecstasy” declined there in 2013.
The “ecstasy” market has been on the decline in several 
European countries for some time, with mephedrone and 
other NPS perhaps serving as a substitute. The use of 
mephedrone and synthetic cannabinoids may have 
declined in some markets in recent years, but a growing 
number of countries have reported a wider range of emerg-
ing NPS, as well as worrying developments such as the 
injecting use of NPS. There continue to be limited data 
on recent developments in injecting drug use and polydrug 
use involving NPS; these particular forms of drug use 
Methamphetamine ﬂows as perceived by recipient countries, 2011-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire, 2011-2013.
Note: The origins of the flow arrows do not necessarily indicate the source/manufacture of methamphetamine. These arrows represent the flows as 
perceived by recipient countries. Flow arrows represent the direction of methamphetamine trafficking and are not an indication of the quantity traf-
ficked. 
The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined 
boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status 
of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been 
determined.
Number of new psychoactive substances  
reported, 2009-2014
Source: UNODC, early warning advisory on NPS, 2009-2014.
Note: This graph represents only the number of different NPS reported 
during the respective reporting year. Not all NPS reported in one year 
were necessarily reported in the following year(s). 
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could pose a serious challenge for providers of treatment 
for drug use and health-care providers.
The sheer number, diversity and transient nature of NPS 
currently on the market partly explain why there are still 
only limited data available on the prevalence of use of 
many NPS. Those difficulties also explain why both the 
regulation of NPS and the capacity to address health prob-
lems related to NPS continue to be challenging. Different 
countries report that NPS continue to proliferate in the 
marketplace, in terms of both quantity and diversity. By 
December 2014, a total of 541 NPS had been reported 
by 95 countries and territories to the UNODC early warn-
ing advisory. Synthetic cannabinoids continued to account 
for the majority of NPS reported in 2014 (39 per cent); 
they were followed by phenethylamines (18 per cent) and 
synthetic cathinones (15 per cent). The growing number 
of NPS available worldwide indicates that the market for 
synthetic drugs is becoming even more diversified.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Illicit crop cultivation: breaking the 
vicious cycle
Illicit crop cultivation is driven by situation-specific com-
binations of vulnerability and opportunity factors. As sur-
vival and subsistence are real considerations for many 
households that engage in illicit crop cultivation, they are 
frequently risk-averse and take into account a variety of 
factors when making decisions on such cultivation. 
One of those factors is the specific nature of the illicit crops 
— agronomic aspects, durability of the product, price, 
ease of sale, etc. All major illicit crops are particularly 
attractive because they produce quick returns from non-
perishable products. Illicit crop cultivation can thus pro-
vide farmers with the necessary short-term economic 
means to survive, but it does not allow the area to develop 
its licit economy and institutional environment. 
Other factors include geographical and environmental 
factors, such as climate, the availability of water and arable 
land, and proximity to market; household-specific socio-
economic factors, such as level of income, existing employ-
ment opportunities, access to credit and size of landholding; 
developmental facilities such as access to roads, the power 
grid and educational and health services; and sociopoliti-
cal and institutional factors, such as security, government 
control and rule of law. Illicit crop cultivation tends to 
take place in marginalized, isolated areas characterized by 
limited government control, unclear land rights, lack of 
infrastructure, poverty and violence, which are areas where 
few international development agencies tend to operate.
Alternative development is an approach aimed at reducing 
the vulnerabilities that lead to involvement in illicit crop 
cultivation and ultimately eliminating such cultivation. 
Alternative development can break the vicious cycle of 
rising illicit drug production, weakening rule of law, 
decreasing growth of the licit economy, decreasing invest-
ment in licit sectors, strengthening organized crime and 
increasing violence by effectively promoting factors foster-
ing a sustainable licit economy. In the long run, this can 
attract investment and help to develop the necessary infra-
structure, thereby changing and sustaining the livelihood 
of rural communities. 
Alternative development is not generally an objective in 
itself but rather a means to an end: it is aimed at contrib-
uting to an enabling environment for long-term rural 
development without illicit crop cultivation. Alternative 
development acts as a catalyst, boosting development in 
areas with particular challenges related to the illicit drug 
economy. 
The General Assembly at its twentieth special session, held 
in 1998, defined alternative development as a process to 
prevent and eliminate illicit crop cultivation “through spe-
cifically designed rural development measures in the con-
text of sustained national growth and sustainable 
development efforts in countries taking action against 
drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural character-
istics of the target communities and groups”.2 This defini-
2 Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication 
of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development (General 
Assembly resolution S-20/4 E).
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tion is used at the international level. Different definitions 
reflecting new strategies and approaches of alternative 
development have been developed by a wide variety of 
implementing countries, donors and practitioners. 
National strategies or plans employ a balanced approach, 
complementing alternative development not only with 
other supply reduction strategies (particularly law enforce-
ment and interdiction), but also with demand reduction 
strategies (prevention, treatment and rehabilitation). 
Another commonly integrated strategy — sometimes 
appearing as a cross-cutting theme or a separate policy — 
is the promotion of good governance or the strengthening 
of state institutions or the rule of law.
Where is alternative development 
implemented?
The bulk of alternative development is implemented in 
all the main coca- and opium-producing countries, as well 
as in some cannabis-producing countries and some minor 
opium-producing countries, which are located in South 
America, Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. 
A number of countries in Asia, Central America, Africa 
and Europe have also reported plans to implement alter-
native development activities (see map above).
Elements of alternative development
Alternative development is promulgated at the interna-
tional level, but the evolution of alternative development 
is driven at the country or even the local level. As the fac-
tors that push farmers towards illicit crop cultivation can 
differ greatly from one country or area to another, the 
strategic elements of alternative development must be tai-
lored to the particular circumstances on the ground at the 
local level. No two alternative development projects or 
interventions are exactly alike, even if they are in the same 
area, but there are commonalities. 
These general strategic elements are often similar and there 
are commonalities in the overall framework and approach, 
but the importance of their roles may vary from project 
to project and some may not feature at all. Success is very 
situation-specific and there is no manual or blueprint for 
alternative development. With the adoption of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development,3 
there is now a set of general guidelines outlining good 
practices in planning and implementing alternative devel-
opment. The major components that feature, to a greater 
or lesser extent, in most alternative development projects 
are as follows: 
 • Income-generating alternatives are at the core of al-
ternative development, as economic necessity tends 
to play an important role in a farmer’s decision on 
whether to engage in illicit crop cultivation. Income-
generating alternatives need to be viable and sustain-
able in order to decrease dependence on illicit crop 
cultivation. 
3  General Assembly resolution 68/196, annex.
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 • The marketing of products of alternative develop-
ment is an important component of any project. To  
enhance marketing options and reduce some of the 
vulnerabilities related to illicit crop cultivation, alter-
native development programmes often try to involve 
the private sector. This approach has enabled products 
of alternative development to have access to markets 
not only at the local and national levels, but also at the 
international level.
 • Long-term political and financial support is essential to 
the success of alternative development. Time is needed 
not only to address the economic drivers behind illicit 
crop cultivation, but also to build trust with local com-
munities and to develop long-term investment. Direct 
participation by farmers and communities plays a key 
role in the design and planning of alternative develop-
ment activities, especially in areas where no public 
institutions can fulfil such a role. 
 • Land tenure and the sustainable management and use 
of land are crucial to the long-term success of alterna-
tive development, as lack of access to land can be one 
of the drivers of illicit crop cultivation. As they require 
several years to produce yields, most alternative cash 
crops require the long-term engagement of farmers; 
without access to land, however, farmers are reluctant 
to cultivate long-term cash crops. 
 • Environmental protection plays an increasingly  
important role. Alternative development has both a 
component of “do no harm”, trying to minimize the 
environmental impact of alternative development 
interventions, and a proactive component, in which 
programmes directly or indirectly contribute to the 
protection of the environment and biodiversity and the 
mitigation of climate change.
What is successful alternative  
development?
Measuring the coverage, quality and effectiveness of alter-
native development interventions and services with regard 
to addressing the drug problem is challenging. The long-
term nature of alternative development interventions is a 
factor in the complexity of measuring their success. Expe-
rience has shown that the success of alternative develop-
ment in terms of the sustainable reduction of illicit crop 
cultivation can only be determined after several years of 
intervention. Attempts to gauge success over shorter peri-
ods have been found to be counterproductive, particularly 
when the resulting information is used for immediate 
action. The fact that projects take place at the local level 
but their impact is often evaluated at the national level 
can also affect perceptions of whether an alternative devel-
opment programme has been successful or not.
In assessing alternative development programmes, indica-
tors related to human development, socioeconomic con-
ditions, rural development and the alleviation of poverty, 
as well as institutional and environmental indicators, have 
been applied, in order to ensure that the outcomes are in 
line with national and international development objec-
Trends in global commitments to providing development assistance and alternative development made 
by donor countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998-2013
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (data extracted on 19 December 2014).
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tives, including the Millennium Development Goals. Fur-
thermore, efforts have been undertaken to consolidate a 
set of indicators that can be used to monitor the impact 
of alternative development. 
In some cases, long-term commitment to alternative devel-
opment has resulted in a sustainable reduction in illicit 
crop cultivation in the country or area concerned. More 
than 40 years of experience with alternative development 
have shown that it works when there is a long-term vision, 
adequate funding and the political support to integrate it 
into a broader development and governance agenda. Sus-
tainable results in reducing illicit crop cultivation in dif-
ferent communities throughout the world have been 
obtained when the socioeconomic development of com-
munities and the livelihood of rural households have 
improved. 
Political commitment
Despite the considerable attention given to alternative 
development at the international level, the political sup-
port has not translated into continued funding from donor 
countries. Alternative development has featured promi-
nently in documents prepared for the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs and the special sessions of the General 
Assembly on the world drug problem; however, funding 
for alternative development has decreased considerably in 
the past few years. The twentieth special session of the 
General Assembly, held in 1998, triggered renewed impe-
tus in funding alternative development in the spirit of 
“shared responsibility”, but overall gross disbursements of 
alternative development funds from member countries of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) have declined by 71 per cent since the 
adoption of the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action on International Cooperation towards an Inte-
grated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug 
Problem.4 In 2013, those disbursements accounted for 
just 0.1 per cent of global development assistance. 
Over the past four decades, alternative development has 
been largely funded by external donors, including OECD 
member countries in North America, Europe and Oceania 
and non-member countries such as China, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ), Saudi Arabia and Thailand. But in recent 
years, South American countries such as Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of ), Colombia and Peru and Asian countries 
such as Thailand have been increasingly using domestic 
funding to support alternative development activities. 
In the process of connecting “local to global” that is 
currently taking place, best practices and lessons learned 
from local experiences within national strategies are 
exchanged. This reinforces efforts by UNODC, the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other entities to foster 
4 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2009, 
Supplement No. 8 (E/2009/28), chap. I,  
sect. C.
more South-South cooperation (a broad framework for 
collaboration among countries of the South), pursuant to 
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative 
Development.
The way forward
Alternative development has contributed to economic 
development (mostly in rural areas) in order to target the 
underlying factors and root causes of illicit drug econo-
mies. The new sustainable development goals (the post-
2015 development agenda) may bring a new vision and 
provide alternative development with a new theoretical 
framework, in addition to socioeconomic development 
— its “traditional” pillar. 
The new development agenda, emerging from the report 
of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on 
Sustainable Development Goals,5 points to the crucial role 
of environmental protection and recognizes that secure 
and equitable rights to land and natural resources are cen-
tral to the achievement of sustainable development. These 
and other elements such as the rule of law and “effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions”, as described in 
goal 16 in the report, are, in part, already addressed by 
alternative development.
Different national experiences have shown that there may 
be opportunities for the alternative development approach 
to be applied to counter illegal activities other than illicit 
crop cultivation. Alternative development could be used 
to support communities affected by, for example, drug 
trafficking, illegal mining or wildlife and forest crime. 
With these broader applications, the concept of alternative 
development could be extended well beyond the existing 
“preventive alternative development” strategy that targets 
areas at risk of being used for illicit crop production. 
5  A/68/970 and Corr.1.
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A. EXTENT OF DRUG USE
Overall drug use remains stable globally
It is estimated that almost a quarter of a billion people 
between the ages of 15 and 64 years used an illicit drug in 
2013. This corresponds to a global prevalence of 5.2 per 
cent (range: 3.4-7.0 per cent), suggesting that drug use 
has remained stable in the past three years, although the 
estimated number of drug users has actually risen by 6 
million to 246 million (range: 162 million-329 million) 
owing to the increase in the global population. With some 
27 million people (range: 15.7 million-39 million), or 0.6 
per cent of the population aged 15-64, estimated to suffer 
from problem drug use, including drug-use disorders or 
drug dependence, problem drug use seems to have 
remained somewhat stable over this three-year period. 
TABLE 1.  Global estimates of the use of various drugs, 2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimates for adults aged 15-64, based on past-year use.   
 
 
Percentage of population that has 
used the drug
Number of users  
(thousands) 
low high low high
Cannabis 2.7 4.9  128,480  232,070 
Opioids 0.6 0.8  27,990  37,560 
Opiates 0.3 0.4  12,920  20,460 
Cocaine 0.3 0.4  13,800  20,730 
Amphetamines 0.3 1.1  13,870  53,870 
“Ecstasy” 0.2 0.6  9,340  28,390 
All illicit drug use 3.4 7.0  162,000  329,000 
FIG. 1. Global trends in the estimated number 
of drug users, 2006-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Estimates are for adults (aged 15-64), based on past-year use.
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FIG. 2. Global trends in the estimated  
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Note: Estimated percentage of adults (aged 15-64) who have used 
drugs in the past year.
0.61 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59
4.9 4.9
4.6 4.8
5.0 5.2 5.2 5.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013Ŷ
ŶƵ
Ăů
Ɖƌ
Ğǀ
ĂůĞ
ŶĐ
ĞĂ
ŵ
ŽŶ
ŐƉ
ŽƉ
Ƶů
ĂƟ
ŽŶ
 a
ge
d 
15
-6
4 
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
 
Prevalence of problem drug use (percentage)
Prevalence of illicit drug use (percentage)
FIG. 3. Global trends in the prevalence of use 
of various drugs, 2009-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Based on the estimated percentage of adults (aged 15-64) who 
have used the substance in the past year.
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2Notwithstanding both regional and national variations in 
trends in the use of different types of drug, cannabis use 
has continued to rise since 2009, while the use of opioids, 
including the use of heroin, opium and the non-medical 
use of pharmaceutical opioids, has stabilized at high levels 
(see figure 3). However, the use of cocaine and ampheta-
mines has declined overall, although that is mainly a reflec-
tion of trends in the Americas and Europe.
Problem drug use as reflected in the 
demand for drug treatment
In the absence of data on patterns of problem drug use, 
data on drug users in treatment are taken as a proxy. Treat-
ment demand for different substances varies by region, 
but almost half of the people who access treatment for 
drug use are first-time entrants. The proportion of first-
time entrants in treatment for ATS and cannabis use dis-
orders in 2013 was higher than for other substances in 
most regions, indicating that, compared with other sub-
stances, there is an expanding generation of ATS and can-
nabis users who need treatment (see figure 4). In Asia, the 
number of people accessing treatment for cannabis-use 
disorders is small, but the proportion of first-time entrants 
among them (62 per cent) is the largest. Compared with 
other regions where cannabis users in treatment are typi-
cally in their twenties, in Asia they are reported to be typi-
cally in their thirties. As observed elsewhere,1,2 this may 
reflect a cohort of long-term regular users of cannabis who 
seek treatment for cannabis-related problems. In Europe, 
North America and Oceania, the proportion of first-time 
entrants for cannabis-use disorders is high, but they tend 
to be in their twenties. A large share of cannabis users in 
treatment may reflect cannabis users referred by the crimi-
nal justice system, whereas opioid users in treatment are 
relatively older (in their thirties). In Western and Central 
Europe, 16 per cent of first-time entrants were seeking 
treatment for opioid use, and overall treatment demand 
remains high, which reflects an ageing cohort of opioid 
users in treatment: of the estimated 1.5 million opioid 
users in Europe, 700,000 received opioid substitution 
therapy in 2012.3 The high proportion of people in treat-
ment for opioid use in Asia and Eastern Europe reflects 
the extent of problem opioid use in those regions, and 
ATS users form another group with a high proportion of 
first-time entrants in treatment in Asia. 
1 Alan J. Budney and others, “Marijuana dependence and its treat-
ment”, Addiction Science and Clinical Practice, vol. 4, No. 1 
(December 2007), pp. 4-16.
2 Flávia S. Jungerman and Ronaldo Laranjeira, “Characteristics of 
cannabis users seeking treatment in Sao Paulo, Brazil”, Rev Panam 
Salud Publica, vol. 23, No. 6 (2008), pp. 384-393.
3 EMCDDA, European Drug Report: Trends and Developments 2014 
(Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2014).
UNDERSTANDING TRENDS IN DRUG USE
Global and regional trends in drug use are estimated from nationally representative surveys that include questions 
on drug use, as well as from information gathered through studies that use indirect methods to estimate the 
number of regular or high-risk users such as problem opioids users. Household surveys on drug use are expensive 
and are, at best, carried out every three to ﬁve years. Many countries do not conduct such surveys on a regular 
basis and many others, especially in Asia and Africa, do not conduct them at all. In these cases, estimates from 
the limited number of countries where data are available are used to compute regional and global estimates.a 
Rather than real-time trends at the global and regional levels, year-on-year changes in drug-use estimates thus 
reﬂect updated information from countries where new data were made available. These changes may be especially 
misleading if updated information is available only in countries with large populations. Indeed, global and regional 
estimates of drug use, including by substance, are heavily shaped by countries with large populations because 
of the use of national drug-use data weighted by population size in the calculation of the estimates. The stable 
trend that can be calculated with existing data, may mask variations that are happening in large countries for 
which data are not available. In addition, the estimated number of drug users is further inﬂuenced by changes 
in estimates of the global population aged 15-64. 
The global and regional estimates of the extent of drug use offered in the present report should be viewed as 
best estimates, noting that they reﬂect the best available information at the time of analysis. From a global policy 
perspective, it would be more prudent to look at long-term trends rather than year-on-year changes, which may 
be merely a reﬂection of changes in a few countries. Furthermore, particular caution is required when consider-
ing trends in problem drug-use estimates at the global level, as the extent of problem drug use is difﬁcult to 
capture in general population surveys (which are used to estimate drug use), and indirect methods, which are 
often complex, are therefore used to obtain these estimates. 
a   For further information, see the methodology section in the online version of this report.
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FIG. 4. Percentage distribution of people in treatment, by primary drug type, by region and share of 
ﬁrst-time entrants for each drug type (2013 or latest available data)
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire.
Prison is a high-risk environment for 
drug use 
On any given day, more than 10.2 million people are held 
in penal institutions throughout the world, mostly as pre-
trial detainees or remand prisoners, or as sentenced pris-
oners.4 However, because of the high transfer of people 
between prison and the wider community, the number of 
people who spend at least some time in prison each year 
is considerably greater. The rapid turnover of a large 
number of people between the prison environment and 
their wider communities outside prison means that prison 
health merits consideration as an integral part of public 
health.
Drug use, including heroin use, and 
drug injection are common in prisons
People who use drugs often have a history of incarceration. 
In the United States of America, for example, it is esti-
mated that between 24 and 36 per cent of all people using 
heroin pass through the correctional system each year, 
representing more than 200,000 individuals.5 Although 
data remain limited, studies have shown that drug use 
within prisons is common (see figure 5). Based on a review 
of 41 studies from 26 countries (mostly in Europe) and 
supplemented with data reported in responses from 
4 Roy Walmsley, “World Prison Population List”, 10th ed. (London, 
International Centre for Prison Studies).
5 Amy E. Boutwell and others, “Arrested on heroin: a national oppor-
tunity”, Journal of Opioid Management, vol. 3, No. 6 (2007), pp. 
328-332.
Member States to the annual report questionnaire, drug 
use in prisons was shown to be highly prevalent in many 
of these studies, although there is considerable variability.6 
Approximately one in three people held in prison have 
used drugs at least once while incarcerated, with approxi-
mately one in eight reporting use in the past month. Can-
nabis is the most commonly used drug, as it is in the wider 
community outside prison, but lifetime and recent (past-
month) use of heroin in prison is more common than that 
of cocaine, amphetamines or “ecstasy”. Based on these 
studies, the median estimate of the proportion of people 
held in prison who have used heroin at some time while 
incarcerated is 10.1 per cent (inter-quartile range: 2.5-13.4 
per cent), while 5.0 per cent (inter-quartile range: 0.8-11.5 
per cent) report use in the past year (which is approxi-
mately 14 times higher than in the general population, 
estimated at 0.35 per cent), and 2.4 per cent (inter-quartile 
range: 1.3-9.0 per cent) report recent use in the past 
month.
A number of studies report high levels of injecting drug 
use by prisoners, which may be a result of the high preva-
lence of heroin use.7 In Europe, of the 12 countries report-
ing to EMCDDA on injecting drug use by prisoners at 
some time during incarceration, four countries report 
6 Chloé Carpentier, Luis Royuela and Linda Montanari, “The global 
epidemiology of drug use in prison”, in Drug Use in Prisoners: Epi-
demiology, Implications and Policy Responses, Stuart A. Kinner and 
Josiah Rich, eds. (forthcoming).
7  WHO, UNODC and UNAIDS, Effectiveness of Interventions 
to Address HIV in Prisons, Evidence for Action Technical Papers 
(Geneva, WHO, 2007).
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4levels above 10 per cent (Luxembourg, 31 per cent; Ger-
many, 22 per cent; Portugal, 11 per cent; and Latvia, 10 
per cent).8 Some small-scale surveys provide anecdotal 
information on high levels of injecting drugs in prison. 
For example, among a survey of female prisoners in Brit-
ish Columbia, Canada, 21 per cent reported injecting 
drugs while in prison;9 a survey of prisoners in Australia 
revealed that 23 per cent had injected drugs at some time 
in prison;10 and among male inmates in Bangkok, 39 per 
cent reported injecting drugs while in prison, with 12 per 
cent injecting for the first time while incarcerated.11 These 
estimates are considerably higher than the prevalence of 
injecting drug use among the general population, which 
is estimated globally to be 0.26 per cent of those aged 
15-64.
Unsafe injecting practices are a major risk factor for the 
transmission of blood-borne infections such as HIV and 
viral hepatitis B and C. Due to the difficulties of obtain-
ing sterile needles and syringes, people held in prisons are 
8  EMCDDA, Statistical Bulletin 2014. Available at www.emcdda.
europa.eu/.
9 R. E. Martin and others, “Drug use and risk of bloodborne 
infections: a survey of female prisoners in British Columbia”, 
Canadian Journal of Public Health, vol. 96, No. 2 (2005), pp. 
97-101.
10 Stuart A. Kinner and others, “High-risk drug-use practices among a 
large sample of Australian prisoners”, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 
vol. 126, Nos. 1 and 2 (November 2012), pp. 156-160.
11 Hansa Thaisri and others, “HIV infection and risk factors among 
Bangkok prisoners, Thailand: a prospective cohort study”, BMC 
Infectious Diseases, vol. 3 (2003).
more likely to share injecting equipment and this practice 
has been found to be extremely common among prison-
ers. Very high levels of sharing of needles and syringes have 
been documented among people who inject drugs (PWID) 
in prisons: 56 per cent in Pakistan, 66 per cent in the Rus-
sian Federation, 70-90 per cent in Australia, 78 per cent 
in Thailand and 83-92 per cent in Greece.12
B. HEALTH IMPACT OF DRUG USE
Millions of people inject drugs  
worldwide
Among people using drugs, PWID are one of the most 
vulnerable and marginalized groups. They experience a 
range of health, socioeconomic and legal challenges, often 
with poor outcomes, not least of which is the elevated risk 
of death compared with the general population (see also 
box 3). The joint UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS/World Bank 
estimate for the number of PWID worldwide for 2013 is 
12.19 million (range: 8.48-21.46 million). This corre-
sponds to 0.26 per cent (range: 0.18-0.46 per cent) of the 
adult population aged 15-64. This estimate is based on 
reporting of information on current injecting drug use 
from 93 countries covering 84 per cent of the global popu-
lation aged 15-64. 
12 Kate Dolan and others, “People who inject drugs in prison: HIV 
prevalence, transmission and prevention”, International Journal of 
Drug Policy, vol. 26 (2015), pp. S12-S15.
FIG. 5. Lifetime, annual and past-month prevalence of drug use in prisons (based on 62 studies 
from 43 countries over the period 2000-2013)
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire; and C. Carpentier, L. Royuela and L. Montanari, “The global epidemiology 
of drug use in prison” (2015).
Note: Symbols represent median prevalence with vertical lines depicting inter-quartile range. Data on lifetime, annual and past-month use are not 
consistent across studies (this explains why the annual prevalence of cocaine use has a median value lower than the past-month use). 
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 The updated global total number of PWID is slightly dif-
ferent from the 12.69 million (for 2012) published in the 
World Drug Report 2014. Although new or more recent 
information on PWID from 22 countries are included, 
the revision primarily reflects new estimates for Poland 
and the United Republic of Tanzania, which were not 
previously reported, and lower estimates for the numbers 
of PWID in Brazil and Viet Nam. The global prevalence 
of PWID among the population aged 15-64 is essentially 
unchanged from the World Drug Report 2014.
By far the highest prevalence of PWID continues to be 
found in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where 1.27 
per cent of the general population aged 15-64 is estimated 
to be injecting drugs, a rate nearly five times the global 
average. The estimate for this subregion is heavily influ-
enced by the high prevalence of injecting drug use expe-
rienced in the Russian Federation (2.29 per cent of the 
population aged 15-64). However, in terms of the actual 
numbers of PWID, the largest proportion continues to 
reside in East and South-East Asia, with an estimated 3.15 
million, accounting for approximately one in four PWID 
worldwide. Large numbers of PWID also reside in Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe (2.91 million, representing 24 
per cent of the global total number of PWID) and North 
America (2.07 million, representing 17 per cent of the 
global total number of PWID). Three countries, the Rus-
sian Federation, China and the United States, when com-
bined, account for nearly half (48 per cent) of the global 
total number of PWID.
HIGH RATES OF HIV, TUBERCULOSIS AND HEPATITIS C ARE OFTEN 
FOUND IN PRISONS
Prisons pose a high-risk environment for the trans-
mission of infectious diseases, particularly HIV and 
tuberculosis. In many countries, PWID, who are at 
increased risk of contracting HIV and other bloodborne 
infections, compared with the population in the com-
munity, are overrepresented in prison populations.a 
The global median prevalence of HIV among people 
living in prisons is estimated at 3.0 per cent, which is 
ﬁve times higher than the global median prevalence 
of HIV of 0.6 per cent among the general population 
aged 15-49.b
Prison settings are often characterized by over-
crowding, inadequate ventilation, poor nutrition 
and limited medical facilities for diagnosis and 
treatment, all of which contribute to the spread of 
tuberculosis among prisoners. In some countries, 
the incidence rates of tuberculosis in prisons were 
found to be 8-35 times higher than among the gen-
eral population.c Combined infections of HIV and 
tuberculosis are particularly serious, with each infec-
tion speeding up the progress of the other. The risk 
of developing tuberculosis is 20-37 times greater in 
people living with HIV compared with those not infected with HIV.d In addition, the prevalence of hepatitis C is 
far higher among people held in prison, particularly among those in prison with a history of injecting drug use.e 
a Kate Dolan and others, “HIV/AIDS in prison: A global systematic review of prevalence, incidence, AIDS related mortality and HIV and 
related interventions”, presented at the 20th International Conference on AIDS, held in Melbourne, Australia, from 20 to 25 July 2014.
b UNAIDS, AIDSinfo database.
c A. Aerts and others, “Tuberculosis and tuberculosis control in European prisons”, International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, vol. 
10, No. 11 (2006), pp. 1215-1223.
d Masoud Dara, Dato Chorgoliani and Pierpaolo de Colombani, “TB prevention and control care in prisons”, in Prisons and Health, S. Enggist 
and others, eds. (Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2014).
e S. Larney and others, “The incidence and prevalence of hepatitis C in prisons and other closed settings: results of a systematic review and 
meta-analysis”, Hepatology, vol. 58, No. 4 (2013), pp. 1215-1224.
Prevalence of HIV among people held in prison, by 
region (2013, or latest year available after 2008)
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire; and 
Dolan and others, “HIV/AIDS in prison” (2014).
Notes: Symbols represent median prevalence with vertical lines depicting 
inter-quartile range. Only two studies were identified from Oceania 
(Australia and New Zealand).
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6The burden of HIV among people who 
inject drugs continues to be high in 
many regions
The burden of HIV among PWID is high, with PWID 
accounting for an estimated 30 per cent of new HIV infec-
tions outside sub-Saharan Africa.13 About 1.65 million 
(range: 0.92-4.42 million) PWID were estimated to be 
living with HIV worldwide in 2013, which would corre-
spond to 13.5 per cent of PWID being HIV positive. This 
joint UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS/World Bank estimate is 
based on information on the prevalence of HIV among 
PWID from 114 countries, covering 93 per cent of the 
estimated global number of PWID.
Although estimates of the prevalence of HIV among 
PWID have been updated for 52 countries (none with 
large numbers of PWID living with HIV), the global total 
number of PWID living with HIV is essentially unchanged 
from the information provided in the World Drug Report 
2014. However, the small downward revision to the total 
number of PWID globally has resulted in the global preva-
lence of HIV among PWID being revised upwards to 13.5 
per cent (from the 13.1 per cent presented in the World 
Drug Report 2014). 
13 UNAIDS, The Gap Report (Geneva, 2014).
Two subregions stand out as having particularly high rates 
of HIV infection among PWID. An estimated 29 per cent 
of PWID are living with HIV in South-West Asia and 
some 23 per cent of PWID are living with HIV in Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe. In the remaining regions, the 
average prevalence of HIV infection among PWID is 
much lower, ranging from 1 per cent in Oceania to 11 per 
cent in Africa (although for Africa this estimate may not 
be reliable as monitoring systems may not be adequate).
Approximately 40 per cent of the estimated global total 
number of PWID living with HIV reside in Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe, mostly in the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine. East and South-East Asia contribute a fur-
ther 20 per cent to the global total number of PWID living 
with HIV, although both the prevalence of injecting drug 
use and the prevalence of HIV among PWID are below 
their respective global averages. It is the large population 
aged 15-64 residing in this region that translates into the 
relatively large number of PWID living with HIV. South-
West Asia, the region with the highest prevalence of HIV 
among PWID, contributes 12 per cent to the total global 
number of PWID living with HIV, with a large propor-
tion of these residing in Pakistan. Four countries, the Rus-
sian Federation, China, Pakistan and the United States (in 
descending order), when combined account for nearly two 
thirds (63 per cent) of the total global estimated number 
of PWID living with HIV.
TABLE 2.  Estimated number and prevalence (percentage) of people who currently inject drugs 
among the general population aged 15-64, 2013
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire; progress reports of UNAIDS on the global AIDS response (various years); the 
former Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV and Injecting Drug Use; and national government reports. 
Note: Numbers are rounded to the nearest 10,000.   
Region Subregion
People who inject drugs
Estimated number Prevalence (percentage)
low best high low best high
Africa 330,000 1,000,000 5,590,000 0.05 0.16 0.91
America 2,150,000 2,820,000 3,970,000 0.34 0.44 0.62
North America 1,780,000 2,070,000 2,380,000 0.56 0.65 0.75
Latin America and the Caribbean 370,000 750,000 1,590,000 0.11 0.23 0.49
Asia 3,380,000 4,560,000 6,110,000 0.12 0.16 0.21
Central Asia and Transcaucasia 360,000 410,000 470,000 0.66 0.75 0.87
East and South-East Asia 2,330,000 3,150,000 4,300,000 0.15 0.20 0.27
South-West Asia 400,000 670,000 940,000 0.22 0.37 0.51
Near and Middle East 30,000 70,000 130,000 0.03 0.08 0.13
South Asia 250,000 260,000 260,000 0.03 0.03 0.03
Europe 2,500,000 3,680,000 5,630,000 0.45 0.67 1.02
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe 1,790,000 2,910,000 4,780,000 0.78 1.27 2.09
Western and Central Europe 710,000 770,000 850,000 0.22 0.24 0.26
Oceania 120,000 130,000 160,000 0.49 0.53 0.66
GLOBAL 8,480,000 12,190,000 21,460,000 0.18 0.26 0.46
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FIG. 6. People who inject drugs living with HIV, in relation to the prevalence (percentage) of people 
who inject drugs and the prevalence (percentage) of HIV among this group, by region, 2013
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire; progress reports of UNAIDS on the global AIDS response (various years); the 
former Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV and Injecting Drug Use; and national government reports.
Notes: The number of PWID living with HIV is represented for each region as both a proportion of PWID in the general population aged 15-64  
(horizontal axis) and as a proportion of PWID living with HIV (vertical axis). The areas of the circles are proportional to the number of PWID living with 
HIV. The orange dot and dashed lines represent the global average prevalence of PWID and the global average prevalence of PWID living with HIV.
Prevalence of people who inject drugs among the general populaƟon aged 15-64 (percentage)
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Africa
Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia
East and  
South-East Asia
South Asia Western and
Central Europe
Near and Middle East
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
LaƟn America and the Caribbean
Global average prevalence of 
HIV among PWID (percentage)
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
Pr
ev
al
en
ce
 o
f H
IV
 a
m
on
g 
pe
op
le
 w
ho
 
in
je
ct
 d
ru
gs
 (p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
North America
OceaniaLOW PWID,LOW HIV
LOW PWID,
 HIGH HIV
Gl
ob
al
 a
ve
ra
ge
 p
re
va
le
nc
e
ŽĨ
Wt
/
Ăŵ
ŽŶ
ŐƉ
ŽƉ
Ƶů
ĂƟ
ŽŶ

ag
ed
 1
5-
 6
4 
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
 
 
South-West Asia
HIGH PWID, LOW HIV
HIGH PWID, HIGH HIV
TABLE 3.  Estimated number and prevalence (percentage) of HIV among people who inject drugs, 
2013
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire; progress reports of UNAIDS on the global AIDS response (various years), the 
former Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV and Injecting Drug Use; estimates based on UNODC data; and national govern-
ment reports. 
Note: Numbers are rounded to the nearest 10,000.   
Region Subregion
HIV among people who inject drugs
Estimated number Prevalence (percentage) 
Best estimatelow best high
Africa 30,000 112,000 1,582,000 11.2
America 167,000 237,000 416,000 8.4
North America 141,000 182,000 248,000 8.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 26,000 55,000 168,000 7.3
Asia 344,000 576,000 993,000 12.6
Central Asia and Transcaucasia 26,000 31,000 40,000 7.5
East and South-East Asia 211,000 329,000 612,000 10.5
South-West Asia 90,000 196,000 314,000 29.3
Near and Middle East 1,000 3,000 9,000 3.8
South Asia 17,000 17,000 18,000 6.8
Europe 373,000 724,000 1,428,000 19.7
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe 322,000 665,000 1,359,000 22.8
Western and Central Europe 51,000 59,000 69,000 7.6
Oceania 1,000 1,000 2,000 1.0
GLOBAL 915,000 1,651,000 4,421,000 13.5
8PREMATURE DEATH IS COMMON AMONG PEOPLE WHO INJECT DRUGS
Compared with the general population, PWID are at an elevated risk of dying, primarily as a result of the trans-
mission of infectious diseases, in particular HIV, and of fatal drug overdoses. A recent systematic review of cohort 
studies that followed PWID over timea suggests that they experience a high mortality rate. The overall (pooled) 
mortality rate across the 65 cohort studies from 25 countries estimated a mortality rate of 2.35 deaths per 100 
person-years (if 100 PWID were followed over one year, two to three deaths would be expected to occur among 
this group). This is a much higher level of mortality than among those of comparable age and gender among the 
general population (standardized mortality ratio = 14.68). 
Asia is the region with the largest estimated population of PWID, accounting for more than one in three PWID 
globally. Albeit based on a very limited number of studies, at 5.25 deaths per 100 person-years, the region also 
experiences a high mortality rate from injecting drugs. By contrast, ﬁndings from ﬁve other studies in Australia 
suggest that the level of mortality among PWID is low in Australia, at 0.71 deaths per 100 person-years. 
The mortality rate was observed to be higher among males who inject drugs (MWID). Based on 37 studies, MWID 
were found to have a mortality rate 1.32 times that of females who inject drugs (FWID). However, based on 19 
studies, FWID had a greater excess mortality than MWID when compared with similar age groups in the general 
population. Across 43 studies, the crude mortality rate among PWID from overdose was estimated at 0.62 deaths 
per 100 person-years.  
Continuity of treatment and the length of time spent in treatment can have an impact in reducing overdoses 
among PWID. Data from six studies showed a risk of dying some 2.5 times higher for PWID during off-treatment 
periods compared with in-treatment time periods. 
Effective evidence-based interventions can now be identiﬁed for prevention, treatment and care of HIV for PWID,b 
including needle and syringe programmes, opioid substitution therapy, antiretroviral therapy and the availability 
of naloxone. For example, a recent systematic reviewc highlighted the importance of opioid substitution therapy, 
ﬁnding that it is associated with an average 54 per cent reduction in the risk of new HIV infection among PWID, 
largely by reducing the frequency of unsafe injecting; this is ultimately very likely to reduce the number of deaths 
among PWID. However, the availability of evidence-based interventions targeting PWID, including opioid substitu-
tion therapy, varies considerably across countries and is generally limited even in countries with a high prevalence 
of PWID and high proportions of PWID who are living with HIV.d
a Bradley M. Mathers and others, “Mortality among people who inject drugs: a systematic review and meta-analysis”, Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, vol. 91, No. 2 (2013), pp. 102-123.
b WHO, UNODC, UNAIDS Technical Guide for Countries to Set Targets for Universal Access to HIV Prevention, Treatment and Care for Injecting 
Drug Users: 2012 Revision (Geneva, WHO, 2012).
c Georgie J. MacArthur and others, “Opiate substitution treatment and HIV transmission in people who inject drugs: a systematic review and 
meta-analysis”, BMJ, vol. 345 (4 October 2012), pp. 1-16.
d UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
Mortality rates among people who inject drugs and the increase in mortality among people who  
inject drugs compared with the general population
Source: Mathers and others, “Mortality among people who inject drugs” (2013).
Note: The numbers within brackets on the horizontal axis represent the number of cohort studies.
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The Russian Federation is affected by a concentrated HIV 
epidemic among PWID. Approximately one in three 
PWID living with HIV worldwide are estimated to reside 
in the Russian Federation, which experiences both a high 
prevalence and a high incidence14 (new cases) of HIV 
among PWID. However, across cities in the Russian Fed-
eration there is a very large variation in the HIV prevalence 
among PWID. A study carried out in eight cities in the 
period 2007-2009 showed percentages of PWID living 
with HIV ranging from levels below 10 per cent in Voro-
nezh (3 per cent) and Omsk (9 per cent), to around 15 
per cent in Naberezhnye Chelny (13 per cent), Chely-
abinsk and Orel (both 15 per cent), to around 60 per cent 
in Irkutsk (57 per cent), Saint Petersburg (59 per cent) 
and Yekaterinburg (64 per cent).15 
The prevalence of HIV among PWID can vary markedly 
between cities (see figure 7) and certain cities and settings 
around the world that carry a large proportion of the 
global burden of HIV are becoming a focus of attention 
in the global response to the HIV epidemic,16 with the 
geographically localized nature of HIV epidemics and the 
role of cities and settings, such as prisons, increasingly 
being seen as critical considerations. 
14 Federal Research and Methodological Centre for Prevention and 
Control of AIDS, HIV Infection: Newsletter No. 38 (Moscow, 2013).
15 K. Eritsyan and others, “Individual level, network-level and city-
level factors associated with HIV prevalence among people who 
inject drugs in eight Russian cities: a cross-sectional study”, BMJ, 
vol. 3, No. 6 (2013).
16 UNAIDS, The Cities Report (Geneva, 2014).
Availability of harm reduction services 
remains low 
In many countries, the levels of service coverage for needle 
and syringe programmes, opioid substitution therapy and 
antiretroviral therapy remain low, as defined according to 
targets set by WHO, UNODC and UNAIDS (see figure 
8).17 The proportion of countries reporting these services 
as either not available or at low levels of coverage are 47 
per cent, 41 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. Most 
of the countries reporting information on service coverage 
are in Europe where the levels of service coverage are rela-
tively high. Outside Europe the level of access to these 
services is much lower.18 
A recent review19 of the global coverage of services for 
needle and syringe programmes, opioid substitution ther-
apy and antiretroviral therapy shows that 91 countries 
include the provision of harm reduction programmes in 
17 The WHO, UNODC, UNAIDS Technical Guide for Countries to Set 
Targets for Universal Access to HIV Prevention, Treatment and Care for 
Injecting Drug Users: 2012 Revision recommends a comprehensive 
package of nine interventions, aimed at reducing the risk of acquir-
ing, and improving the treatment and care of HIV, hepatitis and 
tuberculosis in people who inject drugs, commonly referred to as a 
“harm reduction approach” to injecting drug use.
18 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
19 Harm Reduction International, The Global State of Harm Reduction 
2014, Katie Stone, ed. (London, 2014).
FIG. 7. Prevalence of HIV among people who 
inject drugs in selected cities
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire;  
progress reports of UNAIDS on the global AIDS response (various 
years); the former Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV 
and Injecting Drug Use; and national government reports.
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online version of this report.
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their national policies, but that at the global level, harm 
reduction responses related to unsafe injecting remain 
poor. Needle and syringe programmes were available in 
90 countries in 2014 (out of the 158 countries where 
injecting drug use has been documented), an increase of 
five since 2012, although the nature of these programmes 
varies considerably. In many low- and middle-income 
countries, however, they do not provide an adequate cov-
erage to be fully effective. Since 2012, there has been a 
scale-up of needle and syringe services in 29 countries, but 
in 13 others the provision of services has actually decreased. 
Opioid substitution therapy was available in 80 countries 
in 2014, an increase of two since 2012. In many countries, 
however, opioid substitution therapy programmes remain 
at levels below international minimum guidelines. Since 
2012, 25 countries have seen a scale-up of opioid substi-
tution therapy, but in five others services have declined.
Progress towards realizing the commit-
ments made in the Political Declaration 
on HIV and AIDS
The Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS20 adopted 
by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/262 in 2011 
included a commitment by Member States to work 
towards reducing the transmission of HIV among PWID 
by 50 per cent by 2015. Some progress towards realizing 
this commitment can be noted. Globally, new HIV infec-
tions among PWID have declined slightly (by around 10 
per cent) from an estimated 110,000 (range: 97,000-
123,000) in 2010 to 98,000 (range: 85,000-111,000) in 
2013.21 Although the accumulated evidence collected over 
the past 30 years points to the effectiveness of harm reduc-
tion measures,22 the implementation of such programmes 
remains at very low levels of coverage in many regions of 
the world.23 
Globally, every other person who injects 
drugs is living with hepatitis C
Hepatitis C has the potential to pose serious health prob-
lems for those infected, with the possibility of liver failure, 
liver cancer and premature death. While an estimated 2.2 
per cent of the global population are infected with hepa-
titis C,24 this proportion is 25 times higher among PWID, 
20 Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: Intensifying Our Efforts 
to Eliminate HIV and AIDS (General Assembly resolution 65/277, 
annex).
21 UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, “Halving HIV  
transmission among people who inject drugs: background note”, 
UNAIDS/PCB (35)/14.27, 25 November 2014.
22 David P. Wilson and others, “The cost-effectiveness of harm reduc-
tion”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 26, Suppl. No. 1 
(2015), pp. S5-S11.
23 Bradley M. Mathers and others “HIV prevention, treatment, and 
care services for people who inject drugs: a systematic review of 
global, regional, and national coverage”, The Lancet, vol. 375, No. 
9719 (2010), pp. 1014-1028.
24  The Global Burden of Hepatitis C Working Group, “Global burden 
estimated at 52 per cent for 2013, or 6.3 million PWID 
worldwide. This joint UNODC/WHO/UNAIDS/World 
Bank estimate is based on information from 88 countries. 
Although new or updated information from 36 countries 
has been included, the global estimate is essentially 
unchanged from that presented in the World Drug Report 
2014.
In some countries, the prevalence of hepatitis C among 
PWID is considerably higher, including in countries with 
large PWID populations (see figure 9). Of these 88 coun-
tries, the prevalence of hepatitis C among PWID is 60 per 
cent or higher in 29 countries (33 per cent), including in 
China, where there were an estimated 1.93 million PWID 
in 2012,25 70 per cent or higher in 19 countries (22 per 
cent), including the United States, where there were an 
estimated 1.52 million PWID in 2007,26 and 80 per cent 
or higher in 10 countries (11 per cent).
of disease (GBD) for hepatitis C”, Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 
vol. 44, No. 1 (2004), pp. 20-29.
25 China National Centre for AIDS/STD Control and Prevention, 
2012.
26 Barbara Tempalski and others, “Trends in the population prevalence 
of people who inject drugs in US metropolitan areas 1992-2007”, 
PLOS ONE, vol. 8, No. 6 (2013).
FIG. 9. Number of countries, by prevalence  
of hepatitis C among people who  
inject drugs 
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire;  
progress reports of UNAIDS on the global AIDS response (various 
years); the former Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV 
and Injecting Drug Use; and national government reports.
Note: Total number of countries with data on hepatitis C prevalence 
among PWID is 88.
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Being aware of one’s hepatitis C status is important for 
access to treatment and also in preventing transmission of 
the infection to others. As shown in a recent systematic 
review, a high proportion of PWID are unaware that they 
are living with hepatitis C and, among those known to be 
infected, there is a low uptake of antiviral treatment in 
many European countries.27 The study indicated that the 
level of undiagnosed infection of hepatitis C among PWID 
was high, with a median of 49 per cent (range: 24-76 per 
cent), while among PWID diagnosed with hepatitis C, 
the proportion that had started antiviral treatment was 
generally low, ranging from 1 to 19 per cent with a median 
of 9.5 per cent. The burden of disease from hepatitis C 
infection (such as liver disease and mortality), where 
assessed, was high and the authors of the study concluded 
that it would rise in the decade from 2014. 
Drug-related deaths are predominantly 
related to opioid overdose
With regard to the most serious outcome that can result 
from illicit drug use, UNODC estimates that in 2013 
there were 187,100 (range: 98,300-231,400) drug-related 
deaths28 worldwide, corresponding to a mortality rate of 
40.8 (range: 21.5-50.5) drug-related deaths per million 
people aged 15-64.
27 L. Wiessing and others, “Hepatitis C virus infection epidemiology 
among people who inject drugs in Europe: a systematic review of 
data for scaling up treatment and prevention”, PLOS ONE, vol. 9, 
No. 7 (2014).
28 The definition of drug-related deaths varies between Member States 
but includes some or all of the following: fatal drug overdoses; 
deaths due to HIV acquired through injecting drug use; suicide; 
and unintentional deaths and trauma due to illicit drug use.
Overdose is the primary cause of drug-related deaths 
worldwide and opioids (heroin and non-medical use of 
prescription opioids) are the main drug type implicated 
in these deaths. Drug overdoses, with opioids present in 
about three quarters of the cases, are estimated to account 
for 3.5 per cent of all deaths among Europeans aged 
15-39.29 
In Europe, the highest drug-related mortality rates are 
found in the most northerly countries and territories with 
(in descending order of mortality rates and considering 
only countries and territories with a population aged 
15-64 of 500,000 or greater) Estonia, Scotland, Finland, 
Sweden, Northern Ireland, the Russian Federation, 
Norway and Ireland all experiencing mortality rates of 
over 70 drug-related deaths per million of the population 
aged 15-64. In all of these countries, opioids were the drug 
type most frequently mentioned as the primary cause of 
death. 
Contributing an estimated 23 per cent to the global 
number of drug-related deaths, North America experiences 
the highest drug-related mortality rate by far. Within the 
region, the United States reports one of the highest drug-
related mortality rates worldwide at 4.6 times the global 
average and, with 40,239 drug-related deaths recorded in 
2013, accounts for approximately one in five drug-related 
deaths globally. The high mortality rate in North America 
in part reflects better monitoring and reporting of drug-
related deaths than in most other regions.
29 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014.
TABLE 4. Estimated number of drug-related deaths and drug-related mortality rates, 2013
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire; Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission; Louisa Degenhardt and 
others, “Illicit drug use”, Comparative Quantification of Health Risks: Global and Regional Burden of Disease Attributable to Selected 
Major Risk Factors, vol. 1, M. Ezzati and others, eds. (Geneva, World Health Organization, 2004), p.1109.
Note: For further information, see the methodology section in the online version of this report.   
 Region
Number of drug-related 
deaths
Mortality rate per million 
aged 15-64
Availability of  
mortality data 
(percentage of 
total population  
in region)
best  
estimate
lower 
estimate
upper 
estimate
best  
estimate
lower 
estimate
upper 
estimate
Africa  37,800  18,000  57,700 61.9 29.4 94.3
North America  43,300  43,300  43,300 136.8 136.8 136.8 100.0
Latin America and the  
Caribbean
 6,000  4,900  10,900 18.4 14.9 33.4 80.0
Asia  81,100  13,600  100,700 28.2 4.7 35.0 9.0
Western and Central Europe  7,300  7,300  7,300 22.5 22.5 22.5 100.0
Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe
 9,500  9,500  9,500 41.5 41.5 41.5 92.0
Oceania  2,000  1,700  2,100 82.3 69.9 83.3 75.0
GLOBAL  187,100  98,300  231,400 40.8 21.5 50.5
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Heroin-related overdoses show recent 
increases in the United States
Substantial increases have recently been reported in the 
number of heroin overdoses in the United States (see figure 
12). Mortality rates have nearly tripled from 1.0 to 2.7 
heroin overdose deaths per 100,000 of the population 
between 2010 and 2013; this reflects an increase in the 
number of heroin-related deaths from 3,036 to 8,52730 
(see also section on opiates). 
Deaths related to new psychoactive sub-
stances are on the rise in the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, there has been much recent media attention over 
deaths relating to the use of new psychoactive substances 
(NPS). Over the past few years in England and Wales, the 
number of drug-related deaths in which NPS or so-called 
“legal highs” (predominantly methcathinones such as 
mephedrone, which has been controlled as a Class B drug 
under the United Kingdom Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 
since April 2010) have been mentioned on death certifi-
cates has continually increased, from nine deaths in 2007 
to 60 deaths in 2013.31 There is very limited information 
available on the toxicology of NPS and the overdose risk 
30 H. Hedegaard, L. H. Chen and M. Warner, “Drug poisoning 
deaths involving heroin: United States, 2000-2013”, NCHS Data 
Brief No. 190 (Hyattsville, Maryland, National Center for Health 
Statistics, March 2015).
31  United Kingdom, Office for National Statistics, “Deaths related to 
drug poisoning in England and Wales, 2013”, Statistical Bulletin 
(September 2014).
from the use of these substances, alone or in combination 
with other drugs (including alcohol), is largely unknown.
Non-fatal overdoses are a common 
experience among drug users
While there has been a focus on overdose fatalities, non-fatal 
overdose among illicit drug users remains fairly common 
yet relatively undocumented. A number of studies have been 
conducted to understand the extent, patterns, determinants 
and correlates of non-fatal overdose, especially among regu-
lar opioid users and those injecting drugs; these studies sug-
gest that between 30 and 80 per cent of the study participants 
have experienced an overdose in their drug-using career, 
nearly half of whom had experienced multiple overdoses in 
recent months.32,33,34,35,36 While the absence of specific 
assistance is largely at play, it would seem that in some cases 
victims of such incidents may fear the consequences of 
revealing their illicit drug use or may lack confidence in the 
health-care system.37,38 A number of studies have estimated 
that 1 in 20 or 25 overdose cases are fatal, with a cumula-
tive risk of death increasing with each successive 
overdose.39,40,41 
Non-fatal overdose remains of public health significance 
because of its related morbidity and serious consequences, 
including pulmonary oedema, bronchopneumonia, periph-
eral neuropathy, renal failure, cognitive impairment and 
traumatic injuries sustained during overdose.42,43 Repeated 
32 S. Darke, J. Ross and W. Hall, “Overdose among heroin users 
in Sydney, Australia: I. Prevalence and correlates of non-fatal 
overdose”, Addiction, vol. 91, No. 3 (1996), pp. 405-411. 
33  M. Karbakhsh and N. Salehian Zandi, “Acute opiate overdose in 
Tehran: the forgotten role of opium”, Addictive Behaviors, vol. 32, 
No. 9 (2007), pp. 1835-1842.
34 A. Bergenstrom and others, “A cross-sectional study on prevalence 
of non-fatal drug overdose and associated risk characteristics among 
out-of-treatment injecting drug users in North Vietnam”, Substance 
Use and Misuse, vol. 43, No. 1 (2008), pp. 77-84.
35 P. Davidson and others, “Witnessing heroin-related overdoses: the 
experiences of young injectors in San Francisco”, Addiction, vol. 97, 
No. 12 (2002), pp. 1511-1516.
36 L. Yin and others, “Nonfatal overdose among heroin uses in south-
western China”, The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 
vol. 33, No. 4 (2007), pp. 505-516.
37 B. Fischer and others, “Determinants of overdose incidents 
among illicit opioid users in 5 Canadian cities”, Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, vol. 171, No. 3 (2004), pp. 235-239.
38 M. Warner-Smith, S. Darke and C. Day, “Morbidity associated 
with non-fatal heroin overdose”, Addiction, vol. 97, No. 8 (2002), 
pp. 963-967.
39 EMCDDA, Annual Report 2010 (Lisbon, November 2010).
40 A. Tokar and T. Andreeva, “Estimate of the extent of opiate 
overdose in Ukraine”, Tobacco Control and Public Health in Eastern 
Europe, vol. 2, No. 3 (2012).
41 S. Darke, R. P. Mattick and L. Degenhardt, “The ratio of non-fatal 
to fatal overdose”, Addiction, vol. 98, No. 8 (2003), pp. 1169-1170.
42 Warner-Smith, Darke and Day, “Morbidity associated with non-
fatal heroin overdose” (see footnote 38).
43 Shane Darke and Wayne Hall, “Heroin overdose: research and 
evidence-based intervention”, Journal of Urban Health, vol. 80, No. 
2 (2003), pp. 189-200.
FIG. 10. Deaths related to heroin and  
opioid painkillers in the United States, 
2000-2013
Source: H. Hedegaard, L. H. Chen and M. Warner, “Drug poison-
ing deaths involving heroin”, NCHS Data Brief No. 190 (2015).
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overdoses also place the person at a greater risk of long-term 
physical and cognitive damage, while survivors of a non-
fatal overdose have a higher risk of suffering further over-
dose and death.44 
The risk of overdose varies depending on different fac-
tors.45 Overdoses are reported in users with longer opioid 
use or long-term injecting, who are older, who are more 
likely to have been treated for drug dependence and who 
have a higher level of dependence on the severity of 
dependence scale.46,47 Overdoses are associated with 
higher drug purity; higher frequency of use — almost daily 
use or binge use of drugs;48 and polydrug use, particularly 
the use of amphetamines, cocaine, alcohol or benzodiaz-
epines in conjunction with opioids, especially while inject-
ing. The role of polydrug use in opioid overdose, for 
instance with benzodiazepines, essentially reflects a phar-
macological interaction in the form of an additive respira-
tory depressant effect.49 
Temporary cessation of drug use following periods of drug 
detoxification, hospitalization, arrest or imprisonment 
leads to decreased drug tolerance. When drug use is reini-
tiated, there is an increased risk of overdose. Importantly, 
enrolment in opioid substitution therapy would seem to 
protect from non-fatal overdose: in a study among PWID 
conducted between 1996 and 2004 in Vancouver, Canada, 
it was the only variable that was shown to be inversely 
associated with non-fatal overdose.50 Similarly, social mar-
ginalization or homelessness, together with living with 
HIV, have also been associated with overdose episodes, 
though evidence of a causal association has not been 
established.51 
Overdose is preventable
Despite the high prevalence of non-fatal overdoses and the 
associated morbidity, scant attention has been given inter-
nationally to overdose reduction interventions. Overdose-
related deaths are preventable. Along with long-term 
44 S. Darke and others, “Patterns of nonfatal heroin overdose over a 
3-year period: findings from the Australian Treatment Outcome 
Study”, Journal of Urban Health, vol. 84, No. 2 (2007), pp. 283-
291.
45 A. R. Bazazi and others, “High prevalence of non-fatal overdose 
among people who inject drugs in Malaysia: correlates of overdose 
and implications for overdose prevention from a cross-sectional 
study”, International Journal of Drug Policy (2014).
46 Darke, Ross and Hall, “Overdose among heroin users in Sydney” 
(see footnote 32).
47 Bergenstrom and others, “A cross-sectional study on prevalence of 
non-fatal drug overdose” (see footnote 34).
48 Bazazi and others, “High prevalence of non-fatal overdose among 
people who inject drugs in Malaysia” (see footnote 45).
49 EMCDDA, Annual Report 2010.
50 T. Kerr and others, “Predictors of non-fatal overdose among a 
cohort of polysubstance-using injection drug users”, Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, vol. 87, No. 1 (2007), pp. 39-45.
51 Traci G. Green and others, “HIV infection and risk of overdose:  
a systematic review and meta-analysis”, AIDS, vol. 26, No. 4  
(20 February 2012), pp. 403-417.
opioid agonist (substitution) treatment, the availability 
and accessibility of naloxone is another important inter-
vention in cases of overdose. Naloxone is an opioid antago-
nist that can immediately reverse the effects of opioid 
overdose.52 As many overdoses occur in the presence of the 
drug user’s family members or peers, empowering these 
people with the skills to administer naloxone can be a lifesav-
ing intervention. 
C. GENDER, DRUG USE AND HEALTH 
CONSEQUENCES 
Use of drugs, except tranquillizers, is 
more prevalent in men than in women
Compared with drug use among men, overall drug use 
remains low among women. At the global level, men are 
three times more likely than women to use cannabis, 
cocaine or amphetamines. By contrast, women are more 
likely than men to misuse prescription drugs, particularly 
prescription opioids and tranquillizers.53,54 This mainly 
reflects differences in opportunities to use drugs due to 
the influence of the social or cultural environment rather 
than intrinsic gender vulnerability.55 
A large body of evidence has shown that processes of drug-
use initiation, social factors and characteristics related to 
substance use, biological responses and progression to the 
development of problems related to substance use vary 
considerably between men and women.56 Women with 
substance-use disorders tend to have a history of over-
responsibility in their families of origin and have experi-
enced more disruptions and report more interpersonal 
conflicts in the family than their male counterparts, par-
ticularly issues related to parenting and exposure to child-
hood and adult trauma. Women with substance-use 
disorders may come from families where one or more 
family members is also drug dependent and may have suf-
fered victimization and injury. Many women identify rela-
tionship problems as a cause for their substance use. In 
addition, psychiatric co-morbidities, especially mood and 
anxiety disorders, are reported to be higher among 
52 See also UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
53 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
54 Christine E. Grella, “From generic to gender-responsive treatment: 
changes in social policies, treatment services, and outcomes of 
women in substance abuse treatment”, Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 
vol. 40, SARC Suppl. No. 5 (2008), pp. 327-343.
55 Michelle L. Van Etten and J. C. Anthony, “Male-female differences 
in transitions from first drug opportunity to first use: searching for 
subgroup variation by age, race, region, and urban status”, Journal 
of Women Health and Gender Based Medicine, vol. 10, No. 8 (2001), 
pp. 797-804.
56 Ellen Tuchman, “Women and addiction: the importance of gender 
issues in substance abuse research”, Journal of Addictive Diseases, vol. 
29, No. 2 (2010), pp. 127-138.
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women57,58 and these disorders typically predate the onset 
of substance-use problems.59 
Literature on gender differences published over the past 
three decades has shown that women typically begin using 
substances later than men and that substance use by 
women is strongly influenced by intimate partners who 
also use drugs.60 Women overall may be less likely than 
men to develop drug-use disorders and dependence. Nev-
ertheless, once they have initiated substance use, women 
tend to increase their rate of consumption of alcohol, can-
nabis, opioids and cocaine more rapidly than men61 and 
may progress more quickly than men to the development 
of drug-use disorders and dependence.62,63 In the United 
States, for instance, males were reported to be 2.33 and 
2.25 times more likely to have had drug-use disorders and 
drug dependence, respectively, than females in the previ-
ous year.64,65 
In most surveys among the general population, a greater 
misuse of prescription drugs is reported among women 
than among men, with the difference in the use of seda-
tives and tranquillizers being more marked than in the 
use of prescription opioids or painkillers. Thus, women 
are twice as likely as men to use tranquillizers, but both 
have roughly equal levels of use of prescription opioids. 
Survey data from South America, Western and Central 
Europe and North America indicate that, in comparison 
with the use of most illicit substances, the extent of the 
misuse of tranquillizers at all levels, whether lifetime, 
annual or current (past 30 days), remains at a higher level 
among women than among men: for example, the aggre-
gated past-year misuse of tranquillizers by women in 
Western and Central Europe is nearly twice that of can-
nabis use, while the use of other substances such as 
amphetamine, cocaine and opioids remains at very low 
levels (see figure 11). 
57 Ibid.
58 D. Stewart and others, “Similarities in outcomes for men and 
women after drug misuse treatment: Results from the National 
Treatment Outcome Research Study (NTORS)”, Drug and Alcohol 
Review, vol. 22, No. 1 (2003), pp. 35-41.
59 Kathleen T. Brady and Carrie L. Randall, “Gender differences in 
substance use disorders”, Psychiatric Clinics of North America, vol. 
22, No. 2 (1999), pp. 241-252.
60 Ibid.
61 Jill B. Becker and Ming Hu, “Sex differences in drug abuse”, 
Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology, vol. 29, No. 1 (2008), pp. 36-47.
62 Carla A. Green, “Gender and use of substance abuse treatment 
services”, Alcohol Research and Health, vol. 29, No. 1 (2006), pp. 
55-62.
63 Grella, “From generic to gender-responsive treatment” (see footnote 
54).
64 W. M. Compton and others, “Prevalence, correlates, disability, and 
comorbidity of DSM-IV drug abuse and dependence in the United 
States: results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol 
and Related Conditions”, Archives of General Psychiatry, vol. 64, No. 
5 (2007), pp. 566-576.
65 Dorte Hecksher and Morten Hesse, “Women and substance use 
disorders”, Mens Sana Monographs, vol. 7, No. 1 (2009), pp. 50-62. 
Research has shown that while many people experiment 
with drug use, not many will repeat the experience on 
more than a limited number of occasions and even fewer 
of them will continue into more regular drug use. This is 
illustrated by the sharp decline observed when comparing 
lifetime with annual and current (past month) drug use. 
In the case of the misuse of sedatives and tranquillizers, 
this rate of attrition seems to be much lower than for other 
substances. Data from general population surveys in West-
ern and Central Europe show that more than a third of 
men and women who initiate the misuse of tranquillizers 
continue to be regular or current users, whereas 17 per 
cent of men and 10 per cent of women may continue to 
FIG. 11. Gender differences in the use of  
selected drugs, 2013 (or latest  
available data)
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Unweighted average of lifetime, past-year and past-month preva-
lence in adults (aged 15-64), based on 28 countries in Western and 
Central Europe and six countries in South America.
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be regular cannabis users. Considering the high prevalence 
of the misuse of tranquillizers among women, this remains 
a significant problem. 
Women who inject drugs are often 
more vulnerable to HIV than their male 
counterparts 
The available data on gender disaggregated HIV preva-
lence among PWID point to the existence of gender 
disparities that are quite large in some countries (see figure 
13). Data reported to UNAIDS66 show that FWID expe-
rience a higher prevalence of HIV in many countries with 
large populations of PWID (over 120,000), including 
India, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine. Additionally, in some other countries with a high 
prevalence of HIV among PWID, such as Indonesia, 
Kenya, Mauritius and Thailand, the prevalence of HIV is 
also higher among FWID. Females constitute sizeable 
minorities of the PWID populations in many countries, 
where, for example, 33 per cent of PWID in Canada are 
female, while this figure is 30 per cent in the Russian Fed-
eration, 26 per cent in Ukraine, 20 per cent in China and 
66 UNAIDS, AIDSinfo database.
FIG. 12. Ratio of annual and past-month  
prevalence to lifetime prevalence of 
drug use among women in Western 
and Central Europe, 2013 (or latest 
year available)
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
Note: Unweighted average of lifetime, past-year and past-month preva-
lence in adult females (aged 15-64), based on 28 countries in Western 
and Central Europe.
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FIG. 13. Prevalence of HIV among females who inject drugs compared with prevalence of HIV among 
males who inject drugs (latest year available)
Source: UNAIDS, progress reports on the global AIDS response.
Note: Each circle represents a country. The solid circles are those countries with large numbers (over 120,000) of people who inject drugs. Data were 
available for 61 countries across all global regions.
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10 per cent in Malaysia.67,68 Furthermore, in many coun-
tries the prevalence of HIV among females in prison is 
higher than among male prisoners.69 
A review of 117 studies from 14 countries with a high 
prevalence of HIV among PWID (greater than 20 per cent) 
found an overall higher prevalence of HIV among FWID 
compared with MWID, although the difference was quite 
modest.70 There was also a very wide variation across the 
studies. In all 10 studies with the largest differences in HIV 
prevalence between FWID and MWID, the original 
authors point to sexual transmission as the reason for the 
difference. Similarly, combined data for nine countries in 
Europe found an overall prevalence of HIV among FWID 
of 21.5 per cent compared with 13.6 per cent among 
MWID.71 Again the differences across the countries were 
marked. In countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where in the 
general population females are more affected by HIV than 
males, HIV among FWID is particularly high compared 
with MWID: in Kenya, although FWID were few in 
number, the HIV prevalence is almost three times higher 
(44.5 per cent) than among MWID (16.0 per cent);72 in 
the United Republic of Tanzania, HIV among FWID (66.7 
per cent) is more than double that among MWID (29.9 
per cent);73 in Senegal, HIV among FWID (21.1 per cent) 
is three times higher than among MWID (7.5 per cent);74 
in South Africa, HIV among FWID (17 per cent) is 
slightly higher than among MWID (14 per cent);75 and 
67 Richard H. Needle and Lin Zhao, HIV Prevention among Injecting 
Drug Users: Strengthening U.S. Support for Core Interventions, a 
report of the CSIS Global Health Policy Center (Washington, 
D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies Global Health 
Policy Center, 2010). 
68 S. Pinkham, B. Myers and C. Stoicescu, “Developing effective harm 
reduction services for women who inject drugs”, The Global State of 
Harm Reduction: Towards an Integrated Response, Claudia Stoicescu, 
ed. (London, Harm Reduction International, 2012).
69 WHO, UNODC and UNAIDS, Effectiveness of Interventions 
to Address HIV in Prisons, Evidence for Action Technical Papers 
(Geneva, WHO, 2007).
70 Don C. Des Jarlais and others, “Are females who inject drugs at 
higher risk for HIV infection than males who inject drugs: an 
international systematic review of high seroprevalence areas”, Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 124, Nos. 1 and 2 (2012), pp. 95-107. 
71 EMCDDA, Annual Report 2006: The State of the Drugs Problem in 
Europe (Lisbon, November 2006).
72 UNODC/ICHIRA, “Rapid situational assessment of HIV 
prevalence and risky behaviours among injecting drug users in 
Kenya” (Nairobi, July 2012).
73 Anna Bowring and others, Assessment of Risk Practices and Infectious 
Disease among Drug Users in Temeke District, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania: A Rapid Assessment and Response, prepared for Médecins 
du Monde — France (Melbourne, Australia, Centre for Population 
Health, Burnet Institute, 2011).
74 Enquête de prévalence et de pratiques à risques d’infection à VIH, 
VHB, et VHC chez les usagers de drogues dans la région de Dakar 
(Senegal), Étude ANRS 1224, rapport final (Paris, Agence Nationale 
de Recherche sur le Sida et les hépatites virales (ANRS), février 
2014).
75 Andrew Scheibe, Ben Brown and Monika dos Santos, Rapid 
Assessment of HIV Prevalence and HIV-related Risks among People 
Who Inject Drugs in Five South African Cities: Final Report (February 
2015).
in Nigeria HIV among FWID (21.0 per cent) is seven 
times higher than among MWID (3.1 per cent).76 By 
contrast, a review of 11 studies from five countries in Cen-
tral Asia found no overall gender differences in the HIV 
prevalence among PWID, but again there was consider-
able variation among the studies.77
There have been multiple reasons proposed why FWID 
may be at greater risk of becoming infected with HIV than 
their male counterparts.78,79 Females are more likely to be 
stigmatized and marginalized by society and are more 
likely to hide their injecting drug-use behaviour. Unsafe 
injecting practices may be more common among females 
given the greater difficultly in accessing needle and syringe 
programmes or treatment for drug dependence and the 
lack of services tailored to women’s needs.80 Surveys have 
documented high rates of sex work among FWID (often 
to support their own, as well as their sexual partner’s, drug 
use), and of inconsistent condom use, as well as higher 
rates of sharing of needles and syringes than among FWID 
who are not involved in sex work.81,82,83 The combined 
risks of unsafe injecting and unprotected sex work sub-
stantially elevates the risks of acquiring HIV for females. 
One common feature that emerges from the different 
reviews and is seen in the data from UNAIDS is that the 
gender differences observed in individual surveys show a 
very wide variability. This highlights that local context is 
very important in the implementation of prevention pro-
grammes that are targeted and gender sensitive to cater for 
the separate needs of males and females where these needs 
are different.
76 Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Health, HIV Integrated Biological and 
Behavioural Surveillance Survey (IBBSS) 2010 (Abuja, 2010). 
77 Don C. Des Jarlais and others, “Gender disparities in HIV infection 
among persons who inject drugs in Central Asia: a systematic 
review and meta-analysis”, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 132, 
Suppl. No. 1 (2013), pp. S7-S12.
78 UNODC, “HIV/AIDS prevention and care for female injecting 
drug users” (Vienna, July 2006).
79 Sophie Pinkham, Claudia Stoicescu and Bronwyn Myers, 
“Developing effective health interventions for women who inject 
drugs: key areas and recommendations for program development 
and policy”, Advances in Preventive Medicine, vol. 2012 (2012).
80 UNODC/UN-Women/WHO/International Network of People 
who Use Drugs, policy brief on “Women who inject drugs and 
HIV: addressing specific needs” (Vienna, 2014).
81 Jing Gu and others, “Prevalence and factors related to syringe 
sharing behaviours among female injecting drug users who are also 
sex workers in China”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 22, 
No. 1 (2011), pp. 26-33.
82 Sara Croxford and others, “Sex work amongst people who inject 
drugs in England, Wales and Northern Ireland: findings from a 
National Survey of Health Harms and Behaviours”, International 
Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 26, No. 4 (2015), pp. 429-433.
83 A. Roberts, B. Mathers and L. Degenhardt, Women Who Inject 
Drugs: A Review of Their Risks, Experiences and Needs (Sydney, 
National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, 2010).
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Women are less likely than men to 
access drug treatment 
The problems that women experience as a result of drug 
use may interfere in more areas of their life than in men’s. 
The severity of the medical consequences of substance use 
and psychiatric co-morbidities are also reportedly higher 
among women. However, a convergence of evidence sug-
gests that women with substance use disorders are less 
likely, over their lifetime, to enter treatment than their 
male counterparts, as they are more likely to face barriers 
that affect their access and entry to drug treatment.84,85 
Globally, one out of three drug users is a woman yet only 
one out of five drug users in treatment is a woman, 
although this ratio is higher in Europe and Oceania 
(mainly reflecting Australia) than elsewhere. A higher pro-
portion of women is, however, reported in the case of 
treatment for the misuse of tranquillizers and prescription 
opioids than other substances. Approximately one third 
of those in treatment for the use of tranquillizers are 
women, compared with approximately 10 per cent in the 
case of cannabis. This is most likely a reflection of the 
84 Shelly F. Greenfield and others, “Substance abuse treatment entry, 
retention, and outcome in women: a review of the literature”, Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 86, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-21.
85 Tuchman, “Women and addiction” (see footnote 56).
comparatively higher prevalence of use of tranquillizers 
among women than among men.
Gender disparities in access to substance-use treatment 
have mainly been associated with the limited availability 
of services tailored to meet the specific needs of women 
in treatment. As there remains limited information about 
women with substance-use problems, there is still a general 
lack of appropriate evidence-based treatment models for 
women, especially in resource-constrained countries.86
Women encounter significant systemic, structural, social, 
cultural and personal barriers in accessing substance abuse 
treatment.87,88 At the structural level, the most significant 
obstacles include lack of child care and punitive attitudes 
to parenting and pregnant women with substance abuse 
problems. This makes women fear losing custody of their 
children or having to relinquish their children as a condi-
tion of treatment, and prevents them from seeking treat-
86 Substance Abuse Treatment and Care for Women: Case Studies and 
Lessons Learned (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.04.XI.24).
87 Erick G. Guerrero and others, “Barriers to accessing substance 
abuse treatment in Mexico: national comparative analysis by 
migration status”, Substance Abuse Treatment Prevention and Policy, 
vol. 9 (July 2014).
88 United Kingdom, National Treatment Agency for Substance 
Misuse, “Women in drug treatment: what the latest figures reveal” 
(London, 2010).
FIG. 14. Proportion of women in treatment for various substances, by region (2013 or latest  
available data)
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire.
Note: Unweighted average of proportion of women in all drug treatment per primary substance of use.
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ment in residential settings. Treatment programmes may 
also be located far from where women live and may have 
inflexible admission requirements and schedules that may 
not suit the needs of women.89,90 Moreover, women with 
children may still need to secure child care to participate 
in outpatient treatment programmes as they may not have 
enough money to pay for child-care costs, transportation 
or treatment itself. Although men may be referred for treat-
ment by their family, an employer or the criminal justice 
system, treatment history among women is more associ-
ated with and triggered by other problems, such as a diag-
nosis of antisocial personality disorder, or sex work, and 
could be referred by the social services system, mental 
health facilities or self-initiated, rather than solely due to 
substance abuse.91
In many societies, substance use both in general and 
among women is heavily stigmatized and cultural norms 
may make it difficult for women to acknowledge such a 
problem or leave their homes and families to undergo 
treatment. Since many women with substance-use prob-
lems also live with a partner or other family members with 
a substance-use problem, relationship issues and the role 
of substance use within the relationship dynamic remain 
central issues in women obtaining support to undergo 
treatment.92 A growing body of evidence suggests that 
drug treatment services that attend to social needs and 
other gender-specific needs as well as those of ethnic 
groups can contribute to engagement, retention in treat-
ment and improved treatment outcomes.93
D. DRUG USE PREVENTION 
What works in drug use prevention?
Prevention of drug use is one of the key provisions of 
international drug control systems. Aimed at protecting 
the health of people from harm caused by the non-medical 
use of controlled substances while ensuring availability of 
those substances for medical and scientific purposes,94 
drug use prevention encompasses any activity focused on 
preventing or delaying the initiation of drug use and the 
potential transition to problem drug use.
89 Erick G. Guerrero and others, “Gender disparities in utilization and 
outcome of comprehensive substance abuse treatment among racial/
ethnic groups”, Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, vol. 46, No. 5 
(2014), pp. 584-591.
90 Grella, “From generic to gender-responsive treatment” (see footnote 
54).
91 See, for example, United Kingdom, “Women in drug treatment: 
what the latest figures reveal” (see footnote 88), and Tuchman, 
“Women and addiction” (see footnote 56).
92 Grella, “From generic to gender-responsive treatment” (see footnote 
54).
93 See footnotes 54, 88 and 89.
94 Article 4, paragraph (c), and article 38, paragraph 1, of the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and articles 5 and 20 of the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971.
Compared with treatment for drug dependence, for exam-
ple, the science behind drug use prevention started to 
develop only relatively recently. In 2013, UNODC pub-
lished the International Standards on Drug Use Preven-
tion, which summarize the scientific evidence on the 
effectiveness of drug use prevention efforts. Notwithstand-
ing some notable gaps in the base of evidence, UNODC 
was able to identify a series of interventions and policies 
that are effective in preventing drug use, substance abuse 
and other risky behaviours.95 Building on the Interna-
tional Standards, including recent reviews of the evi-
dence96 and relevant single studies, this section outlines 
the possibilities and opportunities for success in preventing 
drug use that reside in the implementation of evidence-
based interventions. 
In this section, general conclusions about the effec-
tiveness of prevention programmes are drawn from 
reviews that summarise the results of numerous single 
studies. To demonstrate the potential impact of spe-
ciﬁc effective prevention interventions, the results of 
high-quality single efﬁcacy studies are presented. The 
selection criteria were that the studies utilized research 
methods to eliminate alternative explanations of inter-
vention effects (using intervention and control groups 
that were randomized) and had long-term follow-up 
of the intervention and control groups. 
Basics of prevention 
There is no single cause of drug use and addiction. Drug 
use should be seen as an unhealthy behaviour linked to 
the developmental process. Although most drug use starts 
in adolescence, at least half of adolescents never experi-
ment with drugs and some 20 per cent of them report 
past-month use of cannabis.97 In this context, it is impor-
tant to note that what occurs during adolescence very 
much depends on what happened earlier on in an indi-
vidual’s development, during childhood and early adoles-
cence. For this reason, as shown below, drug prevention 
efforts can and should be targeted at earlier ages than 
adolescence. 
In addition, vulnerability to drug use is due to a variety 
of factors, whether stemming from the individual or from 
developmental contexts (see figure 15). The interplay 
between these factors ultimately either increases or attenu-
ates an individual’s vulnerability to substance use. This is 
95 UNODC, International Standards on Drug Use Prevention, 2013.
96 A. Bühler and J. Thrul, Expertise zur Suchtprävention: Aktualisierte 
und erweiterte Neuauflage der Expertise zur Prävention des Substan-
zmissbrauchs, Forschung und Praxis der Gesundheitsförderung, 
Band 46 (Cologne, Germany, Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche 
Aufklärung, 2013).
97 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
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FIG. 15. Factors increasing vulnerability to drug use
Drug use is a developmental, multi-causal process influenced by the interplay of many risk and protective factors from 
different developmental contexts. The more distinct the risk factor, the greater the likelihood of drug use. In contrast, 
protective factors buffer the impact of risk factors.
Source: National Research Council and Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Preventing Mental, Emotional, and Behavioral  
Disorders among Young People: Progress and Possibilities (Washington, D.C., The National Academies Press, 2009).
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why there is no “silver bullet” remedy for prevention, 
although multi-causality also offers many starting points 
for preventive activity. Evidence of different prevention 
interventions in settings significant to the target group — 
family, school, workplace, community, media and leisure 
settings — are presented in this section. These contexts 
are embedded in the wider society, where cultural norms 
and drug policies may also facilitate or discourage drug 
use. Indeed, as factors that promote drug use (such as 
availability of the drug or poor parenting and neglect) are 
often beyond the control of the individual, prevention 
works best if it acts both at the individual level and on the 
developmental contexts within which individuals evolve. 
Individuals and groups vary in their risk of developing 
drug use because of its multi-causal nature. Groups with 
a higher risk, such as children with a substance dependent 
parent, should be approached in a different manner to 
population groups in which the majority does not tend to 
use psychoactive substances, such as school pupils. Preven-
tion programming takes this into account by providing 
strategies for the population at large (universal prevention), 
for groups that are particularly at risk (selective preven-
tion) and for individuals that are particularly at risk (indi-
cated prevention, which also includes individuals that 
might have started experimenting and are therefore at par-
ticular risk of progressing to disorders). The impact of an 
intervention or policy depends on its effectiveness and 
how well it reaches the target group. 
In many individuals, drug use is often only one of a 
number of risky behaviours that share several vulnerability 
factors. For example, many of the risk factors linked to 
substance use are also linked to outcomes such as violence, 
dropping out of school and risky sexual behaviour. Drug 
prevention addressing these common risk factors is thus 
also effective in preventing other risk behaviours.98 Simi-
larly, preventing other problem behaviour may yield posi-
tive results in preventing substance use.99 
Although problem behaviour and drug use peak in 
adolescence100,101 they can be linked to very different 
developmental pathways. If it starts at all, problem behav-
iour starts during adolescence in the majority of youths, 
who then grow out of it during early adulthood. In such 
cases, drug use can be seen in the context of an unhealthy 
means of coping with developmental tasks and pressures 
98 UNODC, International Standards on Drug Use Prevention (2013).
99 P. Rohde and others, “Reduced substance use as a secondary benefit 
of an indicated cognitive-behavioral adolescent depression preven-
tion program”, Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, vol. 26, No. 3 
(2012), pp. 599-608.
100 A. L. Stone and others, “Review of risk and protective factors of 
substance use and problem use in emerging adulthood”, Addictive 
Behaviors, vol. 37, No. 7 (2012), pp. 747-775.
101 H. U. Wittchen and others, “Cannabis use and cannabis use 
disorders and their relationship to mental disorders: a 10-year 
prospective-longitudinal community sample of adolescents”, Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 88, Suppl. No. 1 (2007),  
pp. S60-S70.
specific to adolescence. By contrast, for a minority prob-
lem behaviour starts early and, if not addressed, is highly 
likely to persist throughout their lifetime. Such individuals 
are often characterized by a difficult temperament and 
externalizing or internalizing behaviours during child-
hood. Their drug use, which often begins in early adoles-
cence, may be perceived as an expression of yet another 
facet of unhealthy behaviour that will change its charac-
teristics over their lifetime. 
The same behaviour (drug use in adolescence) thus has 
different sources — an observation to be considered when 
planning a prevention intervention. Figure 16 depicts dif-
ferent developmental pathways of cannabis use among 
students in the United States,102 among whom a minority 
of early and persistent frequent users was identified 
(chronic users), whereas the majority only rarely or tem-
porarily used cannabis or did not use cannabis at all. To 
test the differential perspective, researchers compared the 
early and chronic users to the remaining sample with 
regard to problems in other substance use (i.e. other than 
cannabis), problem behaviours and well-being. Chronic 
users were different in several ways, which supports the 
idea that they experience more (and ongoing) difficulties 
than other youths. In particular, during their high school 
years they achieved lower grades and had lower college 
aspirations, and had lower school attendance rates and 
worked more hours. Later, in early adulthood, they were 
less likely to be married, have children or have graduated 
from college, and were more likely to experience 
unemployment.
The developmental notion of drug use behaviour implies 
that prevention should incorporate not only drug-specific 
components, but also skills that help individuals to deal 
effectively with the challenges of each phase of life, such 
as relationship skills for adolescents or parenting skills for 
parents. In fact, drug prevention is aimed at supporting 
the safe and healthy development of children and youth, 
but may also include, when relevant, additional aspects 
specifically related to drugs around the age of drug use 
initiation.
Drug-specific prevention in younger population groups 
often targets tobacco and alcohol rather than other drugs. 
An understanding of drug use from a developmental per-
spective also explains why this kind of early prevention is 
a way to prevent substance use in young adulthood, 
including illicit drug use (such as cannabis or other drugs). 
First of all, epidemiological research indicates that one 
rarely finds a drug user without previous or concurrent 
use of tobacco or alcohol.103,104 Secondly, a large number 
102 J. Schulenberg and others, “Trajectories of marijuana use during 
the transition to adulthood: the big picture based on national panel 
data”, Journal of Drug Issues, vol. 35, No. 2 (2005), pp. 255-280.
103 EMCDDA, “Polydrug use: patterns and responses”, Selected issue 
2009 (Lisbon, November 2009).
104 K. M. Keyes, S. S. Martin and D. S. Hasin, “Past 12-month and 
lifetime comorbidity and poly-drug use of ecstasy users among 
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of studies have shown that the earlier the use of a specific 
substance is initiated, the more likely it is that substance 
use disorders related to the specific substance are devel-
oped. Cross-substance analyses are rare, but in a high-
quality study, a younger age at first alcohol and nicotine 
use was directly relevant for later initiation of cannabis 
use.105 Thirdly, prevention effectiveness studies show that 
long-term preventive effects on use of cannabis, opioids, 
cocaine, “ecstasy”, methamphetamines, non-prescription 
medicine or LSD in young adulthood can be explained 
by the fact that the participants of the programme initi-
ated any substance use less often or less intensively in 
adolescence.106,107 Figure 17 illustrates a simplified model 
of long-term effectiveness in which participants in a family 
programme stayed on a less progressive track of drug use. 
Settings for drug prevention and  
specific approaches that work
Family
The family-oriented prevention approach targets the set-
ting that is most influential on the development of chil-
dren and adolescents in general. Similarly, long-term 
observational studies tell us how important parental behav-
young adults in the United States: results from the National Epi-
demiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions”, Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, vol. 97, Nos. 1 and 2 (2008), pp. 139-149.
105 S. Behrendt and others, “The relevance of age at first alcohol and 
nicotine use for initiation of cannabis use and progression to can-
nabis use disorders”, Drug Alcohol Dependence, vol. 123, Nos. 1-3 
(2012), pp. 48-56.
106 R. L. Spoth and others, “Universal intervention effects on substance 
use among young adults mediated by delayed adolescent substance 
initiation”, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 77, 
No. 4 (2009), pp. 620-632.
107 R. L. Spoth and others, “Replication RCT of early universal preven-
tion effects on young adult substance misuse”, Journal of Consulting 
Clinical Psychology, vol. 82, No. 6 (2014), pp. 949-963.
iour and attitudes are with regard to drug use, from preg-
nancy to young adulthood. 
Examples of effective drug prevention efforts show that 
they start by providing adequate support to future parents 
who are burdened by their own drug use disorder, other 
mental health conditions or a socioeconomically disad-
vantaged life situation. Pregnancy is experienced as a time 
of uncertainty, but is also seen as a potential turning point 
towards a healthier lifestyle. Thus, prevention can take 
advantage of this special situation and (a) offer help with 
the various issues that these vulnerable groups are con-
cerned with, and (b) motivate them to change their drug 
use behaviour. Positive preventive outcomes have been 
observed among children whose mothers were treated for 
substance use disorder and received parenting training 
FIG. 16. Different trajectories of cannabis use in late adolescence and young adulthood
Source: Schulenberg and others, “Trajectories of marijuana use” (2005).
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during pregnancy.108 Similarly, prenatal and infancy visits 
during which a trained nurse or social worker supports 
parents in need of help with health, housing, employment 
or legal issues, in addition to parenting challenges, have 
proved to be effective in improving the child’s behaviour 
when it reaches adolescence.109 
Training programmes focused on parenting skills are a 
powerful tool, not only for populations at risk but also in 
the general population. In these programmes all parents 
are encouraged to raise their children in a warm and 
responsive manner and to become involved in their chil-
dren’s lives and learn how to communicate effectively with 
their children and enforce rules and limits. Drug-specific 
content in these programmes pertains to the parents’ own 
substance use and, depending on the child in question’s 
developmental stage, the expectations the parents have 
about the child’s substance use and how to communicate 
about drug issues. Such interventions achieve positive pre-
ventive outcomes in the short and long run with regard 
to drug use and other problem behaviour.110,111
108 A. Niccols and others, “Integrated programs for mothers with sub-
stance abuse issues and their children: a systematic review of studies 
reporting on child outcomes”, Journal of Child Abuse and Neglect, 
vol. 36, No. 4 (2012), pp. 308-322.
109 Richard L. Spoth, Mark Greenberg and Robert Turrisi, “Preventive 
interventions addressing underage drinking: state of the evidence 
and steps toward public health impact”, Pediatrics, vol. 121, Suppl. 
No. 4 (2008), pp. S311-S336.
110 Jane Petrie, Frances Bunn and Geraldine Byrne, “Parenting pro-
grammes for preventing tobacco, alcohol or drugs misuse in chil-
dren <18: a systematic review”, Health Education Research, vol. 22, 
No. 2 (2007), pp. 177-191.
111 E. Smit and others, “Family interventions and their effect on ado-
lescent alcohol use in general populations: a meta-analysis of ran-
domized controlled trials”, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 97, 
No. 3 (2008), pp. 195-206.
Family programmes go one step further, by adding a child 
and family component to the parenting training. While 
parents are working on parenting skills, their children or 
adolescents learn how to improve their social and resist-
ance skills, coping strategies, problem solving and deci-
sion-making. Specific to drugs, perceptions of the risks 
associated with use of drugs and social norms and attitudes 
towards drugs are discussed. Unique to this type of inter-
vention is a subsequent family session, during which fami-
lies are asked to communicate about controversial issues 
or resolve typical conflicts while organizing family leisure 
time. Family bonding activities are also part of the session. 
These programmes are expected to significantly lower the 
chance of initiating alcohol use (by roughly 30 per cent) 
and to reduce the frequency of alcohol use among partici-
pating adolescents.112 Rare long-term studies reveal that 
four years after the start of an intervention, participants 
had a 25 per cent less chance of alcohol use than if they 
had not participated in the family programme. With 
regard to other drugs, one programme produced an effect 
on the methamphetamine use of students in the twelfth 
grade.113 Although intervention effects are valid for girls 
and boys, as figure 18 indicates, the benefits appear to be 
even longer lasting for girls.114 
112 Ibid.
113 R. L. Spoth and others, “Long-term effects of universal preven-
tive interventions on methamphetamine use among adolescents”, 
Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, vol. 160, No. 9 
(2006), pp. 876-882.
114 L. Trudeau and others, “Longitudinal effects of a universal family-
focused intervention on growth patterns of adolescent internalizing 
symptoms and polysubstance use: gender comparisons”, Journal of 
Youth Adolescence, vol. 36, No. 6 (2007),  
pp. 725-740.
FIG. 18. Concurrent use of substances among adolescents in the United States who participated in a 
family programme
Source: Trudeau and others “Longitudinal effects of a universal family-focused intervention” (2007).
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These interventions may appear to require considerable 
resources in their implementation, yet they are worthwhile 
according to cost-effectiveness estimations in the United 
States.115 Moreover, less intensive family-oriented efforts 
have also been shown to initiate preventive changes, 
though on a smaller scale. Such efforts should actively 
involve parents as much as possible and include develop-
mental as well as drug-specific topics.116 
School and education
In drug prevention, the school setting serves as an access 
path for measures promoting knowledge and personal and 
social skills of individuals to attenuate individual risk fac-
tors of drug use (see figure 15). However, targeting the 
school system itself also has preventive potential, if it suc-
ceeds in promoting school bonding as well as drug-free 
norms.
Pre-school development programmes not only improve 
cognitive skills and school readiness among children from 
underprivileged backgrounds, they also have an impact on 
tobacco and cannabis consumption during later adolescent 
years. Reducing cannabis consumption by between 7 and 
23 per cent has been achieved when providing these kinds 
of interventions to children at risk in kindergarten or pre-
school programmes.117 Figure 19 illustrates the results of 
a study in the United States,118 in which, at age 21, 
the rate of current cannabis use was lower among young 
adults who had participated in a pre-school development 
programme than among a group of young adults who 
had a similar childhood but were not involved in the 
programme.
At elementary school children benefit from a series of ses-
sions during which they learn and practise a wide range 
of personal and social skills to improve mental and emo-
tional well-being, as well as to help them cope with dif-
ficult situations.119,120 Due to the young age of this 
non-using, universal population, drugs are not yet men-
tioned, although preventive effects can be observed on 
aggressive behaviour and early smoking initiation, which 
115 T. Miller and D. Hendrie, Substance Abuse Prevention Dollars and 
Cents: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, DHHS publication No. (SMA) 
07-4298 (Rockville, Maryland, Center for Substance Abuse Preven-
tion, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
2008).
116 Petrie, Bunn and Byrne, “Parenting programmes for preventing 
tobacco, alcohol or drugs misuse in children <18” (see footnote 
110).
117 K. D’Onise, R. A. McDermott and J. W. Lynch, “Does attendance 
at preschool affect adult health? A systematic review”, Public Health, 
vol. 124, No. 9 (2010), pp. 500-511.
118 F. A. Campbell and others, “Early childhood education: young 
adult outcomes from the abecedarian project”, Applied Developmen-
tal Science, vol. 6, No. 1 (2002), pp. 42-57.
119 A. R. Piquero and others, Effects of Early Family/Parent Training Pro-
grams on Antisocial Behavior and Delinquency: A Systematic Review, 
Campbell Systematic Reviews (Oslo, The Campbell Collaboration, 
(2008)).
120 Spoth, Greenberg and Turrisi, “Preventive interventions addressing 
underage drinking” (see footnote 109).
are important predictors of later drug use. Participation 
in personal and social skills training during elementary 
school leads to a significant reduction in both these dimen-
sions of childhood problem behaviour121 compared with 
students in the control group.
Similarly, programmes that focus on improving the class-
room environment yield positive drug-specific preventive 
outcomes, even if the primary focus is on academic and 
socio-emotional learning as well as addressing misbehav-
iour. Teachers are required to implement non-instructional 
classroom procedures in daily practices with all students, 
who in turn are rewarded for appropriate classroom behav-
iour.122 Figure 21 illustrates that among young male adults 
from the United States the probability of substance-related 
disorders in early adulthood was significantly reduced 
by participation in a classroom behaviour management 
programme in first grade, particularly if they behaved 
aggressively at that time.123 There was no such effect in 
the case of females.
Psychosocial life-skills education in early and middle ado-
lescence is a prevention approach for a wide range of prob-
lem behaviours initiated in adolescence, including drug 
121 K. Maruska and others, “Influencing antecedents of adolescent 
risk-taking behaviour in elementary school: results of a 4-year quasi-
experimental controlled trial”, Health Education Research, vol. 25, 
No. 6 (2010), pp. 1021-1030.
122 David R. Foxcroft and Alexander Tsertsvadze, “Universal school-
based prevention programs for alcohol misuse in young people”, 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, No. 5, 2011.
123 S. G. Kellam and others, “Effects of a universal classroom behavior 
management program in first and second grades on young adult 
behavioral, psychiatric, and social outcomes”, Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, vol. 95, Suppl. No. 1 (2008), pp. S5-S28.
FIG. 19. Cannabis use, teenage pregnancy and 
tertiary education among young adults 
who participated in a pre-school  
intervention 
Source: Campbell and others, “Early childhood education” 
(2002).
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use.124,125,126 Most programmes include interactive exer-
cises to improve several personal or social skills, such as 
self-awareness, creative thinking, relationship skills, prob-
lem solving, decision-making and coping with stress and 
emotions. Specifically with regard to substances, awareness 
of social influences on drug use is enhanced through criti-
cal thinking exercises. Creative thinking is used to identify 
functional alternatives to drug use and communication 
124 F. Faggiano and others, “School-based prevention for illicit drugs 
use: a systematic review”, Preventive Medicine, vol. 46, No. 5 
(2008), pp. 385-396.
125 Amy J. Porath-Waller, Erin Basley and Douglas J. Beirnes, “A meta-
analytic review of school-based prevention for cannabis use”, Health 
Education and Behavior, vol. 37, No. 5 (2010), pp. 709-723.
126 Foxcroft and Tsertsvadze, “Universal School-Based Prevention Pro-
grams for Alcohol Misuse in Young People” (see footnote 122).
skills are built so as to increase assertiveness in resisting 
offers of drugs. Drug information focuses on short-term 
negative consequences and on normative education (that 
is, addressing the often exaggerated perception that ado-
lescents have with regard to prevalence of drug use among 
their peers). Analysis combining the results of studies 
(meta-analysis calculations) on the effects of school-based 
illicit drug use prevention programmes estimated 28 per 
cent less cannabis use as a result of prevention pro-
grammes.127 Greater effects were obtained when pro-
grammes targeted adolescents aged 14 or older, included 
elements from various prevention models incorporating 
social learning, information and value-clarification, used 
127 Porath-Waller, Basley and Beirnes, “A meta-analytic review of 
school-based prevention for cannabis use” (see footnote 125).
FIG. 20. Trajectories of internalizing and externalizing problem behaviour among students in  
Germany who received ongoing personal and social skills training in elementary school
Source: Maruska and others, “Influencing antecedents of adolescent risk-taking behaviour in elementary school” (2011).
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FIG. 21. Probability of subsequent development of a drug-related disorder depending on participation 
in a classroom behaviour management programme in ﬁrst grade
Source: Kellam and others, “Effects of a universal classroom behavior management program” (2008).
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interactive methods, had more sessions, were of longer 
duration and were mediated by persons other than teach-
ers. The life-skills approach also serves as an effective drug 
prevention tool for older adolescents with higher vulner-
ability for substance use, such as students who are consid-
ered at-risk of not graduating at the normal pace.128 
These results corroborate the qualitative conclusion of a 
systematic review suggesting that “programs which develop 
individual social skills are the most effective form of 
school-level intervention for the prevention of early drug 
use” (cannabis and other drug use).129 In contrast, pre-
senting children with fear-arousing information is ineffec-
tive in this particular age group, as is focusing only on 
building self-esteem or emotional education.130 It has been 
estimated that if adolescents aged 10 to 15 years receive a 
comprehensive programme, per month they drink alcohol 
on 12 days less and use cannabis on 7 days less than if they 
receive drug information only.131 Figure 22 illustrates how 
a comprehensive positive development programme shaped 
illegal drug use among participants in Hong Kong, 
China.132 
Computer-based universal prevention programmes with-
out any teacher involvement have also been implemented 
in the school setting and have yielded effects in terms of 
less smoking and less alcohol use among participants.133 
Fully automated software leads students through a series 
of sessions in which they identify social influences and are 
animated to correct their false perceptions of social norms. 
Internet-based programmes of this kind may work outside 
the school context as well, but reaching the target group 
may be a challenge. 
In a study in the United Kingdom, middle-school students 
with an elevated risk level due to certain personality fac-
tors benefited from personal and social skills training tai-
lored to the specific developmental challenges caused by 
their behavioural tendencies.134 Figure 23 shows how sub-
stance use developed for ninth graders with elevated scores 
in anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness, impulsivity and sensa-
tion seeking and therefore with elevated risk for drug use, 
128 Spoth, Greenberg and Turrisi, “Preventive interventions addressing 
underage drinking” (see footnote 109).
129 Faggiano and others, “School-based prevention for illicit drugs use: 
a systematic review” (see footnote 124).
130 Ibid.
131 M. Lemstra and others, “A systematic review of school-based mari-
juana and alcohol prevention programs targeting adolescents aged 
10-15”, Addiction Research and Theory, vol. 18, No. 1 (2010), pp. 
84-96.
132 Daniel T. L. Shek and Lu Yu, “Longitudinal impact of the project 
PATHS on adolescent risk behavior: what happened after five 
years?”, The Scientific World Journal, vol. 2012 (2012).
133 K. E. Champion and others, “A systematic review of school-based 
alcohol and other drug prevention programs facilitated by com-
puters or the Internet”, Drug and Alcohol Review, vol. 32, No. 2 
(2012), pp. 115-123.
134 P. J. Conrod and others, “Effectiveness of a selective, personality-
targeted prevention program for adolescent alcohol use and misuse”, 
JAMA Psychiatry, vol. 70, No. 3 (2013), pp. 334-342.
depending on whether they were offered a tailored inter-
vention or not. The two-session programme included goal-
setting exercises, education about coping strategies typical 
for those personality traits and healthy alternatives, behav-
ioural management and changing dysfunctional beliefs 
that often accompany such traits. Although alcohol and 
drug use were only a minor focus of the intervention, 
problem drinking was less probable among participants 
after the intervention.
Apart from implementing individual-oriented interven-
tions, preventive effects can also be achieved by targeting 
the general climate and drug-specific rules of schools. Feel-
ing left out motivates people to act against conventional 
norms. As a major socializing agent, the school system has 
the potential to integrate marginalized students and facili-
tate positive development. With children at risk, school-
bonding activities to improve school attendance and 
attachment to school, in addition to promoting learning 
of age-appropriate language and numeracy skills, may have 
a positive influence in terms of developing important pro-
tective factors for students in middle childhood.135,136 
Overall, interventions that promote a positive school ethos 
and enhance student participation and commitment to 
school, conjointly with rules that strongly discourage drug 
135 P. Lucas and others, “Financial benefits for child health and well-
being in low income or socially disadvantaged families in developed 
world countries”, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, No. 2 
(2008).
136 A. Petrosino and others, Interventions in Developing Nations for 
Improving Primary and Secondary School Enrollment of Children: A 
Systematic Review, Campbell Systematic Reviews, No. 19 (2012).
FIG. 22. Extent of illicit drug use among  
adolescents who participated  
in a school-based positive youth  
development programme at age 12
Source: Shek and Yu, “Longitudinal impact of the project PATHS 
on adolescent risk behavior” (2012).
Note: Graph shows the extent of illicit drug use among adolescents in 
Hong Kong, China, who participated at age 12 in a school-based posi-
tive youth development programme compared with the extent of illicit 
drug use among those who did not participate.
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use, may be an effective complement to drug prevention 
interventions addressing individual knowledge, attitudes 
and skills. The few existing studies show that this seems 
to work, especially for boys and for early adolescents.137,138 
The consistent implementation of jointly developed 
behavioural standards with regard to drug use for all 
groups involved in school life, shapes social norms among 
students. By contrast, there is no evidence of preventive 
effects from random drug-testing at schools.139,140
A significant number of young adults (the age group with 
the highest drug use rates in high income countries) can 
be reached in tertiary education settings. Moving away 
from home to college is often paralleled by increased 
substance use (see figure 15). Alcohol prevention measures, 
which are effective with this at-risk group of young people, 
are brief interventions. These interventions encourage a 
person to document and reflect on his or her own 
consumption patterns and provide feedback on the 
person’s status relative to use of substances by peers. Brief 
interventions are effective when they are implemented in 
a face-to-face or computer-assisted format, as well as in 
137 C. Bonell and A. Fletcher, “Improving school ethos may reduce 
substance misuse and teenage pregnancy”, BMJ, No. 334 (2007), 
pp. 614-616.
138 A. Fletcher, C. Bonell and J. Hargreaves, “School effects on young 
people’s drug use: a systematic review of intervention and observa-
tional studies”, Journal of Adolescent Health, vol. 42, No. 3 (2008), 
pp. 209-220.
139 A. M. Roche and others, “Drug testing in Australian schools: policy 
implications and considerations of punitive, deterrence and/or pre-
vention measures”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 20, No. 
6 (2009), pp. 521-528.
140 Daniel T. L. Shek, “School drug testing: a critical review of the lit-
erature”, Scientific World Journal, vol. 10 (2010), pp. 356-365.
individual or group formats.141,142,143,144 Interventions 
that challenge expectations of alcohol use are effective, 
especially with gender-homogeneous groups of college 
students.145 
Workplace
Prevention programmes in the workplace typically have 
multiple components, including drug prevention elements 
and policies, as well as counselling and referral to treat-
ment. Rigorous prevention effectiveness studies are rare 
in this setting; some have assessed individual interventions 
but none have evaluated comprehensive approaches aimed 
at changing the entire system.146 Evidence from single 
studies is available with regard to alcohol use and suggests 
that alcohol education and stress management interven-
tions, as well as personal or computer-based brief inter-
ventions, affect alcohol use or alcohol-related problems 
among employees. Availability of alcohol in the workplace 
is associated with alcohol use, so restricting access to alco-
hol and setting strict and unambiguous alcohol policies 
may prevent the drinking of alcohol before going to work, 
on the job and during breaks.
Community
The community can provide a preventive developmental 
context by setting clear standards with regard to the use 
of drugs, along with providing opportunities for adoles-
cents to learn skills and to contribute to community life 
and be recognized for their contribution. Opportunities, 
skills and recognition strengthen bonding with family, 
school and community. Tight bonds motivate young 
people to adopt healthy standards of behaviour.
Community-wide interventions for the general 
population
Preventive effects were evidenced in programmes that 
incorporate multiple components in the community, espe-
cially when relating to alcohol but less consistently when 
141 J. M. Cronce and M. E. Larimer, “Individual-focused approaches 
to the prevention of college student drinking”, Alcohol Research and 
Health, vol. 34, No. 2 (2011), pp. 210-221.
142 M. T. Moreira, L. A. Smith and D. Foxcroft, “Social norms inter-
ventions to reduce alcohol misuse in university or college students”, 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, No. 3 (2009).
143 K. B. Carey and others, “Computer-delivered interventions to 
reduce college student drinking: a meta-analysis”, Addiction, vol. 
104, No. 11 (2009), pp. 1807-1819.
144 Robert J. Tait and Helen Christensen, “Internet-based interven-
tions for young people with problematic substance use: a systematic 
review”, Medical Journal of Australia, vol. 192, No. 11 (2010), pp. 
S15-S21.
145 Allison K. Labbe and Stephen A. Maisto, “Alcohol expectancy chal-
lenges for college students: a narrative review”, Clinical Psychology 
Review, vol. 31, No. 4 (2011), pp. 673-683.
146 G. Webb and others, “A systematic review of work-place 
interventions for alcohol-related problems”, Addiction, vol. 104, No. 
3 (2009), pp. 365-377.
FIG. 23. Problem drinking among students with 
a risk of drug use who participated in 
a short, tailored skills-based prevention 
programme
Source: Conrod and others, “Effectiveness of a selective, person-
ality-targeted prevention program” (2013).
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relating to tobacco and cannabis use.147,148,149 The mini-
mum set-up is a combined approach of a school and a 
family intervention embedded in the structure of an organ-
ized community coalition. The coalition decides which 
evidence-based programmes to implement in the com-
munity. Some programmes do this on the basis of assessing 
a need that has been indicated by a student survey on risk 
and protective factors.
A universal community prevention model that originated 
in the United States and has since become international, 
supports and trains local coalitions of stakeholders to select 
and implement evidence-based prevention programmes 
targeting community-specific elevated risks for problem 
behaviours among adolescents. Six and a half years after 
the project had begun, youths exposed to this community 
initiative were 31 per cent less likely to have ever used 
alcohol, cigarettes or cannabis.150 
Figure 24 indicates that cannabis use expands less and later 
during adolescence in university-school-community part-
nership districts in the United States. These districts pro-
vide a family programme in the sixth grade (13 to 14 
year-olds) and a life skills, social influence or normative 
147 Foxcroft and Tsertsvadze, “Universal School-Based Prevention Pro-
grams for Alcohol Misuse in Young People” (see footnote 122).
148 K. V. Carson and others, “Community interventions for preventing 
smoking in young people”, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 
No. 7 (2011).
149 S. Gates and others, “Interventions for prevention of drug use by 
young people delivered in non-school settings”, Cochrane Database 
of Systematic Reviews, No. 1. (2009).
150 J. D. Hawkins and others, “Youth problem behaviors 8 years after 
implementing the communities that care prevention system: a com-
munity-randomized trial”, JAMA Pediatrics, vol. 168, No. 2 (2014), 
pp. 122-129.
school programme in the seventh grade (14 to 15 year-
olds) delivered in the framework of a university-commu-
nity-school partnership.151 Figure 25 shows the difference 
in methamphetamine use in twelfth graders aged 19 to 20 
years depending on whether they were involved in both 
the family and the school programmes or only in the 
school programme within the community partnership, or 
were in a school district that was part of the control group. 
151 R. Spoth, and others, “PROSPER community-university partner-
ship delivery system effects on substance misuse through 6 1/2 years 
past baseline from a cluster randomized controlled intervention 
trial”, Preventive Medicine, vol. 56, Nos. 3 and 4 (2013), pp. 190-
196.
FIG. 24. Cannabis use among at-risk students from school districts implementing a family  
programme in sixth grade and life skills programme in seventh grade
Source: Spoth and others, “PROSPER community-university partnership delivery system effects on substance misuse” (2013).
Note: High risk among adolescents was initiation of alcohol, cigarette or cannabis use prior to baseline; low risk meant no initiation of substance use 
at baseline.
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FIG. 25. Extent of methamphetamine use 
among young adults who participated 
in a family and a life-skills training 
programme 
Source: Spoth and others, “Long-term effects of universal preven-
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(2006).
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Multi-sectorial interventions for vulnerable  
populations
Family-school approaches without a community compo-
nent that are specifically designed for children at risk are 
also effective. The most prominent individual predictor 
of later substance use disorders in childhood is disruptive 
behaviour facilitated, inter alia, by poor impulse- and self-
control and aggressiveness (see figure 26). From a devel-
opmental point of view, these characteristics hamper 
rewarding situations and relationships at school, in the 
family and with friends, and thus elevate the risk of aliena-
tion from conventional contexts. Alienated adolescents 
may have a tendency to turn to peers with deviant norms, 
which then facilitates maladaptive behaviour, including 
drug use. Therefore, targeting externalization of problems 
or disorders during childhood represents an important 
strategy for prevention not only of drug use but also of 
disruptive, antisocial and delinquent behaviours, as well 
as for addressing problems related to academic perfor-
mance and dropping out of school. These training pro-
grammes or treatments allow parental or even familial 
involvement to be effective. Figure 26 shows the effect of 
social skills training at school with boys aged 7 to 9 years 
that was combined with parenting training during family 
visits in late adolescence. Further results of the study sug-
gest that participants reported less drug use because of the 
programme’s support in lessening their impulsivity and 
antisocial behaviour and promoting making friends with 
less deviant peers. In addition, increased parental supervi-
sion contributed to the preventive effect of the 
programme.
Alcohol and tobacco policies
As mentioned in the preceding sections, a younger age at 
first alcohol and nicotine use was related with later initia-
tion of cannabis use; thus, the prevention of alcohol and 
tobacco use is also relevant to the prevention of drug use. 
In this context, policies that increase prices (and thus 
manipulate affordability) and restrict access to these sub-
stances have been found to be very effective. From a 
tobacco price increase of 10 per cent, a reduction of 4 per 
cent in tobacco consumption can be expected.152 Simi-
larly, a 10 per cent price increase is estimated to decrease 
heavy alcohol consumption by 5 per cent among older 
adolescents and even decrease binge drinking among 
young adults by between 9 and 35 per cent.153 In addi-
tion, study results in the United States consistently show 
that raising the minimum legal drinking age and enforcing 
its regulation reduces alcohol consumption and alcohol-
related accidents while lowering the legal drinking age 
increases use and related problems.154 
Leisure, sports and entertainment venues
Unlike school and family settings, recommendations for 
interventions in other areas of community life cannot be 
made based on the same level of evidence. The effective-
ness of specific drug prevention efforts in leisure settings, 
for example peer education programmes at festivals or 
activities in sports clubs, has not yet been studied in depth. 
This may be surprising as peer education programmes are 
widely used in drug prevention and other prevention 
domains.155 Sports clubs have been described as both a 
setting with great potential for promoting good health and 
a risk environment for drug use,156 but effectiveness stud-
ies are not available. Furthermore, providing low-resource-
intensive leisure activities to children and youths is a 
popular non-drug-specific prevention intervention, but 
these activities have not been empirically studied with 
regard to their effect in attenuating substance use or risk 
factors of substance use. Theoretically, they may in fact 
constitute an element of a healthy developmental context. 
Nevertheless, whether they yield drug use preventive 
effects remains unknown. Research on the effectiveness of 
152 D. P. Hopkins and others, “Reviews of evidence regarding 
interventions to reduce tobacco use and exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke”, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, vol. 20, 
No. 2, Suppl. No. 1 (2001), pp. 16-66.
153 R. W. Elder and others, “The effectiveness of tax policy 
interventions for reducing excessive alcohol consumption and 
related harms”, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, vol. 38, 
No. 2 (2010), pp. 217-229.
154 Alexander C. Wagenaar and Traci L. Toomey, “Effects of minimum 
drinking age laws: review and analyses of the literature from 1960 
to 2000”, Journal of Studies on Alcohol, Suppl. No. 14 (2002), pp. 
206-225.
155 A. Calafat, J. Montse and M. A. Duch, “Preventive interventions in 
nightlife: a review”, Adicciones, vol. 21, No. 4 (2009), pp. 387-414.
156 S. Geidne, M. Quennerstedt and C. Eriksson, “The youth sports 
club as a health-promoting setting: an integrative review of 
research”, Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, vol. 41, No. 3 
(2013), pp. 269-283.
FIG. 26. Differences in drug use among vulner-
able boys who participated in a skills 
training programme for students and 
their parents
Source: N. Castellanos-Ryan and others, “Impact of a 2-year mul-
timodal intervention for disruptive 6-year-olds on substance use in 
adolescence: randomised controlled trial”, The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, vol. 203, No. 3 (2013), pp. 188-195.
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after-school programmes that aim to promote personal 
and social skills points to the fact that risky behaviours in 
general, including drug use, can be prevented but only 
under certain conditions, that is, if they use a connected 
and coordinated set of activities, as well as interactive 
methods, have at least one component devoted to devel-
oping personal or social skills and explicitly target the skill 
in question.157 In this scenario, after-school programmes 
are more of a setting to deliver life skills education than a 
separate programme. 
Mentoring programmes are another approach among 
after-school programmes. Lay adults spend structured lei-
sure time with a child or adolescent on a weekly basis. 
With adolescents at average risk, modest preventive effects 
were observed for general risk behaviour, including drug 
use.158 Mentoring programmes for groups with a high 
proportion of minority and underprivileged adolescents 
can be expected to reduce the risk of alcohol use initiation 
among the mentees by 29 per cent, whereas effects on 
other drug use are rare.159 
Most prevention programmes utilizing entertainment 
venues have multiple components, including different 
combinations of training of staff and managers on respon-
sible beverage service and management of intoxicated 
patrons; changes in laws and policies, for example with 
regard to serving alcohol to minors or to intoxicated per-
sons or with regard to drinking and driving; high visibility 
enforcement of existing laws and policies; communication 
to raise awareness and acceptance of the programme and 
to change attitudes and norms; and offering treatment to 
managers and staff. Training of staff, policy interventions 
and enforcement may reduce intoxication.160,161 Although 
community support through training servers of beverages 
in nightlife settings or of vendors of cigarettes may succeed 
in educating commercial suppliers of alcohol and tobacco, 
preventive effects at the community level can only be 
expected to be successful if regulations are enforced, that 
is controlled and sanctioned.162,163,164
157 Joseph A. Durlak, Roger P. Weissberg and Molly Pachan, “A meta-
analysis of after-school programs that seek to promote personal 
and social skills in children and adolescents”, American Journal of 
Community Psychology, vol. 45, Nos. 3 and 4 (2010), pp. 294-309.
158 D. L. DuBois and others, “Effectiveness of mentoring programs 
for youth: a meta-analytic review”, American Journal of Community 
Psychology, vol. 30, No. 2 (2002), pp. 157-197.
159 R. E. Thomas, D. Lorenzetti and W. Spragins, “Mentoring 
adolescents to prevent drug and alcohol use”, Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews, No. 2 (2011).
160 L. Bolier and others, “Alcohol and drug prevention in nightlife 
settings: a review of experimental studies”, Substance Use and 
Misuse, vol. 46, No. 13 (2011), pp. 1569-1591.
161 I. Brennan and others, “Interventions for disorder and severe 
intoxication in and around licensed premises, 1989-2009”, 
Addiction, vol. 106, No. 4 (2011), pp. 706-713.
162 Bolier and others, “Alcohol and drug prevention in nightlife 
settings” (see footnote 160)
163 Lindsay F. Stead and Tim Lancaster, “Interventions for preventing 
tobacco sales to minors”, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 
No. 1 (2005).
164 Joseph R. DiFranza, “Which interventions against the sale of 
Health sector
The community health sector can prevent progression to 
substance use disorders (when it is in touch with individu-
als already using drugs) by providing brief interventions. 
In the few, short and structured sessions of these interven-
tions, trained health or social workers first identify whether 
there is a problem of substance use and then provide basic 
counselling or referral to additional treatment. Brief inter-
ventions work in many settings (school or medical or com-
munity-based treatment centres) if they target cannabis 
use and follow the motivational enhancement 
approach.165,166 It differs from other treatment interven-
tions in that its purpose is not to impart information or 
skills; rather, it picks the client’s general and drug-specific 
goals as a central theme for promoting ambivalence and 
readiness to change while supporting the person’s auton-
omy. Figure 27 demonstrates the effectiveness of a brief 
motivational intervention after 12 months, conducted in 
the United States by peer educators during a visit to a pae-
diatric emergency department, to negotiate abstinence or 
reductions in cannabis use and its related consequences 
among 14 to 21 year olds.167 Adolescents and young adults 
used cannabis less frequently if they received the brief 
motivational intervention.
tobacco to minors can be expected to reduce smoking?”, Tobacco 
Control, vol. 21, No. 4 (2012), pp. 436-442.
165 T. Carney and others, “Brief school-based interventions and 
behavioural outcomes for substance-using adolescents”, Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews, No. 2 (2014).
166 E. Barnett and others, “Motivational interviewing for adolescent 
substance use: a review of the literature”, Addictive Behaviors, vol. 
37, No. 2 (2012), pp. 1325-1334.
167 E. Bernstein and others, “Screening and brief intervention to 
reduce marijuana use among youth and young adults in a pediatric 
emergency department”, Academic Emergency Medicine, vol. 16, No. 
11 (2009), pp. 1174-1185.
FIG. 27. Frequency of cannabis use by adoles-
cents and young adults after receipt 
of a brief intervention in a paediatric 
emergency room 
Source: Bernstein and others, “Screening and brief intervention 
to reduce marijuana use among youth and young adults in a 
pediatric emergency department” (2009).
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Media
On a societal level, besides availability and affordability, 
norms favourable to drug use constitute a risk factor for 
drug use (see figure 15). As already described, affordability 
and availability may be influenced by enforcement of laws 
and regulations. Laws and regulations may also be under-
stood as formal expressions of social norms. Children, 
adolescents and young adults face norms of drug use infor-
mally by means of approval or disapproval expressed by 
peers, parents, teachers, neighbours and other community 
members. Media campaigns are a way to influence these 
informal social norms. Awareness campaigns or expanding 
media coverage to increase awareness of and focus on drug-
related issues are often one component of state or com-
munity programmes and there are positive indications 
regarding their effect on tobacco consumption.168 Never-
theless, campaigns cannot be expected to influence drug 
use behaviour directly. Although observational data suggest 
that methamphetamine deterrence campaigns in the 
United States are paralleled by a reduction in current drug 
use in the teenager cohort, these results are not corrobo-
rated by rigorous studies.169 Anti-illicit-drug public-ser-
vice announcements in traditional and new media 
demonstrated no significant effect on drug use in high 
quality effectiveness studies and may even be harmful by 
weakening anti-cannabis norms among young target 
groups.170 
The way forward
The scientific evidence reviewed and presented in this sec-
tion illustrates that effective and feasible interventions and 
policies are available for drug prevention. However, the 
gaps in both evidence and effectiveness research point to 
the fact that more evaluation of impact is needed. Reach-
ing those groups with heightened vulnerability remains a 
challenge, while the question of how to adapt interven-
tions developed in optimal conditions to real-life, local 
contexts has not yet been fully answered.
Many activities labelled as drug prevention are not evi-
dence-based, their coverage is limited and their quality 
unknown at best. Among other international organiza-
tions, UNODC has tried to fill this evidence gap through 
its International Standards on Drug Prevention, which 
clearly identify interventions and policies that work and 
the characteristics that are linked to positive prevention 
outcomes. In addition, the EMCDDA European Quality 
168 D. P. Hopkins and others, “Reviews of evidence regarding 
interventions to reduce tobacco use and exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke”, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, vol. 20, 
No. 2, Suppl. No. 1 (2001), pp. 16-66.
169 M. Ferri and others, “Media campaigns for the prevention of illicit 
drug use in young people”, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 
No. 6 (2013).
170 D. Werb and others, “The effectiveness of anti-illicit-drug public-
service announcements: a systematic review and meta-analysis”, 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, vol. 65, No. 10 
(2011), pp. 834-840.
Standards of Drug Prevention provide support in how to 
implement quality interventions and other remarkable 
tools have also been developed. 
In summary, countries need to move away from a model 
in which prevention of drug use is delivered by isolated 
but well-intentioned individuals who improvise in deliv-
ering interventions. Based on the specific situation, inter-
ventions should employ and expand the use of 
evidence-based tools systematically, supporting practition-
ers and policymakers in developing their knowledge, skills 
and competencies and building a critical mass of genuine 
prevention specialists capable of promoting the safe and 
healthy development of children, youth, families and com-
munities through effective prevention of drug use. 
E. TREATMENT OF DRUG USE
Treatment of drug use disorders and 
dependence
With an estimated global average of one in six people who 
suffer from drug-use disorders or drug dependence receiv-
ing treatment each year, it is clear that the accessibility and 
availability of services for such conditions are limited in 
most countries.171 The fact that this figure is approxi-
mately 1 in 18 in Africa, compared with 1 in 5 in Western 
and Central Europe, however, points to large disparities 
between regions. Not included in these figures is the large 
proportion of drug users who may not be dependent but 
may still require interventions to prevent an escalation in 
their disability and comorbidity related to drug use. 
Disparities between regions also exist in the principal drugs 
for which drug users receive treatment, with cannabis 
being the principal drug reported in Africa, cannabis, 
cocaine and to a lesser extent opioids in North America, 
and cocaine and cannabis in Latin America. In Asia, opi-
oids remain the principal drug type for which drug users 
receive treatment, followed by ATS and cannabis. In 
Europe, opioids are followed by cannabis, cocaine and 
ATS, while in Oceania cannabis is followed by opioids and 
ATS. It should be noted, however, that while treatment 
demand highlights the main substances of concern, it also 
reflects the nature of available drug treatment services. 
Although regional differences in the availability of differ-
ent interventions exist, psychosocial interventions, par-
ticularly counselling and social assistance services, are more 
readily accessible and available globally than other inter-
ventions. Indeed, more than a third of countries reported 
the availability of psychosocial, rehabilitation and aftercare 
services whereas less than a quarter reported the availability 
of pharmacological interventions (see figures 28-30).
171 Based on the responses to the annual report questionnaire on 
availability and coverage of drug treatment services. See also E/
CN.7/2015/3.
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It is difficult to determine the quality of different types of 
intervention available at the global level, but there is a 
greater level of pharmacological and psychosocial services 
and interventions in Europe than in other regions, par-
ticularly Western and Central Europe, where higher levels 
of opioid substitution also reflect the fact that opioids are 
the major substance for which drug users receive treatment 
in the region. In other regions, Governments may not yet 
be ready to address drug dependence with pharmacologi-
cally assisted treatment, leading to limited coverage of such 
programmes.
In Africa, the fact that counselling is more available than 
other types of intervention could be due to cannabis being 
the most common substance for which drug users receive 
treatment. However, most drug treatment services in the 
region are provided in specialized psychiatric hospitals, 
which may explain why there is a considerable number of 
interventions in the treatment of psychiatric comorbidities 
in Africa, although the lack of other types of intervention 
in Africa may also indicate limited responses to treatment 
needs in general. 
Not only are available services for the treatment of drug 
use disorders and dependence limited in most countries, 
there is an overall lack of provision of a continuum of care 
in interventions to address drug use disorders and drug 
dependence adequately among those in need of these inter-
FIG. 28. Global extent of drug dependence treatment services, by region
Source: Annual report questionnaire, part II (Member State responses on treatment of drug dependence in 2013).
FIG. 29. Global extent of drug dependence treatment services, by region
Source: Annual report questionnaire, part II (Member State responses on treatment of drug dependence in 2013).
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ventions. An outline of what drug treatment actually 
entails, particularly when considered a chronic condition, 
and how it should be measured for effectiveness is provided 
in this section. 
Philosophy of chronic care versus acute 
care: continuity of interventions
Scientific evidence indicates that the development of drug 
use disorders and dependence is a result of a complex 
multi-factorial interaction between repeated exposure to 
drugs and biological and environmental factors. In recent 
decades, important advances have been made in under-
standing drug dependence as a complex, multifaceted and 
relapsing chronic condition. Such a condition therefore 
requires continuing care and interventions from many 
disciplines.172 
These findings have led to increased interest in the devel-
opment of effective prevention and treatment strategies.173 
It is now known that drug use disorder is a preventable 
and treatable health problem, and effective, comprehensive 
and multidisciplinary interventions are available to 
respond to the different needs of affected individuals.174 
It is critically important, however, to appreciate the chronic 
nature of the disorder, together with the fact that chronic 
conditions cannot and should not be treated like acute 
disorders, for which contemporary medical science has 
provided indisputable evidence.175 
172 UNODC and WHO, “Principles of drug dependence treatment”, 
discussion paper, March 2008.
173 Michael Dennis and Christy K. Scott, “Managing addiction 
as a chronic condition”, Addiction Science and Clinical Practice 
Perspectives, vol. 4, No. 1 (2007), pp. 45-55.
174 Ibid.
175 A. Thomas McLellan and others, “Reconsidering the evaluation of 
addiction treatment: from retrospective follow-up to concurrent 
recovery monitoring”, Addiction, vol. 100, No. 4 (2005), pp. 447-
458.
There are fundamental differences in the philosophies 
relating to the treatment of acute and chronic conditions. 
Acute conditions such as bacterial infections, appendicitis 
and broken bones, tend to have a clearly identifiable cause 
(for example an infectious agent, physical trauma, etc.) 
and can be treated in a relatively short period of time. The 
symptoms of acute disorders may be intense and disrup-
tive, but people who are treated generally recover with no 
lasting deterioration of functional capabilities. An indi-
vidual may break another bone or get another infection, 
but this is considered a new occurrence, not a relapse. 
Treatment services for acute disorders are typically deliv-
ered in a series of isolated activities — screening, admis-
sion, single point-in-time assessment, treatment 
procedures, discharge and brief “aftercare” followed by the 
termination of the service relationship. The individual, 
family or community is given the impression at discharge 
that “cure has occurred”, which is often the case. Long-
term recovery is then self-sustainable without ongoing 
professional assistance.176,177 
By contrast, chronic health problems such as diabetes, 
asthma and hypertension are influenced by multiple bio-
logical, psychological and social factors, some of which 
cannot be clearly identified. Lifestyle or personal behav-
ioural choices are often intimately involved in the onset 
and course of these disorders.178 There are many effective 
treatments for chronic disorders, but they tend to be more 
complex and protracted than acute treatments and do not 
176 Y. I. Hser and others, “Drug treatment careers: a conceptual frame-
work and existing research findings”, Journal of Substance Abuse 
Treatment, vol. 14, No. 6 (1997), pp. 543-558.
177 R. L. Stout and others, “Optimizing the cost-effectiveness of alco-
hol treatment: a rationale for extended case monitoring”, Addictive 
Behaviors, vol. 24, No. 1 (1999), pp. 17-35.
178 Thomas Bien, William R. Miller and J. Scott Tonigan, “Brief inter-
vention for alcohol problems: a review”, Addiction, vol. 88, No. 3 
(1993), pp. 315-335.
FIG. 30. Global extent of drug dependence treatment services, by region
Source: Annual report questionnaire, part II (Member State responses on treatment of drug dependence in 2013).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
low medium high low medium high low medium high low medium high
Social assistance RehabilitaƟon and 
aŌer-care 
 VocaƟonal training EducaƟonal acƟviƟes on
drug use risks
Africa America Asia Europe
^ŽĐŝĂůƌĞŚĂďŝůŝƚĂƟŽŶĂŶĚĂŌĞƌͲĐĂƌĞ
N
um
be
r o
f M
em
be
r S
ta
te
s
CHAPTER I
Treatment of drug use 33
WORLD 
DRUG 
REPORT2015
often result in a “cure” or the same outcome as the treat-
ment of acute conditions. Yet multiple treatment interven-
tions for chronic conditions have been found to be very 
effective. Treatment of these chronic conditions share three 
important features:179 
(a) They can usually remove or reduce symptoms without 
necessarily removing the root causes of a disease. For 
example, beta blockers reduce blood pressure and insu-
lin improves the body’s ability to digest sugars, as long 
as the affected individual continues the treatment, i.e., 
continues taking the medicine; 
(b) Treatment of all chronic conditions requires significant 
changes in behaviour and lifestyle on the part of the 
patient in order to maximize their benefit. Again, even 
if individuals with diabetes regularly take their insulin 
as prescribed, the disease progression will continue if 
they do not also reduce their intake of sugar and in-
crease physical exercise; 
(c) Because of the complexity of the factors that can lead 
to a chronic illness and the need for ongoing medical 
care and lifestyle change, it is not surprising that re-
lapses are very likely to occur in all chronic illnesses.
For these reasons, most contemporary treatment strategies 
in chronic illness involve regular monitoring of medica-
tion adherence, coupled with encouragement and support 
for pro-health behavioural changes as well as support by 
trained family members, to provide continuing monitor-
ing and assistance for the behavioural changes necessary 
to sustain good quality of life. Consequently, “nothing 
less” must be provided or can be effective for the treatment 
of drug dependence than a qualified, systematic, science-
based approach, similar to treatment of other chronic 
health problems such as diabetes or hypertension.
Is drug treatment better than no 
treatment?
Effectiveness of treatment
For over four decades scientific research has shown that 
effective treatment for drug-use disorders has helped drug-
dependent individuals to halt their consumption, prevent 
relapse, reduce their involvement in crime, change other 
dysfunctional behaviour and make a positive contribution 
to their family and community.180 Effective treatment 
typically incorporates many components — pharmaco-
therapy, behavioural therapy and social support — each 
directed towards a particular aspect of the disorder and 
matching an individual’s particular problems and needs.181 
179 Sondra Burman, “The challenge of sobriety: natural recovery with-
out treatment and self-help programs”, Journal of Substance Abuse, 
vol. 9 (1997), pp. 41-61.
180 United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of Drug Addiction 
Treatment: A Research-based Guide, 3rd ed., NIH publication No. 
12-4180 (2012).
181 Ibid.
Treatment programmes for women
Research indicates that current addiction treatment pro-
grammes can be effective for different age and gender 
groups.182 Studies that have reviewed treatment pro-
grammes for women indicate that women who are enrolled 
in gender-specific programmes, which in addition to phar-
macotherapy and behavioural therapy address their unique 
treatment needs, have better treatment outcomes and 
improvements in important areas of their lives than those 
women who are in non-gender-specific programmes. 
These interventions may include addressing psychosocial 
issues that are more prevalent among women such as child 
care and employment support, family issues, psychiatric 
comorbidities, and psychological issues such as child abuse 
and trauma, victimization.183,184,185 
Treatment programmes for adolescents
The findings of several large studies186,187 clearly indicate 
that treatment programmes can decrease drug and alcohol 
use, improve school performance and reduce the nature 
and extent of problem behaviours. The National Institute 
on Drug Abuse supported Drug Abuse Treatment Out-
come Studies for Adolescents (DATOS-A) reviewed 23 
community-based adolescent treatment programmes, 
which in essence addressed peer relationships, educational 
concerns and family issues such as parent-child relation-
ships and parental substance use. They also included ele-
ments of adult treatment programmes, such as participation 
in group therapy and in a 12-step programme. Adolescents 
who participated in these treatment programmes have 
reported improved psychological adjustment, and longer 
stays in treatment produced more favourable outcomes in 
several of the criteria. However, strategies specific to ado-
lescents are needed to improve their treatment retention 
and completion in order to maximize the therapeutic ben-
efits of drug treatment.188 
Cost and benefit of treatment
An apparent major benefit of drug treatment, aside from 
the recovery of the patient and the subsequent health and 
social implications, is the element of cost, as research stud-
ies indicate that spending on treatment is cost-
182 Ibid.
183 S. F. Greenfield and others, “Substance abuse treatment entry, 
retention, and outcome in women: a review of the literature”, Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 86, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-21.
184 R. E. Claus and others, “Does gender-specific substance abuse treat-
ment for women promote continuity of care?”, Journal of Substance 
Abuse Treatment, vol. 32, No. 1 (2007), pp. 27-39.
185 United Kingdom, National Health Services, National Treatment 
Agency for Substance Misuse, “Women in drug treatment: what the 
latest figures reveal”, March 2010.
186 Y. I. Hser and others, “An evaluation of drug treatments for adoles-
cents in 4 US cities”, Archives of General Psychiatry, vol. 58, No. 7 
(2001), pp. 689-695.
187 Kimberly R. Martin, “Adolescent treatment programs reduce drug 
abuse, produce other improvements”, NIDA Notes, vol. 17, No. 1 
(2002).
188 Ibid.
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effective.189,190,191 At the least, the ratio of saving to 
investment is 3:1 (for every dollar invested three are saved), 
and when a broader calculation of costs associated with 
crime, health and social productivity is taken into account, 
the rate of savings to investment can rise to 13:1.192 
When the cost of each option is weighed up, it can be 
shown that drug treatment is less expensive than either 
incarceration or a complete lack of treatment.193 Drug 
treatment is cost-effective in reducing drug use along with 
its associated health and social costs and it is also less expen-
sive than the alternatives, such as not treating addicts or 
simply incarcerating dependent users. For example, in the 
United States the average cost of one full year of metha-
done maintenance treatment is approximately $4,700 per 
patient, whereas one full year of imprisonment costs 
approximately $18,400 per person.194 In the United King-
dom, it is estimated that, with under 165,000 people in 
treatment for heroin and/or “crack” dependency, an esti-
mated 4.9 million acquisitive crimes such as burglary, rob-
bery and shoplifting were prevented during 
2010-2011.195 
Although many treatment activities can be initially 
resource intensive, every dollar invested in treatment yields 
up to 10 dollars in reduced costs in lost productivity, use 
of social services and criminality.196 When savings related 
to health care are included, total savings can exceed costs 
by a ratio of 12 to 1. Major savings to the individual and 
society also come from significant drops in interpersonal 
conflicts, improvements in workplace productivity and 
reductions in drug-related accidents.
Why drug treatment is often perceived 
to be ineffective
The scientific evidence is clear that the best available treat-
ments for individuals with drug dependence are those that 
189 Paul G. Barnett and Ralph W. Swindle, “Cost-effectiveness of inpa-
tient substance abuse treatment”, Health Services Research, vol. 32, 
No. 5 (1997), pp. 615-629.
190 Paul G. Barnett and Stanley S. Hui, “The cost-effectiveness of 
methadone maintenance”, The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine, 
vol. 67, Nos. 5 and 6 (2000), pp. 365-374.
191 L. W. Gerson and others, “Medical care use by treated and 
untreated substance abusing medicaid patients”, Journal of Substance 
Abuse Treatment, vol. 20, No. 2 (2001), pp. 115-120.
192 William S. Cartwright, “Economic costs of drug abuse: financial, 
cost of illness, and services”, Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, 
vol. 34, No. 2 (2008), pp. 224-233.
193 United States, Department of Health and Human Services, 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of Drug Addiction 
Treatment for Criminal Justice Populations: A Research-based Guide, 
3rd ed., NIH publication No. 11-5316 (April 2014), pp. 26-28.
194 S. L. Ettner and others, “Benefit-cost in the California treatment 
outcome project: does substance abuse treatment ‘pay for itself ’?”, 
Health Services Research, vol. 41, No. 1 (2006), pp. 192-213.
195 United Kingdom, National Health Services, National Treatment 
Agency for Substance Misuse, “Falling drug use: the impact of treat-
ment”, December 2012.
196 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2013 (E/
INCB/2013/1).
are ongoing, able to address multiple problems in numer-
ous life domains — such as medical and psychiatric symp-
toms and social instability — and are well integrated into 
the community, making them available and accessible to 
such individuals. 
One major difference in the perception of their ineffec-
tiveness is that drug dependence treatments are not pro-
vided and evaluated under the same assumptions that 
pertain to other chronic illnesses. Particularly important 
in this regard is that drug dependence treatments are rarely 
delivered under a continuing care model that would be 
appropriate for a chronic health problem. Indeed, with 
the exception of methadone maintenance and the 12-step 
approach, most contemporary treatments for drug depend-
ence are acute care episodes. 
It is common for a drug dependent individual to be admit-
ted to a 30 to 90 day outpatient rehabilitation pro-
gramme,197 rarely accompanied by medical monitoring 
or medication. This period of treatment is typically fol-
lowed by discharge and while the intentions and overall 
goals of treatment might be conceptualized as ongoing by 
those in the treatment field, operationally addiction treat-
ments are delivered in much the same way as one might 
treat a patient with a broken bone or with an acute 
infection. 
Outcome evaluations tend to be conducted 6 to 12 months 
after treatment discharge. A major (and sometimes exclu-
sive) measure in all such evaluations is whether patients 
have been continuously abstinent since leaving treatment. 
In other words, policymakers and society in general gen-
erally ignore the fact that during treatment patients are 
most likely to experience significant symptom (compulsive 
drug use) decrease and an improvement in psychosocial 
functioning, with treatment effectiveness only being meas-
ured based on pre- and post-outcomes, an approach that 
is applicable for the treatment of acute conditions. 
If these goals and this treatment/evaluation strategy were 
applied to a hypothetical hypertension treatment regime, 
patients who meet diagnostic criteria for hypertension 
would be admitted to a 30-to-90 day outpatient “hyper-
tension rehabilitation” programme where they might 
receive medication, behavioural change therapy, dietary 
education and an exercise regime. Because of some ideo-
logical limits and evaluation goals, the medication would 
be tapered during the final days of the treatment and 
patients would be referred to “community sources”. The 
evaluation team would re-contact the patient six months 
later and determine whether the patient continuously had 
normal blood pressure throughout the post-treatment 
period. Only those patients who met this criterion would 
be considered “successfully treated”. Clearly, this hypo-
thetical treatment management strategy and its associated 
197 McLellan and others, “Reconsidering the evaluation of addiction 
treatment” (see footnote 175).
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outcome evaluation approach would be absurd if applied 
to any chronic illness, including drug dependence.
How to measure success in treatment 
As discussed in the previous section, traditionally treat-
ment of drug dependence has been seen in the context of 
acute care and a simple recovery/rehabilitation oriented 
model, which assumed relatively short interventions and 
services after which the patient is considered successfully 
treated, discharged and expected to continue their recov-
ery.198 As noted by McLellan and colleagues:199 “Typically, 
the immediate goal of reducing alcohol and drug use is 
necessary but rarely sufficient for the achievement of the 
longer-term goals of improved personal health and social 
function and reduced threats to public health and safety 
— i.e., recovery.” Moreover, as noted by the Betty Ford 
Institute Consensus Panel on “what is recovery”, unlike 
the term “cancer survivor”, for instance, the term “in 
recovery” has not been clearly defined and may not be well 
understood by the public.200 
Consequently, the traditional method of evaluating treat-
ment outcomes has been to contact patients after certain 
intervals and assess if the person has retained those posi-
tive changes, including “cessation of drug use” following 
discharge. As research has shown, the majority of patients 
relapse following cessation of treatment, giving rise to the 
interpretation that available treatment of drug dependence 
is not effective.
As substance-use disorders are increasingly viewed as 
chronic conditions, drug dependence treatment services 
have also adopted models that aim to assess effectiveness 
of interventions and the impact of the health problem on 
the person’s overall well-being regularly over the course of 
treatment. 
The different treatment outcome domains identified as 
relevant to both the patient and to society include:201,202,203
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 Betty Ford Institute Consensus Panel, “What is recovery? A work-
ing definition from the Betty Ford Institute”, Journal of Substance 
Abuse Treatment, vol. 33, No. 3 (2007), pp. 221-228.
201 McLellan and others, “Reconsidering the evaluation of addiction 
treatment” (see footnote 175).
202 WHO Quality of Life Assessment Group, “The World Health 
Organization Quality of Life assessment (WHOQOL): position 
paper from the World Health Organization”, Social Science and 
Medicine, vol. 41, No. 10 (1995), pp. 1403-1409.
203 Alexandre B. Laudent, “The case for considering quality of life 
(a) Reduction in substance abuse; increase or improve-
ment in personal health including physical and psy-
chological improvements (including spiritual); 
(b)  Improvement in social functioning, including employ-
ment, family and social relationships;
(c) Reductions in behaviours that are a threat to public 
health and safety or that are associated with the spread 
of infectious diseases or with personal and property 
crimes.
It has therefore been suggested that outcome evaluations 
of addiction treatment should use clinical and social 
behavioural indicators with repeated measurement proce-
dures commonly used in chronic medical conditions as 
part of standard treatment delivery.204 
Treatment in primary health-care  
settings
Drug use is one of the top 20 risk factors for poor health 
worldwide and among the top 10 in developed countries. 
Drug use disorders are associated with an increased risk of 
other diseases such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, tuberculosis 
and cardiovascular diseases, as well as suicide and overdose 
deaths. Injecting drug use is a major conduit of HIV and 
hepatitis transmission in many regions.205 Additionally, 
individuals with drug use disorders have health-care costs 
that are nearly twice as high as those of patients without 
such disorders, which contributes to the growing cost of 
health care.206 
Despite the availability of effective treatments, most indi-
viduals with drug use disorders have never been treated.207 
A big gap exists between the number of people who want 
or could benefit from treatment for drug use disorders and 
the number of people who actually receive services.208 
There are many reasons for this, with one of the key fac-
tors being the difficulties in accessing treatment due to 
insufficient integration of substance use disorder services 
in mainstream general health-care delivery. This lack of 
integration is a problem because so many individuals who 
in addiction research and clinical practice”, Addiction Science and 
Clinical Practice, vol. 6, No. 1 (2001), pp. 44 and 45.
204 McLellan and others, “Reconsidering the evaluation of addiction 
treatment” (see footnote 175).
205 UNODC and WHO, “The joint UNODC-WHO programme on 
drug dependence treatment and care” (2009).
206 C. Boyd and others, “Clarifying multimorbidity to improve target-
ing and delivery of clinical services for medicaid populations”, Faces 
of Medicaid Data Series (Hamilton, New Jersey, Center for Health 
Care Strategies, December 2010).
207 W. M. Compton and others, “Prevalence, correlates, disability, and 
comorbidity of DSM-IV drug abuse and dependence in the United 
States: results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol 
and Related Conditions”, Archives of General Psychiatry, vol. 64, No. 
5 (2007), pp. 566-576.
208 United States of America, Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Results from the 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Sum-
mary of National Findings, NSDUH Series H-44, DHHS Publica-
tion No. (SMA) 12-4713 (Rockville, Maryland, 2012). 
As in the case of hypertension, symptoms of drug use 
disorder remain under control during the course of 
treatment. However, as the severity of the problem and 
symptoms reappear once patients are out of treatment, 
the effectiveness of treatment can only be measured 
during treatment and not once it is over.
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need drug treatment services also need other health ser-
vices. This problem is particularly severe for vulnerable 
groups who have limited or no contacts with health-care 
providers. 
However, the data show that individuals are seldom 
screened for drug-related problems by their primary-care 
physicians.209 The failure of providers to identify drug use 
issues is typically due to reluctance to deal with these ill-
nesses, and remains one of the most common obstacles to 
early diagnosis and treatment.210 Contributing factors 
include inadequate medical training to deal with drug use 
disorders, a belief that there is no effective treatment, 
insufficient time during the visit and a general feeling of 
inadequacy.211,212
Providing screening and initial services in primary health-
care settings is feasible;213,214 and it can reach many more 
individuals than can reliance on specialized treatment 
alone, promises better outcomes for patients215,216  and 
can result in reduced overall health-care costs.217 Early 
detection of drug-related problems can facilitate treatment 
and, ultimately, a reduction in the significant disability 
and comorbidity that accompany these disorders. There-
fore, it is critical for primary-care practitioners to recognize 
and effectively respond to patients with drug use issues.
The first step is screening and assessment that will enable 
the integration of clinical findings into a potential diag-
nosis of drug use disorders. The timing of the diagnosis is 
critical, since early intervention, before severe complica-
tions have happened and a patient’s relationship with the 
drug becomes stronger than relationships with family and 
209 D. Ernst, W. R. Miller and S. Rollnick, “Treating substance abuse 
in primary care: a demonstration project”, International Journal of 
Integrated Care, vol. 7 (2007).
210 C. M. Delos Reyes, “Overcoming pessimism about treatment of 
addiction”, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 287, 
No. 14 (2002), p. 1857.
211 Bridget M. Kuehn, “Despite benefit, physicians slow to offer brief 
advice on harmful alcohol use”, Journal of the American Medical 
Association, vol. 299, No. 7 (2008), pp. 751-753.
212 Brian Vastag, “Addiction poorly understood by clinicians”, Journal 
of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 10 (2003), pp. 
1299-1303.
213 Ernst, Miller and Rollnick, “Treating substance abuse in primary 
care” (see footnote 39).
214 B. K. Madras and others, “Screening, brief interventions, referral 
to treatment (SBIRT) for illicit drug and alcohol use at multiple 
healthcare sites: comparison at intake and 6 months later”, Drug 
Alcohol Dependence, vol. 99, Nos. 1-3 (2009), pp. 280-295.
215 T. F. Babor and others, “Screening, brief intervention, and refer-
ral to treatment (SBIRT): toward a public health approach to the 
management of substance abuse”, Substance Abuse, vol. 28, No. 3 
(2007), pp. 7-30.
216 R. Saitz and others, “Screening and brief intervention for unhealthy 
drug use in primary care settings: randomized clinical trials are 
needed”, Journal of Addiction Medicine, vol. 4, No. 3 (2010), pp. 
123-130.
217 Constance Weisner and others, “Integrating primary medical care 
with addiction treatment: a randomized controlled trial”, Journal 
of the American Medical Association, vol. 286, No. 14 (2001), pp. 
1715-1723.
friends, is the most effective.218 Once a diagnosis of drug 
use disorder has been established, an intervention can 
either be implemented by the primary health-care practi-
tioner, or patients can be referred to the appropriate spe-
cialist for treatment. While a specialty treatment 
programme remains the gold standard, various studies 
demonstrate that a primary health-care role in early inter-
vention is essential to the success of any 
treatment.219,220,221,222
Targeted brief interventions can be effective primary-care 
treatment models, as demonstrated by studies on brief 
office-based interventions.223,224 Studies evaluating the 
effectiveness of integrating primary medical care with 
addiction treatment have demonstrated cost benefits and 
improved medical outcomes.225 For example, patients with 
primary-care connections were shown to be less likely to 
seek expensive emergency department and hospital 
services,226 while for every dollar invested in evidence-
based integrated treatment, up to six dollars are saved in 
terms of costs for health, security and welfare. 
Efforts to integrate substance use disorder services with 
primary care face significant barriers, many of which arise 
at the policy level. Integrating drug treatment with main-
stream primary health-care delivery, expanding and devel-
oping specific competencies in primary health-care 
practitioners, enabling same-day services, improving access 
to medications and improving access to specialty care 
should be the global priorities.
F. EXTENT OF DRUG SUPPLY
The regions in which the cultivation and manufacture of 
drugs take place have not changed. Herbal cannabis pro-
duction occurs in most countries worldwide, while the 
production of cannabis resin remains confined to a few 
countries in North Africa, the Middle East and South-West 
218 S. Butterfield, “Treat addicted patients for the long-term”, American 
College of Physicians Internist, June 2009.
219 J. R. Mertens and others, “The role of medical conditions and pri-
mary care services in 5-year substance use outcomes among chemi-
cal dependency treatment patients”, Drug Alcohol Dependence, vol. 
98, Nos. 1 and 2 (2008), pp. 45-53.
220 M. L. Willenbring, S. H. Massey and M. B. Gardner, “Helping 
patients who drink too much: an evidence-based guide for primary 
care physicians”, American Family Physician, vol. 80, No. 1 (2009), 
pp. 44-50.
221 S. Coulton, “Alcohol misuse”, American Family Physician, vol. 79, 
No. 8 (2009), pp. 692-694.
222 William E. Cayley Jr., “Effectiveness of brief alcohol interventions 
in primary care”, American Family Physician, vol. 79, No. 5 (2009), 
pp. 370 and 371.
223 Willenbring, Massey and Gardner, “Helping patients who drink too 
much” (see footnote 220). 
224 Coulton, “Alcohol misuse”, (see footnote 221).
225 Weisner and others, “Integrating primary care with addiction treat-
ment” (see footnote 217).
226 Peter D. Friedmann and others, “Do mechanisms that link addic-
tion treatment patients to primary care influence subsequent utiliza-
tion of emergency and hospital care?”, Medical Care, vol. 44, No. 1 
(2006), pp. 8-15.
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Asia.227 In South America, three Andean countries continue 
to account for virtually all global cultivation of coca bush, 
while the vast majority of illicit opium poppy cultivation 
worldwide remains concentrated in two countries in Asia. 
The manufacture of synthetic drugs is difficult to assess in a 
quantitative way, but there are reports of the manufacture of 
ATS in all regions. The emergence in recent years of a large 
number of NPS228 has increased the range of synthetic drugs 
available on the market, but it is difficult to ascertain whether 
227 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
these substances are replacing existing drugs under interna-
tional control.  
Cannabis continues to be the most-seized drug worldwide, 
both in terms of the number of seizure cases and actual 
quantities intercepted. This is probably due to the fact that 
the cannabis market is the largest drug market globally 
with an extremely extensive web of trafficking flows.
With the exception of heroin/illicit morphine and ATS, 
overall quantities of drugs seized in the past decade have 
228 For the purposes of the present report, the analysis of NPS includes 
ketamine, which differs from other NPS in that it is widely used in 
human and veterinary medicine, while most NPS have little or no 
history of medical use.
Fig. 31. Global trends in main indicators of 
drug supply and drug supply reduc-
tion, 2005-2014
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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Fig. 32. Distribution of global seizures, by  
drug and region (number of cases), 
2005-2008 and 2009-2013 
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
INTERPRETING DRUG SEIZURES
A direct indicator of counter-narcotics law enforcement 
activity, drug seizures are the result of those successful 
operations that end in drug interceptions, and are thus 
influenced by law enforcement resources and priorities. At 
the same time, seizures are one of the key elements that 
help to establish the size of drug markets, drug availability 
and trafficking patterns and trends, particularly if broad 
geographical entities are considered and long periods are 
analysed. For example, the expansion of the cocaine market 
in Europe from the mid-1990s to the middle of the first 
decade of the 2000s was reflected in rising cocaine sei-
zures. Similarly, the 2001 “heroin drought” in Australia and 
the sharp decline in the cocaine market in the United States 
from 2007 to 2012 were also reflected in falling seizures.
Seizure information can serve as a powerful market indica-
tor, particularly if triangulated with other data such as drug 
prices and purity. Falling seizures in combination with rising 
drug prices and falling purity levels may suggest a decline 
in overall drug supply, while rising seizures in combination 
with falling drug prices and rising purity levels are usually 
considered a good indicator of an increase in drug supply. 
However, rising drug seizures in combination with rising 
drug prices and falling purity levels may suggest intensi-
fied law enforcement activity and thus a potential overall 
decline in drug supply. 
It should be noted that reported seizures relate to events 
that took place in the past and in specific locations. In an 
environment where drug traffickers adapt quickly to chang-
ing risks and opportunities, drug trafficking patterns and 
flows derived from seizure data do not necessarily reflect 
the current modus operandi of traffickers in every detail. 
At the same time, experience has shown that some of the 
main drug-trafficking routes, once established, can prove 
rather resilient to change.
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remained relatively stable. A peak in heroin/illicit mor-
phine seizures was reported in 2011, which initiated a 
period of much higher levels of seizures, driven by 
increased interceptions in Asia. Interceptions of ATS 
increased continuously from 2003 to 2013 in all regions, 
with the exception of Europe, where they remained stable. 
This may suggest the expansion of the ATS market to 
locations where some of these substances were not previ-
ously available. 
Large variations in average size of drug 
seizures
With an average size of less than 1 kg per case over the 
past five years, seizures of heroin/illicit morphine and ATS 
are the smallest among all the drug types at the global level. 
The largest are seizure cases involving herbal cannabis 
(roughly 10 kg on average), while the average size of sei-
zures of cocaine and cannabis resin is 5 kg and 3 kg, respec-
tively. These differences may result from variations in 
trafficking modus operandi, whereby cocaine and cannabis 
products are smuggled in larger shipments than other 
drugs. Law enforcement may also target different levels of 
the supply chain depending on the drug. However, other 
elements such as drug price, market size, value and struc-
ture, the dynamics and structure of drug supply chains, as 
well as law enforcement priorities, would have to be 
explored before drawing clear conclusions on this 
subject. 
The average size of seizure cases of all drugs, except ATS, 
has decreased in the past decade. This may reflect changes 
both in the targeting of law enforcement efforts and in 
trafficking patterns along the supply chain, but may also 
be the result of improved reporting of small seizure cases 
in some regions. The average size of seizures of a number 
of products decreased slightly between 2003 and 2013: 
heroin/illicit morphine decreased from 0.7 kg to 0.5 kg; 
cocaine decreased from 6.2 kg to 4.6 kg; and cannabis 
resin decreased from 4.3 kg to 3.9 kg. However, the aver-
age size of herbal cannabis seizures decreased substantially, 
from 23 kg to 7.8 kg, whereas the average size of ATS sei-
zures doubled over the period, from 0.3 kg to 0.7 kg.
The Americas is the region where seizure cases are the larg-
est on average. In the past five years, seizures of herbal 
cannabis in the region averaged 41 kg, while seizures of 
cocaine averaged 13 kg, seizures of ATS averaged 8 kg and 
seizures of heroin/illicit morphine averaged 3 kg; all sig-
nificantly larger than in all other regions. It is worth 
noting, however, that the average size of seizure cases of 
all drugs in the Americas has decreased in the past decade, 
as has the number of seizure cases, with the exception of 
ATS, possibly suggesting an expansion of the ATS market 
in that region and comparatively greater targeting of ATS 
trafficking by law enforcement.
At the other end of the scale, the smallest seizures, in terms 
of their average size, are reported in Europe, irrespective 
of drug type. In the past five years, seizures of cannabis 
FIG. 33. Quantities of heroin and illicit mor-
phine seized, by region, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
FIG. 34. Quantities of cocaine seized,  
by region, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
FIG. 35. Quantities of herbal cannabis seized, 
by region, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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resin averaged 1.7 kg per case in the region, while seizures 
of cocaine averaged 0.8 kg, seizures of herbal cannabis 
averaged 0.6 kg and both heroin/illicit morphine and ATS 
seizures averaged 0.2 kg. The small size of seizures in 
Europe may be due to law enforcement focusing more on 
the middle and lower end of the supply chains of all drug 
types than on the upper end, but it could simply reflect 
better reporting of seizure cases in general, and of small 
cases in particular. 
Emergence of new trafficking hubs229
South America remains the main departure hub for 
cocaine to the rest of the world. The cocaine-producing 
countries, Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Colombia and 
Peru, serve as departure (and transit) countries for the 
export of cocaine to the rest of the region. A number of 
other countries may serve as transit points for trafficking 
cocaine from Latin America to the major consumer mar-
kets in North America and Western and Central Europe, 
but Brazil (particularly since 2010) and Argentina are the 
cocaine transit countries most frequently mentioned in 
major individual drug seizures. 
The Netherlands, Morocco and Spain have been men-
tioned in individual drug seizures as the main departure 
or transit countries for cannabis over the past decade as a 
whole and continue to be so when considering more recent 
trends during the period 2010-2014. Albania and Argen-
tina have emerged respectively as cannabis departure or 
transit countries in the past five years, confirming that 
cannabis cultivation and production are dynamic and 
widespread, and that trafficking routes may be in constant 
change.
229 The present section is based on data from the individual drug 
seizure database. Reporting countries are asked to provide infor-
mation on the country where the drugs were obtained (or, in the 
case of unaccompanied shipments, the departure country). For the 
purposes of this section, such locations are considered to be transit 
points of the drug.
Heroin is produced in three different regions, but while 
there is information from reports of individual seizures on 
the trafficking routes for heroin from Afghanistan, avail-
able data do not currently allow for the identification of 
the transit countries used in the trafficking of heroin from 
Colombia and Mexico or from the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic and Myanmar. Pakistan is mentioned in 
individual drug seizure reports more frequently than other 
countries as a transit country for heroin seized elsewhere. 
This confirms that Afghan heroin is smuggled southwards 
from Afghanistan through Pakistan, but it may also sug-
gest that this trafficking route is more successfully targeted 
by law enforcement in destination countries and/or that 
data reporting on the last departure country of the ship-
ment seized is comparatively better for this route than for 
others. 
Although opium poppy is cultivated in South-East Asia, 
individual drug seizures indicate that neither of the opium-
cultivating countries in the region, the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic and Myanmar, appears to be an important 
heroin trafficking departure hub. This may be due to the 
fact that Afghan heroin dominates the global market, but 
it may also reflect the fact that countries that report indi-
vidual seizures are not markets for heroin produced in 
South-East Asia. 
Most seizures are made on road and 
rail, but the largest seizures are made 
at sea and in ports230 
The frequency of use of different modes of transportation 
used by drug traffickers has not changed a great deal over 
the past decade. Accounting for nearly half the reported 
individual seizures in the 2009-2014 period, trafficking 
by road and rail is the most common mode of transporta-
tion used by traffickers globally, along with trafficking by 
air. The average size of drug shipments intercepted on road 
and rail increased substantially from 68 kg between 2006 
and 2008 to 107 kg between 2009 and 2014. 
Accounting for 8 per cent of all reported cases in the past 
six years, maritime trafficking remains the least common 
mode of transportation in terms of individual seizure cases, 
but maritime seizures tend to be comparatively very large. 
With an average weight of 365 kg per seizure in the 2009-
2014 period (compared with 250 kg in the 2006-2008 
period) maritime seizures are by far the largest among the 
three modes of transportation. This confirms that inter-
diction of maritime shipments has potentially the greatest 
impact on the total quantities of drugs smuggled, as well 
as on trafficking flows and the availability of illicit drugs 
at the global level. For example, parcel post was the most 
commonly detected method of drug importation at the 
Australian borders in 2013, yet just three maritime seizure 
230 The present section is based on data from the individual drug  
seizure database.
Fig. 36. Quantities of cannabis resin seized,  
by region, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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cases accounted for 74 per cent of the total weight of 
heroin intercepted that year in the country.
Trafficking by air has become more frequent, but quanti-
ties intercepted remain comparatively small. Drugs being 
trafficked by air seized from 2009 to 2014 accounted for 
46 per cent of global seizure cases, but at an average of 10 
kg the size of the interceptions was much smaller. This 
represents an increase from the average of 6 kg per case 
observed in the period 2006-2008 and may reflect an 
increase in seizures involving trafficking by air cargo as 
opposed to air couriers.
Fig. 37. Average size of heroin/illicit morphine 
seizure cases, by region, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources. 
Note: The figures provided between brackets refer to the number of 
heroin/illicit morphine seizure cases for 2013. 
Table 5. Main transit countries as reported by recipient countries in major individual drug seizure 
cases (above 100 g for heroin and cocaine, above 1 kg for cannabis), by drug, 2005-2014
Source: UNODC, major individual drug seizure database. Data presented in the table reflect transit countries as reported by the countries 
where seizures were made and were not validated by the mentioned transit countries.
Note: Information provided on the main transit countries reported in major individual drug seizure cases is based on 11,441 cases of cannabis, 
11,864 cases of cocaine and 4,041 cases of heroin. This tables lists the ten countries with the highest number of mentions as transit. The figures pro-
vided refer to the total number of mentions of the country as the last departure/transit point in major individual seizure cases reported to the UNODC 
over the 10-year period 2005-2014, and to the number of different reporting countries responsible for those mentions. It should be noted that some 
major consuming countries did not report on transit and departure countries.    
Cocaine (base, salt and crack) Heroin (base, salt) Cannabis (herb, resin, oil)
Transit  
Countries
Total number  
of times  
country  
mentioned as 
transit point  
in individual 
seizures
Number of 
recipient 
countries 
reporting
transit 
countries
Transit  
Countries
Total number  
of times  
country  
mentioned as 
transit point  
in individual 
seizures
Number of 
recipient 
countries 
reporting
transit 
countries
Transit  
Countries
Total number  
of times  
country  
mentioned as 
transit point  
in individual 
seizures
Number of 
recipient 
countries 
reporting
transit 
countries
Argentina 2,101 45 Afghanistan 21 6 Denmark 57 3
Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of)
530 19 India 44 11 Greece 36 8
Brazil 1,747 56 Kazakhstan 23 1 Morocco 4,308 24
Colombia 1,061 31 Kyrgyzstan 42 3 Netherlands 117 10
Costa Rica 624 34 Netherlands 30 4 Pakistan 76 24
Dominican  
Republic 
1,313 20 Pakistan 3,216 178 Paraguay 117 7
Ecuador 410 22 Spain 29 4 Portugal 28 11
Panama 305 18 Tajikistan 128 4 Saint Vincent 
and the  
Grenadines
33 7
Peru 897 25 Turkey 45 7 Spain 846 33
Venezuela  
(Bolivaria
Republic of)
587 27 United Arab Emirates 43 15 Swaziland 32 3
Fig. 38. Mode of transportation reported  
in individual drug seizure cases,  
2006-2008 and 2009-2014
Source: UNODC, individual drug seizure database.
Note: Distribution of main modes of transport excludes cases in which 
the mode of transport was unknown, not applicable or specified as 
“other”. This analysis is based on 20,326 cases (1,445 tons) for the 
period 2006-2008 and on 47,319 cases (3,945 tons) for the period 
2009-2014.
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Opium cultivation is reaching historic 
levels; prevalence of use remains stable
According to the limited information available, at 0.7 per 
cent and 0.4 per cent of the population aged 15-64 respec-
tively, the global prevalence of use of opioids and opiates 
has remained stable, representing 32.4 and 16.5 million 
users. Due to a 7 per cent increase, from 209,000 ha in 
2013 to 224,000 ha in 2014, opium cultivation in Afghan-
istan is now at its highest level since estimates became 
available, although the increase was actually greater 
from 2012 to 2013 (36 per cent) (see figure 39). The 63 
per cent reduction in poppy eradication in Afghanistan, 
from 7,348 ha in 2013 to 2,692 ha in 2014, may be a 
contributing factor.
Following a consistent downward trend between 2000 and 
2006, opium poppy cultivation in both the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar increased steadily to 
reach roughly 64,000 ha in 2014, of which an estimated 
57,600 ha were cultivated in Myanmar and 6,200 ha in 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.231
Only partial information about the extent of opium poppy 
cultivation and heroin production in the Americas is avail-
able, but Mexico eradicated 14,662 ha of opium poppy 
in 2013 (7 per cent less than in 2012) and Colombia esti-
mated the area under opium poppy cultivation in 2013 
to be 298 ha. Colombia also reported the eradication of 
514 ha of opium poppy in 2013 and the dismantling of 
one heroin laboratory per year over the 2011-2013 period.
231 UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey: Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Myanmar 2014 (Bangkok, 2014).
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Global potential opium production also continued to 
increase in 2014, reaching 7,554 tons, its second-highest 
level since the late 1930s (see figure 40). Opium produc-
tion in Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 85 per 
cent of that total (6,400 tons) and, at 410 tons of heroin 
of export purity, 77 per cent of global heroin production 
(estimated at 526 tons).232 The remaining 116 tons 
(heroin of unknown purity) were produced in the rest of 
the world, but because the conversion ratios were updated 
in 2014, potential heroin production in 2014 is not com-
parable with production in previous years.
The majority of the opium and illicit morphine seized in 
2013 was concentrated around poppy cultivation areas in 
Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, while heroin 
seizures covered a wider area (see figure 41). Since 2002, 
Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of ) and Pakistan have 
consistently accounted for more than 90 per cent of the 
global quantity of opium seized each year and this pattern 
continued in 2013 when, with a 13 per cent increase from 
the previous year, the Islamic Republic of Iran remained 
the country with the largest quantity of opium seized 
(436 tons). 
Globally, heroin seizures increased by 8 per cent from 2012 
to 2013, whereas illicit morphine seizures decreased by 26 
per cent (see figure 42). The largest drop in illicit mor-
phine seizures was observed in Afghanistan, where they 
fell from 44 tons seized in 2012 to 24 tons in 2013. Since 
2005, Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of ) and Paki-
stan have accounted for more than 90 per cent of global 
232 UNODC updated the conversion ratio from opium to heroin in 
2014 and estimated export quality heroin to have a purity of 52 per 
cent. The updated conversion ratio is 9.6 kg of opium for the pro-
duction of 1 kg of export quality heroin (52 per cent purity). For 
details, see Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Produc-
tion, p. 35.
morphine seizures each year, but in 2013 the quantity 
increased in the Islamic Republic of Iran (to 10.4 tons 
from 7 tons in 2012)233 and in Pakistan (to 3.8 tons from 
1.4 tons in 2012). 
Up-to-date information on the use of opiates was available 
in only a few countries and points to stable global demand 
for heroin, whereas the non-medical use of prescription 
233 Islamic Republic of Iran, Drug Control Headquarters, Drug Control 
in 2013 (March 2014).
FIG. 39. Opium poppy cultivation and eradication in Afghanistan, 1998-2014
Source: Period 1997-2002: UNODC; since 2003: national illicit crop monitoring system supported by UNODC.
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FIG. 40. Global potential opium production, 
1998-2014
Source: Period 1997-2002: UNODC; since 2003: national illicit 
crop monitoring systems supported by UNODC.
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opioids has continued to increase in many regions. The 
markets for opiates in Africa, South-West Asia, parts of 
East Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Oceania are mainly 
supplied by South-West Asia (Afghanistan), while some 
markets in South-East Asia and Oceania are also supplied 
by South-East Asia (the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and Myanmar). The Americas are mainly supplied by Latin 
America (Colombia and Mexico), with the exception of 
Canada, which to a significant extent is supplied by Afghan 
heroin. 
Shifts in opiate trafficking routes
Despite the increase in opium and illicit morphine seizures 
in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan, the stability 
of global seizures of heroin from 2008 to 2013 and of 
overall demand for heroin imply that the increase in esti-
mated global opium and heroin production has not yet 
been reflected in a significant increase in heroin supply in 
most regions. There are signs, however, of increases in 
some heroin-related indicators (such as mortality and 
health emergencies) in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, where there are also indications of increased 
purity and lower prices. Moreover, in South and South-
East Asia and West and East Africa, there are indications 
of increasing trafficking, but the paucity of data makes it 
difficult to determine whether these subregions are expand-
ing markets for heroin. 
The so-called “Balkan route” (through Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ) and Turkey overland via South-Eastern 
Europe to Western and Central Europe), the so-called 
“northern route” (through Central Asia to the Russian 
Federation) and the so-called “southern route” (southwards 
through Iran (Islamic Republic of ) or Pakistan) are the 
established global trafficking routes of Afghan opiates. 
These routes are marked, however, by constant changes; 
for example, two major heroin seizures in Armenia (917 
kg) and Georgia (588 kg) reported in 2014234 were in 
stark contrast to the very low levels of seizures made in 
those countries over the past 15 years. This suggests that 
drug trafficking networks may be experimenting with new 
234 For Armenia, see UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South 
Eastern Europe, 2014, footnote 12. For Georgia, see “Regional 
report on Eastern Europe and Caucasus” of the Council of the 
European Union, p. 7, dated 17 December 2014.
FIG. 41. Global quantities of heroin seized, by region and in selected countries, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and other official sources.
FIG. 42. Global quantities of illicit morphine 
seized, total and selected countries, 
2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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trajectories, although significant seizures continue to be 
made elsewhere on the Balkan route. 
There is no evidence of a decline in the demand for heroin 
in the Russian Federation,235 yet heroin seizures along the 
northern route have actually decreased. Despite a tempo-
rary reduction from 2011 to 2013, the fact that heroin 
seizures in Afghanistan itself have increased in the past 
decade may show that an increasing amount of opiates are 
being intercepted before reaching markets outside Afghan-
istan. On the other hand, several countries reported 
increasing seizures of heroin trafficked via the southern 
route (on which heroin is trafficked to Asia and Europe 
often via African countries) as well as maritime routes, 
which is consistent with reports236 of an expansion of traf-
ficking along the southern route. In Pakistan, opium sei-
zures increased for the third consecutive year to reach 34 
tons in 2013. The strengthening of controls between 
Afghanistan and Iran (Islamic Republic of ) and between 
Iran (Islamic Republic of ) and Turkey may have forced 
traffickers to move southwards towards the coasts of Iran 
(Islamic Republic of ) and Pakistan.237 
The increasing importance of Africa as a transit region for 
Afghan heroin bound for Europe and other regions has 
235 UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South-Eastern Europe 
(2014).
236 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
237 Responses to annual report questionnaire for 2013 and UNODC, 
Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 2015 (Vienna, 
2015).
been reflected in increasing seizures of heroin being 
reported in recent years by some African countries, 
particularly in East Africa, and in seizures in Europe of 
African provenance. Since 2010, heroin seizures associated 
with the southern route have been reported in a number 
of European countries, including Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and 
the United Kingdom (see table 6 and figure 43). It is not 
clear whether this is a long-term shift away from the 
Balkan route or simply a response to opportunities 
MAP 1. Main global trafﬁcking ﬂows of opiates
Sources: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.
Notes: The trafficking routes represented on this map should be considered broadly indicative and based on data analyses rather than definitive route 
outlines. Such analyses are based on data related to official drug seizures along the trafficking route as well as official country reports and responses 
to annual report questionnaires. Routes may deviate to other countries that lie along the routes and there are numerous secondary flows that may 
not be reflected. The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent 
undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. 
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has 
not yet been determined.
TABLE 6. Large seizures of heroin in Belgium 
and the Netherlands linked to the 
southern route in 2013 and 2014
Sources: UNODC, The Illicit Drug Trade through South-Eastern 
Europe (March 2014) and the Netherlands, Public Prosecution  
Service.
Date Amount Method Route Remarks
2013 863 kg Container
Mozambique വ 
Belgium വ 
the Netherlands
Seized at 
Antwerp 
seaport
2013 230 kg Container
Pakistan വBelgium 
വthe Netherlands
Seized at 
Antwerp 
seaport
2014 764 kg Container
Iran (Islamic Repub-
lic of) വ United 
Arab Emirates വ 
the Netherlands
Seized at 
Rotterdam 
seaport
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presented by perceived lower levels of law enforcement 
along the southern route.238
Although suspected for decades,239 recent seizure data 
suggest that movements of large shipments of heroin from 
Afghanistan across the Indian Ocean to East and Southern 
Africa may have become more common. Dhows (tradi-
tional sailing vessels used in the Red Sea and the Indian 
Ocean) are known to move opiates from Afghanistan to 
Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania.240 In 2014, 
more than 2,200 kg of heroin were seized on the Indian 
Ocean by the Combined Maritime Forces,241 which is 
more than the total reported heroin seizures for the whole 
of Africa between 2011 and 2013. In Kenya, 377 kg of 
heroin and 33,200 litres of liquid heroin were seized in 
2014 from a single ship transiting via the Islamic Republic 
of Iran that was destined for Mombasa, Kenya; in the 
United Republic of Tanzania, a single record seizure of 
1,032 kg of heroin transiting via Pakistan and smuggled 
to the country by dhow was reported;242 while in West 
Africa, Nigeria reported the seizure of 25 kg of heroin 
bound for North America and Western and Central 
Europe in 2013. Thus, there are increasing signs of paral-
lels with the phenomenon in the 2000s, when Africa began 
to play a strategic role in the trafficking of cocaine.
238 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 
2015 (Vienna, 2015).
239 United States, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Drug 
Trafficking from Southwest Asia: Drug Intelligence Report (August 
1994).
240 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa:  
A Threat Assessment (Vienna, September 2013), p. 23.
241 Combined Maritime Forces is a multinational naval partnership 
that operates in international waters, encompassing some of the 
world’s most important shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and 
adjoining bodies of water.
242 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 
2015 (Vienna, 2015).
Canada and the United States: different 
sources of supply in heroin trafficking
Compared with global average prevalence, opioid use 
remains high in North America (3.8 per cent). In the 
United States, there are indications of a partial shift in the 
opioid market towards use of heroin driven, in part, by 
changes in the formulation of OxyContin — one of the 
major prescription opioids that is misused — to a con-
trolled-release formulation that cannot be snorted or 
injected,243 as well as by an increase in the availability of 
243 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
FIG. 43. Departure areas of heroin seized in Italy, 2011-2013
Source: Italy, Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Antidroga, Annual Report 2013.
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FIG. 44. Quantities of heroin seized in Africa, 
2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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heroin and a decrease in its price in some parts of the 
country. A recent household survey in the United States 
indicated that there was a significant decline in the misuse 
of prescription opioids from 2012 to 2013.244 
The number of drug-related deaths continues to rise in 
the United States, with heroin-related cases increasing con-
siderably (from 5,925 deaths in 2012 to 8,257 in 2013) 
to reach their highest levels in the past decade.245 Prescrip-
tion painkiller overdoses also continue to rise, particularly 
among women. Over the period 2004-2011, emergency 
room cases related to heroin and other opioid use rose by 
183 per cent (see figure 45).246 
Seizures of heroin in the United States have increased since 
2008 (to 6.2 tons in 2013). Authorities have reported 
increased trafficking of both Mexican- and South Ameri-
can-produced heroin247 and, in 2014, Mexico reported 
being a transit country for heroin produced in Colombia 
and destined for the United States.248 Indeed, the major-
ity of heroin in the United States is estimated to be sup-
plied by Latin American production.249 In 2011 and 
2012, however, authorities suggested that the availability 
of Afghan heroin was increasing in the United States,250 
although current estimates of its share of consumer mar-
kets have not been made available to UNODC (past esti-
mates pointed to a market share of around 4 per cent).251 
Seizures of Afghan opiates made on the southern route in 
Africa destined for the United States seem to confirm that 
organized criminal groups may be trafficking heroin to 
supply the growing market in the United States.252 
Unlike all the other countries in the Americas, Canada is 
not supplied to a large extent by Latin American heroin. 
According to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police National 
Intelligence Coordination Center, between 2009 and 2012 
244 United States, SAMHSA, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics 
and Quality, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health: Detailed Tables, NSDUH Series H-46, HHS Publication 
No. SMA 13-4795 (Rockville, Maryland, 2014), tables 7.20B and 
7.30B.
245 United States, Executive Office of the President, National Drug 
Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2014 (Washington, D.C., 2014).
246 United States, SAMHSA, Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2011: 
National Estimates of Drug-Related Emergency Department Visits, 
HHS Publication No. SMA 13-4760 (Rockville, Maryland, 2013).
247 United States, DEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary 
(November 2013).
248 Country report submitted by Mexico to the Twenty-fourth Meet-
ing of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Latin 
America and the Caribbean (October 2014).
249 “In 2012, heroin from South America accounted for 51 per cent 
(by weight) of the heroin analysed through the DEA Heroin Sig-
nature Program, while heroin from Mexico accounted for 45 per 
cent and heroin from South-West Asia accounted for 4 per cent”; 
see United States, DEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, 
2014 (November 2014), p. 9.
250 UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire submitted 
by the United States for 2011 and 2012.
251 United States, DEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, 
2014 (November 2014).
252 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 
2015 (Vienna, 2015).
at least 90 per cent of the heroin seized in Canada origi-
nated in Afghanistan.253 The southern route was report-
edly the major conduit for those shipments, with nearly 
50 per cent having transited through India, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ) and Pakistan.254,255 
Australia: a mixed market with constant 
changes in supply source
Levels of opioid use in Australia and New Zealand remain 
high (2.9 per cent), mainly because of high levels of misuse 
of prescription opioids. According to a recent survey in 
Australia, there has been an increase in the misuse of pre-
scription opioids (from 3.0 per cent in 2010 to 3.3 per 
cent in 2013), while the prevalence of heroin use has 
declined from 0.2 to 0.1 per cent.256
There are also signs of changes in the heroin market in 
Oceania. The number of heroin seizures made at the Aus-
tralian border increased in 2013 from the previous year, 
with 429 kg being intercepted, confirming the increasing 
trend since 2004. Most of the heroin seized in Australia 
in 2013 originated in South-East Asia, while in previous 
253 UNODC Vienna southern route study conference: view from 
Canada, presentation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
UNODC regional workshop on Afghan opiate trafficking on the 
southern route (Vienna, March 2014).
254 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Report on the Illicit Drug 
Situation in Canada, 2009 (Ottawa, 2009).
255 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 
2015 (Vienna, 2015).
256 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey Report, Drug Statistics Series No. 28 
(Canberra, 2014).
FIG. 45. Changes in heroin-related indicators in 
the United States, 2004-2013
Source: United States, SAMHSA and 2014 National Drug Control 
Strategy.
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years the supply fluctuated between heroin originating in 
South-East Asia and South-West Asia (see figure 47). In 
2013, by number of seizures, the Netherlands, Viet Nam 
and Thailand (in descending order) were the primary 
embarkation points of heroin reaching Australia, while 
Thailand, Viet Nam, Taiwan Province of China and 
Malaysia (also in descending order) were the principal last 
departure points in terms of quantities seized.257
257 Australian Crime Commission, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012-13.
Europe: a diverging heroin market with 
emerging supply routes 
The heroin market in Europe is marked by variations 
across subregions. In Western and Central Europe, there 
are indications of a stable or downward trend in the use 
of heroin, but in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the 
prevalence of use of heroin remains high. 
Quantities of heroin seized in Europe accounted for almost 
30 per cent of all heroin seized globally in 2013. Heroin 
seizures in South-Eastern Europe increased slightly in 
2013 from the previous year, with Turkey seizing 
13.5 tons, slightly more than the 13.3 tons reported in 
2012. A recent government report in Turkey258 highlighted 
several new developments, including an increase in heroin 
arriving in Turkey from Iraq rather than exclusively from 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the increasing use of sea 
containers in heroin trafficking and the diversification of 
the activities of organized criminal groups, which are 
trafficking not only heroin but also cannabis resin and 
methamphetamine.
The quantities of heroin seized in Eastern Europe increased 
slightly in 2013, but remained stable from a long-term 
perspective. Opioid use in Eastern Europe, in particular 
in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, remains high, with 
an estimated 2.37 million (2.29 per cent prevalence), 
including 291,500 opiate users (0.9 per cent prevalence). 
Opioid use in the other countries in the subregion remains 
lower than the global average, although experts in Belarus 
perceive an increase in opioid use, particularly of acetylated 
opium and pharmaceutical opioids. Also, in the Russian 
Federation the replacement of heroin with cheaper alter-
nates such as acetylated opium and desomorphine contin-
ues to be reported.259 A major health consequence of 
people injecting opioids in Eastern Europe is the high 
prevalence of HIV, which is estimated to be 24.6 per cent 
in the Russian Federation and 19.7 per cent in Ukraine, 
and accounts for a third of the global estimated number 
of PWID living with HIV in the region. In the Russian 
Federation, drug-related deaths due mainly to opioid over-
dose are also reported to be high, at 80 deaths per million 
of the population.
In Western and Central Europe, seizures of heroin in most 
countries either remained stable or continued to decline 
gradually, except in Belgium, where seizures of heroin 
increased dramatically, from 112 kg in 2012 to 1.2 tons 
in 2013, as a result of two large seizures. It is important 
to mention that some large maritime seizures were made 
in Western and Central Europe, which suggests that sig-
nificant heroin shipments were not detected at points of 
departure and transit, whether in South-West Asia, the 
258 Turkish National Police, Department of Anti-Smuggling and 
Organized Crime, Turkish Drug Report 2013 (Ankara, 2014).
259 UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire by Russian Fed-
eration 2012-2013. 
FIG. 46. Heroin detections at the Australian 
border, as a proportion of total weight, 
by method of importation, 2012-2013 
Source: Australia, Customs and Border Protection Service.
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FIG. 47. Geographical origin of heroin samples, 
as a proportion of analysed border  
seizures by the Australian Federal  
Police, 2008-June 2013 
Source: Australian Federal Police, Forensic Drug Intelligence, 
2013.
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Middle East or Gulf countries. This also suggests that the 
ports of Belgium and the Netherlands may play a key role 
as entry points to Europe for heroin imported from 
Afghanistan via the southern route.260
Other opioids, such as buprenorphine, fentanyl and meth-
adone, are available in illicit markets in Western and Cen-
tral Europe. For example, fentanyl and buprenorphine are 
the main opioids used in Estonia and Finland, respectively. 
In some instances, these substances account for a signifi-
cant proportion of overdose deaths, as in the case of fen-
tanyl in Estonia. On the other hand, injecting heroin has 
been declining in Western and Central Europe,261 as has 
the number of heroin users entering treatment for the first 
time, resulting in an ageing cohort of heroin users cur-
rently in treatment. 
In the United Kingdom, following a decrease in 2011, 
there was an increase in heroin-related deaths in 2013. 
This increase may be partially explained by an increase in 
heroin purity which, having been low in 2011 and 2012, 
rose to almost its 2010 level in 2013. The average whole-
sale price of heroin in the United Kingdom decreased 
slightly from £30,000 per kilogram in 2012 to £28,000 
in 2013,262 which may indicate an increase in the heroin 
supply and may also be related to the increase in produc-
tion in Afghanistan. 
260 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 
2015 (Vienna, 2015).
261 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014.
262 Charlotte Davies and Rosemary Murray, 2013 National Report 
(2012 Data) to the EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: 
United Kingdom — New Development and Trends (London, United 
Kingdom Focal Point on Drugs, 2014).
Heroin is trafficked to Europe via the Balkan route and 
the northern route, but heroin shipments from Iran 
(Islamic Republic of ) and Pakistan are also entering 
Europe by air or sea, either directly or transiting through 
countries in East and West Africa. The quantity of heroin 
seized in Europe over the past decade has varied greatly 
and, since 2010, supplies of heroin to the United Kingdom 
from Afghanistan via the Balkan route have decreased. 
Belgium and the Netherlands remain important transit 
points for heroin trafficking to the United Kingdom via 
heavy goods vehicles and ferries.263
Increase in heroin seizures in East and 
South-East Asia
In the absence of any recent reliable data on the extent of 
the use of opioids in most parts of Asia it is difficult to 
determine a trend, although, based on expert perceptions, 
it is considered to be generally stable. Expert perceptions 
of trends in drug use indicate that opioid (including 
heroin) use is perceived to be decreasing in China, where, 
although the total number of registered heroin users 
increased by 6 per cent in 2013, to 1.32 million heroin 
users, the proportion of heroin users among all registered 
drug users decreased. This was because of an increase in 
the proportion of users of synthetic opioids, which may 
also include opiate polydrug users (see figure 50).
Historically, the southern route has been a marginal con-
duit for Afghan opiates trafficked to East and South-East 
Asia, as opiates produced in Myanmar tend to feed that 
market. There have been various reports, however, that 
Myanmar may be unable to meet regional demand, and 
263 UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire by the United 
Kingdom.
FIG. 48. Quantities of heroin seized in Europe, 
2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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FIG. 49. Purity-adjusted price per gram  
of heroin the United Kingdom,  
2003-2013
Source: Charlotte Davies and Rosemary Murray, 2013 National 
Report (2012 Data) to the EMCDDA (London, United Kingdom 
Focal Point on Drugs, 2014).
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that heroin is trafficked to East and South-East Asia from 
Afghanistan.264 It is quite likely that a portion also travels 
north from Afghanistan overland via Central Asia to 
China,265 the primary consumer in the Asia region.266 
Amounting to 11.8 tons in 2013, seizures of heroin in 
East and South-East Asia increased for the third consecu-
tive year. China continued to account for the majority of 
heroin seizures in the region, with annual seizures of 8.5 
tons, up from 7.3 tons in 2012. The authorities in China 
reported that northern Myanmar remained the main 
source of heroin in the Chinese market, but also noted 
some cases of seizures of opiates originating in 
Afghanistan.267
Africa: possible increase in heroin use 
Although information on the extent of drug use in Africa 
is limited, according to UNODC the prevalence of use of 
opiates is estimated at 0.3 per cent of the population aged 
15-64 (an estimated 1.88 million users). Moreover, the 
increasing importance of Africa as a transit area for Afghan 
heroin bound for markets in other regions may have led 
to an increase in heroin use locally.
 
264 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking through the Southern Route, 
2015 (Vienna 2015).
265 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010 (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.10.XI.13).
266 Even more confusingly, at times traffickers seem to use western 
China as a transit zone between Pakistan and Central Asia (based 
on seizure data reported by the World Customs Organization).
267 Country report submitted by China to the Thirty-eighth Meeting 
of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Asia and 
the Pacific.
FIG. 50. Trends in registered drug users and the proportion of registered drug users, by drug type  
in China, 2002-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and other official sources.
FIG. 51. Number and weight of annual Afghan 
heroin seizures in China, 2009-2013
Source: “Afghan opiate trafficking on the southern route: statis-
tics, seizures and recent trafficking trends in China”, presentation 
by the National Narcotics Control Commission of China, UNODC 
regional workshop on Afghan opiate trafficking on the southern 
route, Vienna, March 2014.
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Lowest levels of coca bush cultivation 
on record
Coca bush cultivation continued to decline in 2013, 
reaching its lowest level since estimates from the 
mid-1980s. The decline in 2013 was driven mainly by an 
18 per cent decrease in coca bush cultivation in Peru 
(from 60,400 ha in 2012 to 49,800 ha) and by a 9 per 
cent decrease in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (from 
25,300 ha to 23,000 ha). 
Coca bush cultivation in Colombia, on the other hand, 
remained stable in 2013, although it remained at histori-
cally low levels. In addition to the figure collected on 31 
December 2012, available information for Colombia on 
the presence of coca bush cultivation shows that prior to 
eradication 89,215 ha were under cultivation at some 
point in 2013, 34 per cent less than in 2012.268 The 
potential production of pure cocaine in Colombia was 
268 UNODC and Colombia, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2013 
(Bogotá, June 2014).
estimated at 290 tons,269 the lowest level since 1996. The 
combination of a decrease in cultivation in all the main 
coca bush cultivating countries has led to a decline in the 
estimated global production of cocaine. It should be noted 
that the illicit extraction of cocaine alkaloids from coca 
leaves, the first step in the manufacture of cocaine, con-
tinues to take place almost exclusively in the three coca-
producing countries, which also accounted for the majority 
of cocaine hydrochloride manufactured worldwide. 
Cocaine markets: the impact of  
decreasing production
The global supply of cocaine may originate in Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of ), Colombia and Peru, but the larg-
est cocaine markets and highest rates of prevalence of 
cocaine use are reported in North and South America and 
Western and Central Europe. Estimated at 0.4 per cent of 
269 The methodology used to estimate potential cocaine production 
was adjusted and thus not comparable with the last report. For 
more information on the adjustment, see Colombia: Coca Cultiva-
tion Survey 2013 cited above.
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the global adult population aged 15-64, the annual preva-
lence of cocaine use has shown a declining trend in West-
ern and Central Europe and North America, particularly 
the United States, over the past few years, but cocaine use 
still remains at high levels in those subregions, while infor-
mation for most of Africa and Asia remains sporadic. 
Cocaine is usually trafficked northwards from the Andean 
countries of South America to North America and across 
the Atlantic to Europe via the Caribbean or Africa, by a 
variety of means, including air and sea. Individual drug 
seizure cases reported to UNODC show that maritime 
trafficking has increased as a means of transporting large 
quantities of cocaine in recent years, accounting for 
60 per cent of the total quantities seized (see figure 53). 
Accounting for more than 50 per cent of actual seizure 
cases, trafficking by air is very frequent but the quantities 
intercepted are comparatively small (average of 6 kg per 
case in the period 2009-2014) (see figure 54).   
The fact that coca bush cultivation continued to decrease 
in 2013, reaching its lowest level in the past three decades, 
may partially explain the shrinking of some cocaine mar-
kets and the reduction in the availability of cocaine in, for 
example, the United States and, more recently, in Canada. 
Successful law enforcement efforts and conflicts between 
transnational criminal groups have also had an impact on 
the availability of cocaine.270
Following the increase observed between 2011 and 2012, 
cocaine seizures have remained stable (687 tons seized in 
2013 compared with 684 tons in 2012), despite a decrease 
in seizures in the two main cocaine markets, the United 
States (65 per cent decrease, from 104 to 37 tons) and 
270 United States, DEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, 
2013 (November 2013).
MAP 2. Main global trafﬁcking ﬂows of cocaine
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database.
Notes: The trafficking routes represented on this map should be considered broadly indicative and based on data analyses rather than definitive route 
outlines. Such analyses are based on data related to official drug seizures along the trafficking routes as well as official country reports and responses 
to annual report questionnaires. Routes may deviate to other countries that lie along the routes and there are numerous secondary flows that may 
not be reflected. The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent 
undetermined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. 
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has 
not yet been determined. 
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CONTINUED INCREASE IN COCA ERADICATION AND THE  
DISMANTLING OF LABORATORIES
The manual eradication of coca bush in the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia continued to increase in 2013, 
reaching 11,407 ha, while seizures of coca leaf dropped 
signiﬁcantly compared with 2012. The authorities in Peru 
eradicated over 23,900 ha of coca bush crops in 2013, 
with most of it focused on the Palcazú-Pichis-Pachitea 
area and the Monzón Valley, which had the highest 
rates of expansion in the area used for cultivation and 
which serve as key points for the production of illicit coca 
derivatives produced both locally and elsewhere. Because 
of eradication efforts and the subsequent decrease in 
the supply of coca leaf, the average price of dried coca 
leaf in Peru increased by 30 per cent in 2013. Authorities 
reporteda that state eradication efforts in recent years 
have caused drug trafﬁcking organizations to shift illicit 
cultivation to increasingly scattered and isolated areas. 
In Colombia, supply reduction activities in 2013 included 
the aerial spraying of over 47,000 ha of coca bush and 
the manual eradication of over 22,000 ha. 
Clandestine cocaine-processing laboratories also exist 
outside the main cocaine-producing countries. In 2013, a 
number of countries in South America, including Argen-
tina, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of), reported the detection of clandestine laboratories 
processing coca leaf derivatives, but the overall number 
of laboratories dismantled has decreased since 2011. 
Two European countries also reported the detection of 
clandestine laboratories processing coca leaf derivatives; 
however, cocaine laboratories detected outside South 
America are usually secondary extraction laboratories 
for extracting cocaine from other materials, such as 
clothing or plastics, used for trafﬁcking and conceal-
ment purposes. In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the 
number of cocaine hydrochloride laboratories destroyed 
by authorities increased by 81 per cent to 67 in 2013. 
During 2013, the authorities in Colombia destroyed a 
total of 2,128 laboratories for the extraction of coca 
paste or cocaine base, as well as 208 cocaine hydro-
chloride laboratories.
Cocaine-type laboratories dismantled,  
2011-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
a Country report submitted by Peru to the Twenty-fourth Meeting 
of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
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Source: UNODC, individual drug seizure database.
Note: Excludes cases in which the mode of transportation was 
unknown, not applicable or specified as “other”.
FIG. 54. Average size of cocaine seizures, by 
mode of transportation, 2006-2008 
and 2009-2014 
Source: UNODC, individual drug seizure database.
Note: Excludes cases in which the mode of transportation was 
unknown, not applicable or specified as “other”. The values in the 
figure are based on 4,714 seizure cases by air, 5,817 cases by road and 
rail and 244 maritime cases, for 2006-2008. For 2009-2014, the figures 
are based on 13,058 seizure cases by air, 8,415 cases by road and rail 
and 843 maritime cases.
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Western and Central Europe (18 per cent decrease, from 
71 to 58 tons) (see figure 55). The only region where 
cocaine seizures increased in 2013 was Central America 
and the Caribbean, up to 162 tons in 2013 from 78 tons 
in 2012. 
In 2013, Colombia again reported the largest annual 
cocaine seizures by a single country worldwide, even 
though its seizures of cocaine base, paste and salts decreased 
from 243 tons in 2012 to 226 tons in 2013. Authorities 
in Colombia reported frequently meeting resistance when 
conducting supply reduction activities, such as monitor-
ing coca bush cultivation and cocaine production, which 
may have had an impact on seizures. 
North America: shrinking cocaine market 
Supply reduction measures may have led to a reduction 
in the size of the cocaine market in some areas of the 
world, reflected in the decrease in the number of seizures 
made and in the decline in the prevalence of cocaine use. 
Compared with previous years, there was a decrease in the 
amount of cocaine seized while entering Canada in 2013. 
Most cocaine seizures came from the Caribbean, Central 
and South America and, to a lesser extent, the United 
States, via air cargo, mail and passenger luggage, with most 
cocaine entering Canada via the major sea ports. Some of 
the possible explanations for the shrinking of the cocaine 
market in Canada are changes in consumer preferences 
and a shift in tactics and routes by criminal organizations 
in an attempt to avoid law enforcement detection. 
In 2013, the prevalence of cocaine use in the United States 
was estimated to be 1.6 per cent of the population aged 
12 and older, and this has remained stable over the past 
few years, although it is still signifcantly lower than in 
2006. Cocaine use among high-school students has been 
declining, with annual prevalence nearly halving since 
2006, when it was reported to be 3.5 per cent, to 1.8 per 
cent in 2013. The proportion of young people who per-
ceive that cocaine is easy to obtain has also declined in 
recent years.
South America: increase in cocaine use 
Long-term trends show that the quantity of cocaine seized 
globally has remained stable, with South American coun-
tries continuing to account for the majority of cocaine 
seizures made worldwide. In South America, the annual 
prevalence of cocaine use was estimated to have increased 
from 0.7 per cent in 2010 (1.84 million users) to 1.2 per 
cent in 2012 (3.34 million users), three times the global 
estimated average level of consumption and it remained 
at the same level in 2013. Experts in Chile and Costa Rica 
perceived an increase in cocaine use in previous year data, 
but the increase in cocaine use in the subregion is driven 
by increasing use in Brazil, which is the largest cocaine 
market in South America. While no recent survey has been 
undertaken in Brazil, extrapolating data from a survey 
among university students, UNODC estimates a preva-
FIG. 55. Global quantities of cocaine seized, by region and in selected countries, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and other official sources.
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lence of use of cocaine of 1.75 per cent among the adult 
population of the country. Because of its geographical posi-
tion, Brazil plays a strategic role in the trafficking of 
cocaine, seizures of which doubled in the country in 2013 
to over 40 tons. Cocaine enters Brazil by air (small air-
craft), land (car, truck and bus) and river (boat across the 
Amazon and its tributaries), before being shipped overseas, 
mainly to Europe, either directly or via Africa (roughly 30 
per cent of the cocaine seized in the country is intended 
for external markets),271 using containers and aircraft. 
Seizures of cocaine (base, paste and salts) decreased in 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Peru and Venezuela (Boli-
varian Republic of ) in 2013. In the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, cocaine seizures reached their lowest level since 
2007. In Peru, seizures of cocaine paste peaked in 2012, 
but decreased to 10.8 tons in 2013, while seizures of 
cocaine salt rose slightly to 13.3 tons in 2013. In the Boli-
varian Republic of Venezuela, cocaine seizures decreased 
to 20.5 tons in 2013 (from 27.6 tons in 2012). According 
to authorities in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the 
country remains a transit point for cocaine, particularly 
cocaine trafficked by air in private aircraft, but newly 
introduced legislative changes related to air traffic control 
have decreased the entry and exit of uncontrolled aircraft, 
which has led to a decrease in drug trafficking by air.272 
Three European countries273 listed the Bolivarian Repub-
lic of Venezuela as a significant departure or transit country 
for cocaine in 2013.
Australia: more people are using 
cocaine but with less frequency
In Australia, while the use of drugs such as cannabis, 
“ecstasy”, methamphetamine and amphetamine has gen-
erally declined since 2004, the number of people using 
cocaine has been increasing since that time (see figure 57). 
The frequency of use of cocaine by recent users has 
decreased, however, with a lower proportion using it in 
the past month (18 per cent) and a higher proportion 
using it only once or twice a year (71 per cent). There 
was an increase in the proportion of people who were 
271 Country report submitted by Brazil to the Twenty-fourth Meet-
ing of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
272 UNODC, annual report questionnaire, replies submitted by  
Venezuela for 2013 and country report submitted by Venezuela 
to the Twenty-fourth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agencies, Latin America and the Caribbean.
273 France, Poland and Spain.
offered or had the opportunity to use cocaine in 2013 (up 
to 5.2 per cent from 4.4 per cent in 2010), despite increases 
in the retail price in recent years. Users’ perceptions about 
the harmfulness of the substance have decreased to 3.6 per 
cent of people considering cocaine the drug of most seri-
ous concern, which may partly explain the increase in the 
number of people having tried cocaine.274 
In New Zealand, the cocaine market remains very limited, 
with a little over 228 g of cocaine seized in 2013, and its 
use seems to rarely come to the attention of health 
agencies.
274 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey Report (see footnote 256).
Fig. 57. Indicators of cocaine use in Australia
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey, detailed report 2013.
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Fig. 58. Frequency of cocaine use by recent  
users in Australia, 2010 and 2013
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey, detailed report 2013. 
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Europe: stable cocaine market 
Cocaine use remains high in the main markets of Western 
and Central Europe (around 1.0 per cent of the popula-
tion aged 15-64). There are some signals, however, of a 
decreasing trend in countries with high levels of use, such 
as Denmark, Italy and Spain, whereas the United Kingdom 
reports a rising trend in cocaine use in the past year (see 
figure 59) and most of the remaining countries report 
stable or declining trends in cocaine use. There is also a 
declining trend in treatment demand for cocaine use, 
which may indicate a decline in the European cocaine 
market. 
Based on seizure data, cocaine continues to be the third 
most trafficked drug in Europe, after herbal cannabis and 
cannabis resin. In recent decades, with the development 
of new routes, cocaine trafficking (and use) in Europe has 
evolved and become more complex. The quantities of 
cocaine intercepted in Europe increased from the mid-
1990s, reaching a peak in 2006 (121 tons) before declin-
ing to an average of 62 tons between 2008 and 2013. 
Seizures in the Iberian Peninsula, which is used as a major 
entry point for cocaine to Europe, reached a peak in 2006, 
before falling until 2012. However, quantities seized in 
2003 increased, possibly reflecting a change in law enforce-
ment priorities or a change in the modus operandi of traf-
fickers. As cocaine is often perceived to be an elite drug, 
the economic climate may account for the decrease in sei-
zures and a possible related decrease in cocaine use.
Eastern Europe has seen an increased number of cocaine 
interdictions in recent years, although of small quantities, 
which may suggest that the cocaine market is moving east-
wards.275 Expert perceptions of trends in the use of cocaine 
in the Russian Federation point to an increase, while it is 
perceived to be stable in the other countries in the 
subregion.
Central America and the Caribbean: 
transit points for cocaine trafficking
The prevalence of use of cocaine remained high in Central 
America and the Caribbean in 2013, and the subregion 
continued to be reported as a transit area for cocaine traf-
ficked to Europe. Trafficking patterns in Central America 
appeared to be relatively stable, with Panama (41 tons) 
and Costa Rica (20 tons) seizing the largest quantities of 
cocaine in the region in 2013. Costa Rica reported that it 
had changed from being primarily a transit country to a 
country of both transit and temporary storage. Trinidad 
and Tobago seized 2.3 tons of cocaine in 2013, surpassing 
the previous annual record of 1.9 tons in 2005. Law 
enforcement authorities have observed a change in traf-
ficking patterns in which drug traffickers and smugglers 
cancel confirmed flights at the last minute then make hasty 
bookings in an attempt to avoid detection during passen-
ger screenings.
Africa: still a transit hub for cocaine  
trafficked to Europe
Information about the extent of cocaine use and traffick-
ing in Africa is limited, but prevalence estimates of cocaine 
use for Southern Africa and West and Central Africa indi-
cate a high prevalence of use (0.7 per cent annual preva-
lence in 2013). The use of the African continent as a 
trans-shipment region for cocaine trafficking to Europe 
continues, with countries in West Africa being reported 
as transit countries. Nigeria reported the seizure of 290 kg 
275 UNODC, annual report questionnaire by the Russian Federation, 
2013; EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report: a Strategic 
Analysis (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2013).
FIG. 59. Trends in cocaine use in high- 
prevalence countries in Europe
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
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of cocaine in 2013, while Ghana reported a record 901 kg 
seized and Côte d’Ivoire reported the seizure of 20 kg in 
2013, down from 27 kg in 2012. Between 2010 and 2012, 
reported cocaine seizures in Eastern Africa increased sig-
nificantly, most notably in the United Republic of Tanza-
nia. There is a change in trafficking modus operandi 
suggested by official authorities in the United Republic of 
Tanzania, where, since 2013, traffickers have been smug-
gling cocaine in smaller amounts to avoid detection.276 
276 Country report submitted by the United Republic of Tanzania 
to the Twenty-fourth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agencies, Africa.
Asia: stable but limited cocaine use
Mostly limited to countries in East and South-East Asia 
and the Near and Middle East, cocaine use in Asia remains 
comparatively low at a prevalence of 0.05 per cent among 
the population aged 15-64 (an estimated 1.3 million 
users). Quantities of cocaine seized have remained stable 
over the past three years, with some 2 tons intercepted in 
the region in 2013. However, exceptionally large amounts 
of cocaine are reported each year in some Asian countries; 
for example, roughly 1 ton was seized in Pakistan in 2013. 
Larger than amounts seized in the past, this suggests that 
cocaine is trafficked in the region and that pockets of use 
may be emerging in parts of Asia. 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN OF COCAINE PRODUCTION
Illicit coca bush cultivation and coca leaf transformation 
into cocaine lead to serious environmental damage. Coca 
bush cultivation takes place in the northern-Andean eco-
system, a biodiversity hotspota and the most species-rich 
region on Earth,b where coca bush cultivation has dev-
astating effects. Deforestation is the most researched 
aspect of the impact on the environment.c Recent studies 
using satellite imagesd have given a clearer picture of the 
damage caused to vegetation. In Colombia alone, roughly 
290,000 ha of forest were lost directly to coca bush crops 
between 2001 and 2013.e The slash-and-burn technique 
is used to clear new plots using ﬁre,f which destroys the 
vegetative matter that would otherwise protect the soil. 
Besides forest loss, this also leads to increased erosion. 
As farmers move to undeveloped areas, additional land is 
cleared to establish subsistence crops. Thus, even though 
coca bush cultivation has decreased, the percentage of 
deforestation caused by the cultivation has increased. 
Recent studies have found that proximity to coca bush 
crops increases the probability of forest loss, and that 
deforestation is “contagious” in areas where coca bush 
is grown.g Moreover, the presence of coca bush cultiva-
tion in natural parksh increases the negative impact on 
biodiversity.
Further environmental damage is caused by the herbicides 
and fertilizers used in cultivation and by the chemicals 
employed in the transformation of coca leaf into cocaine, 
although there is far less evidence in this regard. What is 
known, however, is that in 2005 alone, 81,000 tons and 
83,000 barrels of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, 
many of them considered highly toxic, were used for 
coca bush cultivation in Colombia. These, together with 
the gasoline, alkaline bases, sulphuric acid, ammonia and 
potassium permanganate required to transform coca leaf 
into cocaine, end up in the soil and water table.
a Andrew V. Bradley and Andrew C. Millington, “Coca and colo-
nists: quantifying and explaining forest clearance under coca and 
anti-narcotics policy regimes”, Ecology and Society, vol. 13, No. 1 
(2008).
b UNODC, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: a Survey of 
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru (June 2006), part 2.
c Liliana M. Dávalos and others, “Forests and drugs: coca-driven 
deforestation in tropical biodiversity hotspots”, Environmental 
Science and Technology, vol. 45, No. 4 (2011), pp. 1219-1227; 
UNODC, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2014; Coca  
Cultivation in the Andean Region: a Survey of Bolivia, Colombia 
and Peru and Bradley and Millington, “Coca and colonists:  
quantifying and explaining forest clearance under coca and  
anti-narcotics policy regimes”.
d Ibid.
e Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey 2013.
f A. Gomez and others, “Examining the potential of using informa-
tion on fire detected by MODIS and socio-economic variables to 
highlight potential coca cultivations in forest areas in Colombia”, 
The Open Geography Journal, vol. 6 (2014), pp. 18-29.
g Ricardo Rocha and Hermes Martínez, “Coca y deforestación en 
Colombia”, Serie Archivos de Economía, documento No. 375, 
(Bogotá, 2011); Dávalos and others, “Forests and drugs: coca-
driven deforestation in tropical biodiversity hotspots”.
h Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: a Survey of Bolivia, Colom-
bia and Peru, part 2; Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2014 and 
Bolivia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2014.
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Cannabis cultivation: a global  
phenomenon
Cannabis plants are grown almost everywhere in the world, 
making global levels of cannabis cultivation and produc-
tion difficult to estimate. Herbal cannabis is produced in 
almost every country, while the production of cannabis 
resin is confined to a few countries in North Africa, the 
Middle East and South-West Asia. Morocco reported 
47,196 ha of cannabis cultivation in 2013, a slight decrease 
compared with the 52,000 ha reported in 2012, while 
Mongolia reported 15,000 ha of land covered by cannabis. 
With 10,000 ha under commercial cannabis plant cultiva-
tion in 2012, producing some 1,400 tons of cannabis resin, 
one of the largest producers of cannabis resin is Afghani-
stan, where cannabis cultivation is linked to opium poppy 
cultivation: 38 per cent of villages where opium poppy is 
grown also report cannabis plant cultivation, compared 
with only 5 per cent of non-poppy-growing villages.277 
277 UNODC and Ministry of Counter Narcotics of Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2013 (December, 2013).
Increasing cannabis seizures, with 
regional differences
Cannabis plant cultivation sites range from small-scale, 
home-growing sites to large-scale industrial farms. Can-
nabis plant cultivation techniques and equipment have 
seen an increase in professionalism and innovation, result-
ing in an increase in the capacity of cannabis plant growers 
to avoid detection by law enforcement; yet 2013 data show 
an increase in quantities seized of both herbal cannabis 
and cannabis resin worldwide (see figure 61 and figure 
62). This bucks the declining trend in seizures of herbal 
cannabis that began in 2011 and may point to increased 
law-enforcement activities and/or an increase in cannabis 
production and trafficking, albeit with geographical 
variations. 
Individual drug seizure cases reported to UNODC show 
that trafficking by land accounted for more than 60 per 
cent of the total quantities seized and number of cases, 
with an average of 190 kg per seizure case in the period 
2009-2014. Maritime trafficking is the second most 
CANNABIS
Key figures
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TABLE 8. Reported eradication of cannabis plants, 2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and other official sources.
Note: n.a. = not available.
Eradication (outdoor) Eradication (indoor)
Plants (no.) Sites (no.) Plants (no.) Sites (no.)
United States 4,024,605 6,376 United States 361,183 2,747
Philippines 2,013,678 451 Germany 93,771 n.a.
Guatemala 2,000,000 n.a. Czech Republic 66,279 276
Costa Rica 1,461,747 199 Ireland 28,851 391
Brazil 900,744 n.a. New Zealand 21,202 783
Italy 884,612 1,100 Latvia 14,220 14
Trinidad and Tobago 597,100 117 Italy 10,262 622
Ukraine 483,000 n.a. Iceland 6,652 323
Belgium 393,888 1,107 Belgium 2,870 105
New Zealand 105,321 n.a.
FIG. 61. Global quantities of cannabis resin seized, by region and in selected countries, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and other official sources.
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FIG. 62. Global quantities of herbal cannabis seized, by region and in selected countries, 2003-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and other official sources.
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common method of transportation, but the quantities 
intercepted are comparatively larger, with an average of 
387 kg per seizure case in the same period (see figure 63).
The trend in Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean 
never actually underwent a decline. The contribution of 
Latin America and the Caribbean to total global quantities 
of herbal cannabis seized increased from 20 per cent to 30 
per cent in 2013, but the largest quantities of herbal 
cannabis were seized in North America (47 per cent). The 
global increase in quantities of cannabis resin seized in 
2013 was mainly driven by the rise in Pakistan, from 166 
tons in 2012 to 314 tons in 2013, which counteracted the 
marked decrease in the quantities of cannabis resin 
reported as seized in Afghanistan. Quantities intercepted 
in North Africa increased by 31 per cent, mainly owing 
to increases in Algeria (from 157 tons in 2012 to 212 tons 
in 2013) and Egypt (from 12 tons to 84 tons), and despite 
a decrease in Morocco from 137 tons in 2012 to 107 tons 
in 2013. Spain accounted for 23 per cent of global 
quantities of cannabis resin seized in 2013.
The Americas: increase in cannabis use 
and related problems in the United 
States
With an annual prevalence of use of 8.4 per cent among 
the population aged 15-64, cannabis is the most widely 
used illicit substance in the Americas, driven mainly by 
the high level of use in North America (11.6 per cent). 
The most recent data point to an increase in the prevalence 
of cannabis use in the United States, which, because of 
ongoing changes in legislation in some states, has drawn 
special attention. 
Cannabis use among high-school students in the United 
States increased in 2013 (from 24.7 per cent in 2012 to 
25.8 per cent annual prevalence in 2013), but there has 
been a significant decline in the use of synthetic cannabis 
to an annual prevalence of 6.4 per cent in 2013 from 8 
per cent in 2012, when it was first included in a school 
survey.278 Available data show an increasing trend in can-
nabis-related treatments in the past decade, along with 
increasing cannabis-related hospital admissions.279
Although the largest quantities of herbal cannabis were 
still seized in North America (47 per cent), the United 
States reported decreases in seizures between 2009 and 
2013 (see figure 65). Seizures in Mexico followed a similar 
trend, decreasing between 2010 and 2013. Despite these 
recent decreases, the United States and Mexico still account 
for the majority of global herbal cannabis seizures.280 Mex-
ican authorities report the production of herbal cannabis 
for both local consumption and for trafficking to the 
United States, mainly over land, in private vehicles and 
buses, using various methods of concealment.281 
Recent data show an increase in cannabis use in South 
America, especially in Chile (7.5 per cent annual preva-
lence of use) and Colombia (3.3 per cent), while herbal 
278 L. D. Johnston, and others, Monitoring the Future National Survey 
Results on Drug Use: 1975-2014: Overview, Key Findings on Adoles-
cent Drug Use (Institute for Social Research, University of Michi-
gan, 2015).
279 Z. Mehmedic and others, “Potency trends of ∆9-THC and other 
cannabinoids in confiscated cannabis preparations from 1993 to 
2008”, Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 1209-1217.
280 UNODC, World Drug Report 2014.
281 Country report submitted by Mexico to the Twenty-fourth Meet-
ing of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
FIG. 63. Modes of transportation of seized  
cannabis, 2009-2014
Source: UNODC, individual drug seizure database.
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FIG. 64. Cannabis use in the United States, 
2002-2013
Source: United States, SAMHSA.
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cannabis seizures increased sharply from 821 tons in 2012 
to 1,308 tons in 2013, owing to significant seizures in 
Paraguay (462 tons),282 Colombia (408 tons) and Brazil 
(222 tons). It is noteworthy that, in the context of inter-
national police cooperation in this region, Brazil and Para-
guay conduct joint operations to eradicate marijuana in 
Paraguay. The Brazilian Federal Police also perform eradi-
cation operations in the northeast of Brazil.283  
Europe: increase in cannabis market 
indicators, but prevalence of use 
remains stable
Europe is one of the world’s largest consumer markets for 
cannabis resin, yet the market in Western Europe may now 
be dominated by herbal cannabis. Of the estimated 2,050 
tons of cannabis consumed in the European Union and 
Norway in 2012, 1,280 tons were estimated by EMCDDA 
to be herbal cannabis, the use of which is more evenly 
spread across European countries than the use of cannabis 
resin, which is concentrated in a few countries.284 
The quantity of herbal cannabis seized in Europe increased 
from 284 tons in 2012 to around 362 tons in 2013, pri-
marily due to seizures in South-Eastern Europe. Seizures 
of cannabis resin also increased in Europe from 480 tons 
in 2012 to 560 tons in 2013, again primarily due to sei-
282 Country report submitted by Paraguay to the Twenty-fourth Meet-
ing of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
283 UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire by Brazil, 
2012-2013
284 EMCDDA, “Perspectives on drugs: new developments in Europe’s 
cannabis market”, 27 May 2014.
zures in South-Eastern Europe, specifically in Turkey, 
where seizures of cannabis resin increased from 27 tons in 
2012 to 94 tons in 2013. However, quantities of cannabis 
resin seized in Spain, where cannabis resin seizures are the 
largest in Europe, have decreased for five consecutive years; 
almost all of the cannabis resin that enters the country 
continues to be of Moroccan origin and the main mode 
of transportation is by sea, in speedboats, sailboats and 
fishing vessels.
In recent years, the price and potency of cannabis products 
in Europe has increased.285 In countries with available 
information, there has been an increase in both the culti-
vation of cannabis plants and the reported eradication of 
cannabis plants and production sites. The cannabis market 
in Europe is marked by high demand and a variety of 
products, the production of which is sometimes linked to 
violence and other criminal activities,286 as organized 
criminal groups have become involved in the trafficking 
of cannabis. 
Even though domestic production of cannabis is 
widespread, there are still signs that it may not be sufficient 
to meet European market demand. For example, in the 
United Kingdom seizures at the border of both herbal 
cannabis and cannabis resin are increasing, while seizures 
of locally grown cannabis plants (sinsemilla) are decreasing. 
On the one hand, such trends may suggest that domestic 
production is not sufficient to satisfy demand, which may 
285 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014.
286 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report: a Strategic 
Analysis (Luxembourg, 2013).
FIG. 65. Quantities of herbal cannabis seized  
in the United States and respective 
contribution to global seizures  
estimate
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
FIG. 66. Number and quantity of cannabis  
seizures in Europe, 2003-2013 
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire and 
other official sources.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 g
lo
ba
l e
st
im
at
ed
 se
izu
re
s
se
ize
d 
in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 (p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
To
ns
Herbal cannabis seizures in the United States
United States contribution to global seizures
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Ca
nn
ab
is 
se
izu
re
s (
in
de
x 
ba
se
 =
 1
00
 in
 2
00
3)
Quantity of herbal cannabis seized
Quantity of cannabis resin seized
Number of herbal cannabis seizure cases
Number of cannabis resin seizure cases
CHAPTER I
Cannabis 61
WORLD 
DRUG 
REPORT2015
increasingly rely on imported products. On the other 
hand, the detection of cannabis plant cultivation sites, 
usually indoors, may have become a growing challenge for 
law enforcement, as there is an increasing tendency for 
criminal groups to run numerous small-scale cultivation 
sites rather than few large-scale plantations in order to 
mitigate the risk of detection.287 
Although the prevalence of cannabis use remains high in 
Western and Central Europe (5.7 per cent), there is evi-
dence of stabilizing or decreasing trends, especially in 
countries with long and established cannabis use. Infor-
mation on the use of NPS in Europe is not comprehensive 
and does not establish whether the decrease in cannabis 
use is associated with the emerging use of synthetic can-
nabinoids or other NPS. 
Asia: cannabis consumption remains 
below global levels
Cannabis consumption in Asia seems to continue to be 
below global levels, although reliable estimates of preva-
lence of use are available for only a few countries. Cannabis 
is the most common illicitly used substance in the region, 
with an annual prevalence of use among those aged 15-64 
of 1.9 per cent. Experts perceive an increase in its use, but 
the quantities of herbal cannabis seized remained stable 
overall in most parts of Asia in 2013, totalling 292 tons. 
South Asia continued to account for the majority of the 
quantities of cannabis resin intercepted in the subregion, 
but countries in the Near and Middle East/South-West 
Asia reported that seizures of cannabis resin originating in 
Afghanistan were increasing. This trend continued in 
2013, marking the increasing importance of Afghanistan 
in the global supply of cannabis resin and highlighting the 
fact that the same trafficking routes are being used for the 
smuggling of different substances. In 2013, Pakistan 
reported seizures of almost twice the quantity seized in 
2012, mentioning Afghanistan as the source country for 
all the cannabis resin seized. 
Oceania: high levels of use, fed by 
domestic cultivation
Information about drug use in Oceania is limited to Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, where there are high levels of 
cannabis use (10.7 per cent annual prevalence of use). 
With a high frequency of cannabis experimentation and 
use within the general population, cannabis is the most 
widely used illicit drug in New Zealand and accounts for 
most illicit-drug-related hospital admissions. Cannabis 
cultivation remains a predominantly domestic matter in 
New Zealand, with no evidence of large-scale imports or 
exports of cannabis or any of its derivatives.
Cannabis is also the most common drug used (both past-
year and lifetime use) in Australia, with prevalence and 
287 Ibid.
frequency of use having remained stable between 2010 
and 2013. The median age of cannabis users rose from 27 
in 2001 to 30 in 2013, suggesting the existence of an 
ageing cohort of drug users in Australia, while perceptions 
regarding cannabis supply suggest an increased general 
tolerance to cannabis use.288 
288 Australian National Drugs Strategy Household Surveys (NDSHS)
http://www.aihw.gov.au/alcohol-and-other-drugs/ndshs/
FIG. 67. Cannabis use in Australia
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey, detailed report 2013. 
FIG. 68. Forms of cannabis used, recent users  
in Australia aged 14 years or older 
(past-year use)
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey, detailed report 2013. 
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Herbal cannabis continues to be the most seized illicit 
drug in Oceania. The quantity of herbal cannabis seized 
in Australia in 2013 was the highest reported in the past 
decade,289 whereas in New Zealand, it remained relatively 
stable. In Australia, the retail cannabis price has remained 
stable while THC content is thought to have increased in 
the past decade,290 suggesting a potential increase in the 
availability of the drug.
Africa: increases in cannabis cultivation 
and production 
Cannabis cultivation, production, trafficking and use 
occur in all parts of Africa.291 There is only limited infor-
289 Australian Crime Commission, Illicit Drug Data Report 2012-13.
290 W. Swift and others, “Analysis of cannabis seizures in NSW, Aus-
tralia: cannabis potency and cannabinoid profile”, PLOS ONE, vol. 
8, No. 7 (2013).
291 Report of the Twenty-fourth Meeting of Heads of National Drug 
mation available on the drug use situation in Africa, but 
the prevalence of cannabis use in the region is estimated 
to be high (7.5 per cent of the population aged 15-64) 
compared with the global average (3.9 per cent), and is 
particularly high in West and Central Africa (12.4 per 
cent). In 2013, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria each reported 
seizing over 200 tons of cannabis herb. Between 1990 and 
2011, Morocco reported the largest annual quantities of 
cannabis resin seized in North Africa and continued to 
seize significant quantities of cannabis resin in 2012 and 
2013 (137 tons and 107 tons, respectively). Since 2012, 
however, with 157 tons intercepted in 2012 and 212 tons 
in 2013, Algeria is now reporting the largest annual quan-
tities of cannabis resin seized in North Africa, which the 
country attributes to law enforcement efforts.292 
Law Enforcement Agencies, Africa (UNODC/HONLAF/24/5).
292 Country report submitted by Algeria to the Twenty-fourth Meeting 
of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Africa.
IS CANNABIS BECOMING MORE HARMFUL?
Measured in terms of THC (ǻ9-tetrahydrocannabinol) 
content, cannabis potency is often linked to how harm-
ful cannabis may be. Higher THC content has been 
associated with anxiety, depression, an increased risk of 
dependence, psychotic symptoms and effects on the res-
piratory and cardiovascular systems, particularly among 
regular users, although anxiety or psychotic symptoms 
may also occur in recent and inexperienced users.a A 
recent study in south London suggests the risk of psycho-
sis is three times higher in users of high-potency herbal 
cannabis (“skunk”) than in non-users.b,c 
The presence in cannabis of CBD (cannabidiol), a can-
nabinoid with anti-psychotic properties,d,e may partially 
counterbalance the harm caused by THC. This interaction 
should be taken into account when analysing cannabis 
potency, yet CBD is not frequently monitored, which leads 
to difﬁculties in assessing the harm caused by cannabis 
and public health implications. Globally, cannabis potency 
data is very scarce, but in countries with available infor-
mation there are signs of an increase in THC content, 
particularly in the past decade, and in cannabis-related 
health problems. A systematic review of THC content 
in herbal cannabis has suggested that it is increasing, 
although the increase is not constant and does not 
exceed 5 per cent globally.f 
Reporting an average potency of over 10 per cent in 
2012,g most European countries experienced an increase 
in THC content, mainly in herbal cannabis, from 2006 
to 2012. In the past two decades, there has also been a 
change in users’ preferences in Europe, most notably in 
the Central and Western part of the region, where can-
nabis markets are the largest. Data suggest a shift from 
cannabis resin to herbal cannabis, with increasing use of 
domestic, as opposed to imported, products, particularly 
sinsemilla (unfertilized female plants), characterized by 
high levels of THC and very low levels of CBD.h 
The past decade has seen rapid advancement in cannabis 
plant cultivation techniques in some European countries, 
leading to the spread of domestic (indoor) cultivation, 
thereby reducing reliance on imported cannabis products.i 
Indoor cannabis plant cultivation, using controlled grow-
ing conditions and genetically selected strains, has led to 
an increase in the number of harvests, as well as in yield 
Trends in mean potency (percentage of THC) of 
cannabis products sold in “coffee shops” in the 
Netherlands, 1999-2014
Source: Trimbos Institute.
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and potency. Selective breeding, which mainly focuses 
on achieving high THC content, has also resulted in the 
selection of varieties containing less CBD.j
Data on cannabis samples sold in “coffee shops” in 
the Netherlands show that the THC content of the two 
most consumed cannabis products — imported cannabis 
resin and domestically produced (Dutch) herbal canna-
bis or nederwiet (mostly sinsemilla) — has stabilized at 
high levels (around 15 per cent) in recent years, while 
CBD content has remained low (under 1 per cent) in 
nederwiet but comparatively high in imported resin (7 
per cent).k 
Even within a speciﬁc strain of cannabis there may be 
great variability in content, suggesting that users may 
be unwittingly exposed to very different levels of THC 
and CBD.l Moreover, the change in users’ preferences, 
from traditional (seeded) herbal cannabis to sinsemilla, 
suggests an increased level of risk exposure in Europe.
Despite evidence of stabilizing or decreasing trends in 
the prevalence of cannabis use in Europe, particularly in 
countries with established levels of cannabis use, there 
are indications of increases in cannabis-related health 
problems. Between 2006 and 2012, the number of indi-
viduals (ﬁrst admissions to drug treatment) seeking help 
for cannabis use in Europe rose from 45,000 to 59,000, 
nearly half of whom (49 per cent) were daily users; and 
cannabis has become the most frequent drug reported 
as the main reason for ﬁrst-time entrants for treatment.m 
Moreover, cannabis-related emergency episodes have 
seen an increase in Europe, particularly in countries with 
the highest prevalence of use. 
In Oceania, recent data also suggest that the THC con-
tent of cannabis may be increasing. A ﬁrst systematic 
analysis of the potency of cannabis at the street level 
in Australia was carried out in 2013 and showed high 
levels of THC content. Analysis of samples taken from 
recreational users in possession of up to 15 g of can-
nabis revealed an average THC content of just under 15 
per cent and a CBD content of 0.14 per cent. The shift 
towards increasing use of cannabis with high THC and 
low CBD content has also been linked to an increase 
in drug treatment demand and in the risk of cannabis 
dependence and vulnerability to psychosis, but there 
is little evidence of the direct impact of potency.n In 
New Zealand, there have also been suggestions of an 
increase in the THC content of herbal cannabis in the 
past two decades.o 
The THC content of cannabis in the United States 
increased from less than 3.4 per cent in 1993 to 8.8 
per cent in 2008, whereas CBD content remained low 
and invariable over time (0.4 per cent in 2008).p Federal 
seizure data show that the THC content of marijuana has 
increased in the past two decades, from 3.7 per cent in 
1993 to 12.6 per cent in 2013, reﬂecting a higher pro-
portion of sinsemilla in the market (with a THC content 
Trends in median CBD content of cannabis  
products sold in “coffee shops” in the  
Netherlands, 2005-2014
Source: Trimbos Institute.
THC and CBD content in cannabis samples, 
cannabis-treatment admissions and marijuana-
related hospital emergencies, United States, 
1993-2013
Sources: Z. Mehmedic and others, “Potency trends of ǻ9-THC 
and other cannabinoids”; and SAMHSA. 
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REGULATED COMMERCIAL  
CANNABISa MARKETS: WHAT 
CAN WE LEARN FROM THE 
STATE OF COLORADO? 
Recent changes in cannabis policy
In the United States, following the recent implemen-
tation of commercial marijuana markets in the states 
of Coloradob and Washington,c the states of Alaskad 
and Oregone passed laws in 2014 that make legal the 
“production, sale, and use of marijuana” for persons 
aged 21 and older, while the District of Columbia voted 
to remove criminal and civil penalties for adult posses-
sion of marijuana and personal marijuana cultivation.f 
Outside the United States, the parliament in Jamaicag 
recently passed a law allowing for possession of 2 
ounces or less, personal cultivation of ﬁve or fewer 
plants and the legal use of marijuana by Rastafarians 
for religious purposes.h Uruguay is currently in the 
process of implementing the commercial regulation 
of cannabis following changes to the law in 2012.
United States, state of Colorado: the first year 
of a regulated commercial marijuana market
The right to purchase marijuana legally in the state of 
Colorado occurred gradually. In 2000, voters approved 
a measure to make medical marijuana legal for the 
treatment of certain conditions,i but the commercializa-
tion of medical marijuana did not become widespread 
until 2009.j Three years later, in 2012, Amendment 
64 regulated marijuana similarly to alcohol and, as of 
1 January 2014, Colorado became the ﬁrst state to 
implement retail sales of marijuana for recreational use 
to adults aged 21 years or older.k One year later, 502 
licensed medical marijuana dispensaries and 322 retail 
marijuana stores were operating throughout the state.l 
According to recent marijuana prevalence estimates 
for Colorado, adjusted for population growth and 
underreporting,m there were an estimated 686,000 
adult residents in 2014 who used marijuana at least 
once per year. A 2014 reportn estimated the total 
market demand of this population and non-residents 
to be some 130.3 tons (range: 104.2-157.9).o Com-
pared with the current estimated supply of 77 tonsp 
(42 per cent of which is consumed for medical use), the 
demand for cannabis is far greater than licit supply can 
meet. It is thus likely that an estimated 53 tons would 
need to be supplied by personal home production and 
by unlicensed or out-of-state producers.
In addition to inhaled or smoked forms of canna-
bis herb and resin, the commercial marketplace has 
made available a wide range of THC-containing food 
products, or “edibles”, which may increase the risk 
of accidental ingestion, acute intoxication, psychosis, 
poisoning and intoxication-related injury or death.q In 
of 14.5 per cent in 2013). Available data in the United 
States show an increasing trend in cannabis-related 
treatments in the past two decades, from 6.9 per cent 
in 1993 to 17.5 per cent in 2012, along with increasing 
cannabis-related hospital admissions.q
a W. Hall, “What has research over the past two decades revealed 
about the adverse health effects of recreational cannabis use?”, 
Addiction, vol. 110, No. 1 (2015), pp. 19-35.
b Marta Di Forti and others, “Proportion of patients in south 
London with first-episode psychosis attributable to use of high 
potency cannabis: a case-control study”, The Lancet Psychiatry, 
vol. 2, No. 3 (2015), pp. 233-238.
c It should be noted that this is specific to “skunk”, as other can-
nabis products may result in different risks.
d A. W. Zuardi and others, “Cannabidiol, a Cannabis sativa con-
stituent, as an antipsychotic drug”, Brazilian Journal of Medical 
and Biological Research, vol. 39, No. 4 (2006), pp. 421-429.
e A. Englund and others, “Cannabidiol inhibits THC-elicited 
paranoid symptoms and hyppocampal-dependent memory 
impairment”, Journal of Psychopharmacology, vol. 27, No. 1 
(2013), pp. 19-27.
f F. Cascini, F. C. Aiello and G. L. Di Tanna, “Increasing delta-
9-tetrahydrocannabinol (∆-9-THC) content in herbal cannabis 
over time: systematic review and meta-analysis”, Current Drug 
Abuse Reviews, No. 5, vol. 1 (2012), pp. 32-40.
g EMCDDA, Statistical Bulletin 2014.
h EMCDDA, Cannabis Production and Markets in Europe, 
EMCDDA Insights Series No. 12 (Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Union, 2012).
i Phenomenon of “import substitution” referred by Jansen A. M. 
(2002), “The economics of cannabis cultivation in Europe”, 
paper presented at the 2nd European Conference on Drug  
Trafficking and Law Enforcement, Paris 26-27 Sept. 2002. 
Available at: www.cedro-uva.org/lib/jansen.economics.html.
j EMCDDA (2012), Cannabis Production and Markets in Europe. 
EMCDDA Insights Series No.12 (Luxembourg, Office for Offi-
cial Publications of the European Union, 2012).
k S. Rigter and R. Niesink, THC-concentraties in wiet, nederwiet 
en hasj in Nederlandsecoffeeshop, 2013-2014 (Utrecht, 
Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and Addiction (Trimbos 
Institut), 2014).
l D. J. Potter, P. Clark and M. B. Brown, “Potency of ∆9-THC 
and other cannabinoids in cannabis in England in 2005: 
implications for psychoactivity and pharmacology”, Journal of 
Forensic Sciences, vol. 53, No. 1 (2008), pp. 90-94.
m EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014. 
n Swift and others, “Analysis of Cannabis Seizures in New South 
Wales, Australia: cannabinoid profile and implications”, PLOS 
ONE (2013).
o G. Knight and others, “The results of an experimental indoor 
hydroponic Cannabis growing study, using the ‘Screen of 
Green’ (ScrOG) method-Yield, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 
and DNA analysis”, Forensic Science International, vol. 202, 
Nos. 1-3 (2010), pp. 36-44.
p Mehmedic and others, “Potency trends of ∆9-THC and other 
cannabinoids in confiscated cannabis preparations from 1993 to 
2008” (see footnote 279).
q Ibid.
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contrast to inhaled THC-containing products, which take 
effect after a few seconds or minutes, oral consumption 
has a delayed effect of between 30 and 90 minutes that 
lasts from 4 to 12 hours, far longer than psychotropic 
effects from inhalation, which last around 2 to 3 hours. 
This may lead to ingestion of greater quantities of THC 
than desired.r 
Health impacts
According to the results of the United States National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health, the prevalence of mari-
juana use in Colorado is higher, and is increasing faster, 
than the national average. There is no causal evidence 
to connect legislation to prevalence of use, but peaks in 
past-year prevalence appear to coincide with laws easing 
restrictions on personal consumption.
Mirroring trends in prevalence of use of marijuana in 
Colorado, the number of primary treatment admissions 
per 100,000 is high and growing among persons aged 
12 or older, and has exceeded the national average since 
2003. 
Reaching an average of 18.7 per cent, according to the 
laboratory responsible for state-mandated testing, the 
THC concentration of legally sold cannabis in Colorado 
is relatively high.s Perhaps serving as an early indicator 
of the acute effects of increased access to high-potency 
marijuana and THC-containing products, calls to the 
Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug Center concerning 
marijuana doubled between 2013 and 2014. In addi-
tion, emergency room data indicate that there has been 
a number of severe burns from attempted THC extrac-
tion from cannabis plants and cyclic vomiting caused 
by the ingestion of high THC-content products (cases 
doubled following medical marijuana legalization), and 
unintentional marijuana ingestion among children (from 
zero in the ﬁve years prior to medical liberalization, to 
14 between 2009 and 2011, among admissions to the 
Children’s Hospital of Colorado).t 
Moreover, according to the Colorado State Patrol, mari-
juana was related to 12.2 per cent of all citations for 
driving under the inﬂuence of any substance in 2014, 
while among road accidents involving fatalities the 
number of drivers who tested positive for marijuana dou-
bled from 37 in 2006 to 78 in 2012. It will, however, be 
several years before any change speciﬁcally attributable 
to retail marijuana sales and trafﬁc deaths is evident.
Criminal justice
As expected, arrests for possession (2 ounces or less) and 
cases brought to state court declined signiﬁcantly from 
2012 to 2013 across Colorado, freeing law enforcement 
resources otherwise spent on making marijuana-related 
arrests, whereas marijuana-related arrests in the border 
counties of the neighbouring state of Nebraska have 
increased signiﬁcantly.u Arrests at Colorado schoolsv for 
marijuana charges have also increased, although only 
slightly, from 273 in 2012/13 to 289 in 2013/14, but 
several years of data will be required before the impact 
of commercially available marijuana on youth behaviour 
can be properly interpreted.
State revenues
Following strong growth in 2014, monthly tax revenues 
from the retail and medical marijuana markets in the state 
Prevalence of past-year marijuana use (aged 12  
or older) in the United States, 2006-2013
Source: United States, National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 
SAMHSA.
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Drug treatment admissions for marijuana,  
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the population aged 12 or older in the state of 
Colorado and in the United States as a whole, 
2001-2012
Source: United States, Treatment Episode Data Set (2001-2012), 
SAMHSA.
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of Colorado ended at nearly triple the revenue earned 
in January, bringing in over $8.5 million in the month 
of December alone. In revenue from sales, licences and 
fees in both the medical and retail marijuana markets, 
the state is poised to net approximately $76 millionw 
in the 2014 calendar year. 
a To be consistent with legal language from bills pertaining to canna-
bis as “marijuana” throughout the Americas, the term marijuana in 
the present section of the report refers to all cannabis products and 
in some cases tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) containing products.
b Data from Amendment 64: Use and Regulation of Marijuana 
(United States, Constitution of the State of Colorado, art. XVIII, 
sect. 16).
c United States, State of Washington, Initiative Measure No. 502.
d United States, State of Alaska, Ballot Measure No. 2: 13PSUM 
An Act to Tax and Regulate the Production, Sale, and Use of 
Marijuana.
e United States, State of Oregon, Measure 91: Control, Regulation, 
and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act.
f United States, District of Columbia, Ballot Initiative No. 71, 
which took effect in July 2014, will allow up to 2 ounces of 
marijuana and cultivation of up to six plants. As the District of 
Columbia does not have statehood, thereby falling under Federal 
governance, this initiative may not fall under the same provision 
as those of states.
g Jamaica, Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2015.
h “Jamaica poised to relax cannabis laws”, The Guardian (London), 
22 January 2015.
i United States, Constitution of the State of Colorado, 0-4-287, art. 
XVIII, miscellaneous art. XVIII.
j See United States, Department of Justice, “Memorandum for 
selected United States attorneys on investigations and prosecutions 
in states authorizing the medical use of marijuana”, 19 October 
2009.
k In November 2012, Colorado voters passed Constitutional 
Amendment 64, which legalized marijuana for recreational 
purposes for anyone over 21 years of age. Retail stores opened on 
1 January 2014.
l United States, State of Colorado, Department of Revenue, 
Enforcement Division, MED Licensed Facilities (Medical 
marijuana facilities, Retail Marijuana Facilities).
m Demand estimates for 2014 were based on the prevalence of 
past-year users estimated by the National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health (NSDUH) 2010 and 2011 survey results, stratified 
by frequency of use and adjusted for population growth (5.3 
per cent) and underreporting (22.2 per cent adjustment among 
users who use 20 days or less per month and 11.1 per cent for 
those who use more frequently), see Miles K. Light and others, 
“Market size and demand for marijuana in Colorado” (July 2015), 
prepared for the Colorado Department of Revenue, p. 15.
n Light and others, “Market size and demand for marijuana in 
Colorado” (July 2015), prepared for the Colorado Department of 
Revenue.
o The total amount estimated for use (130.3 tons) includes an 
estimated 121.4 tons for residents and 8.9 tons for visitors. The 
quantity of marijuana in demand for the estimated 184,000 
residents under the age of 21 who reported use in the past year 
was not included.
p Light and others, “Market size and demand for marijuana in 
Colorado” (see footnote 210).
q T. S. Ghosh and others, “Medical marijuana’s public health lessons: 
implications for retail marijuana in Colorado”, New England 
Journal of Medicine, vol. 372, No. 11 (2015), pp. 991-993.
r F. Grotenhermen, “Pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of 
cannabinoids”, Clinical Pharmacokinetics, vol. 42, No. 4 (2003), 
pp. 327-360.
s “State mandated testing of retail marijuana in Colorado”, 
presentation made by Andy LaFrate from Charas Scientific to 
the 249th American Chemical Society National Meeting and 
Exposition, Denver, Colorado, March 2015.
t A. A. Monte and others, “The implications of marijuana 
legalization in Colorado”, Journal of the American Medical 
Association, vol. 313, No. 3 (2015), pp. 241 and 242.
u J. M. Ellison and R. Spohn, “Colorado’s legalization of medicinal 
marijuana: the effects on Nebraska’s law enforcement and local 
jail system” (Nebraska Center for Justice Research, University of 
Nebraska at Omaha, 2015).
v United States, Denver Police Department Versadex and OSI 
databases.
w United States, Colorado Department of Revenue.
Monthly revenue (United States dollars) from sales tax, excise tax, licences and fees for retail and  
medical marijuana, and total monthly tax revenue, United States, state of Colorado, 2014 
 Source: United States, Colorado Department of Revenue.
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The global market for synthetic drugs, which for the pur-
poses of the present report includes amphetamine-type 
stimulants (ATS) and new psychoactive substances (NPS), 
continues to be dominated by methamphetamine, with 
East and South-East Asia accounting for the largest seizures 
reported worldwide. The market for methamphetamine 
is becoming increasingly diversified. In addition to the 
established and growing market for methamphetamine in 
East and South-East Asia, there are also indications of 
increasing use in parts of North America and Europe. Sei-
zure data for “ecstasy” and its precursor chemicals point 
to the growing availability of “ecstasy” in East and South-
East Asia.
Regarding the large numbers of NPS294 which have 
293 For the purpose of the present report, the term “synthetic drugs” 
includes ATS, the main drugs being amphetamine, methampheta-
mine and “ecstasy”-type substances, and NPS. 
294 For the purposes of the present report, the analysis of NPS includes 
ketamine, which differs from other NPS in that is widely used in 
human and veterinary medicine, while most NPS have little or no 
history of medical use.
emerged in recent years, it remains unclear whether they 
are displacing existing drugs under international control, 
in either the short or long term, or whether they are diver-
sifying the range of synthetic drugs available on the 
market. Although prevalence figures for synthetic can-
nabinoids in the United States and mephedrone in the 
United Kingdom suggest declining use of these substances, 
a growing number of countries has been reporting a wider 
range of emerging NPS and worrying developments such 
as the injecting use of NPS. Up to December 2014, a total 
of 541 NPS were reported to the UNODC early warning 
advisory by 95 countries and territories, through data sub-
missions from Member States and national drug testing 
laboratories participating in the international collaborative 
exercises programme.295 While there are large numbers of 
NPS available on the synthetic drugs market globally, 
emergence and persistence patterns of these substances 
show significant differences between countries and regions. 
295 UNODC, early warning advisory on NPS.
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Methamphetamine is driving the 
increase in ATS seizures
Surging seizures since 2009 point to a rapid expansion of 
the global ATS market, with ATS seizures almost doubling 
to reach over 144 tons in 2011 and 2012 — the highest 
ATS seizure amounts since UNODC systematic monitor-
ing began — before decreasing slightly in 2013 (see figure 
69). The increase from 2009 is primarily attributable to 
the growing amount of methamphetamine seized, which 
increased from 34 tons in 2009 to 88 tons in 2013. The 
growing importance of methamphetamine is a rather 
recent feature of the global ATS market. Over the years, 
global amphetamine seizures have fluctuated, ranging 
between about 20 tons and 33 tons annually since 2009. 
Global “ecstasy” seizures were low compared with amphet-
amine and methamphetamine seizures and remained 
under 5 tons annually between 2009 and 2013.
Increasing interconnections in the  
methamphetamine market
While methamphetamine continues to be primarily traf-
ficked within regions, significant increases in metham-
phetamine seizures observed in the past five years would 
seem to indicate the establishment of new trafficking 
routes linking previously unconnected regional metham-
phetamine markets (see map 3). New international supply 
channels linking major methamphetamine markets in 
North America and East and South-East Asia have been 
observed. In addition, methamphetamine trafficking 
routes to East and South-East Asia have emerged from 
several parts of Africa and the Americas. West Africa in 
particular appears to have become an established source 
of methamphetamine trafficked to East and South-East 
Asia via South Africa or Europe. Turkey may have emerged 
FIG. 69. Total seizures of amphetamine-type 
stimulants reported worldwide,  
2009-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire, 2009-
2013. 
Note: The category “non-specified ATS” includes seizures reported to 
UNODC as ATS without indicating a specific substance and excludes 
prescription stimulants. 
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as a transit point for methamphetamine smuggled from 
Western Asia to Western and Central Europe. Recently, 
there have also been reports of methamphetamine traf-
ficking from Western and Central Europe to North Amer-
ica, South America and East and South-East Asia.
New trends in methamphetamine use
Methamphetamine use continues to be a major problem 
in large parts of East and South-East Asia and accounts 
for a large share of people receiving drug treatment in a 
number of countries in the subregion. In 2013, people 
receiving treatment for methamphetamine use accounted 
for the majority of people treated for drug use in many 
countries.296,297
Methamphetamine use in the United States displays a 
stable trend, with annual prevalence of methamphetamine 
use among the general population aged 15-64 having 
remained in the range of 0.5 to 0.6 per cent between 2010 
and 2013. However, there are recent indications of 
increases in methamphetamine use in certain parts of the 
United States. In Minneapolis/Saint Paul, a 19 per cent 
increase in the number of people treated for methampheta-
mine use between 2011 and 2012 was reported.298 In the 
state of Ohio, there was a 34 per cent increase in the 
number of people receiving treatment for methampheta-
mine use between 2009 and 2012.299 In San Diego, deaths 
related to methamphetamine use have increased by more 
than 70 per cent between 2008 and 2012.300 
In Europe, while amphetamine and “ecstasy” continue to 
account for the bulk of ATS seizures, there appears to be 
increasing availability of crystalline methamphetamine, 
including in countries where reports on the use of meth-
amphetamine have not been common in the past. Accord-
ing to the Federal Criminal Police Office in Germany, the 
number of first-time crystalline methamphetamine users 
increased by almost 7 per cent to 2,746 users in 2013, 
crystalline methamphetamine seizure cases rose by about 
10 per cent to 3,847 cases and the quantity of the drug 
seized increased by 88 per cent to 75.2 kg in the same 
year.301 The results of a survey in Frankfurt, Germany, 
found high methamphetamine use among people in the 
techno-party scene in 2012.302 According to EMCDDA, 
there have been new reports from Greece and Turkey of 
the smoking of methamphetamine.303 In Greece, crystal-
296 Based on data collected by the Drug Abuse Information Network 
for Asia and the Pacific.
297 Ibid.
298 United States, DEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, 
November 2014.
299 Ibid.
300 Ibid.
301 UNODC, Global SMART Update 2014, vol. 12, (September 2014).
302 C. Bernard, B. Werse and C. Schell-Mack, MoSyD Jahresbericht 
2012: Drogentrends in Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt, Centre for 
Drug Research, Goethe University, 2013).
303 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014.
line methamphetamine seizures increased from only 1 kg 
in 2012 to 15 kg in 2013 and, according to the Turkish 
National Police, crystalline methamphetamine makes up 
the majority of methamphetamine seizures in the coun-
try.304 EMCDDA also reports an emergence of crystalline 
methamphetamine smoking among people who inject 
opioids in southern European countries.305 
For some years, methamphetamine has dominated the 
market in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, in 
2013, methamphetamine seizures not only accounted for 
the largest share of ATS seizures reported in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, but also in some countries in the 
Baltics and Eastern Europe, such as Belarus, Latvia, Lithu-
ania and the Republic of Moldova, as well as Cyprus, 
Greece and Portugal. 
A diversified market for methampheta-
mine in East and South-East Asia
The methamphetamine sold in East and South-East Asia 
is presented in two main forms: methamphetamine tablets 
and crystalline methamphetamine. In both cases, meth-
amphetamine is available in salt form, most frequently as 
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which, in principle, can 
be smoked, nasally insufflated, orally ingested and injected. 
Methamphetamine tablets, commonly known as “yaba” 
in the subregion, are small pills, typically of low purity, 
which are available in many different shapes and colours. 
In addition to methamphetamine, such tablets often con-
tain a large portion of caffeine, plus a range of adulterants. 
In the case of methamphetamine tablets, both ingestion 
and smoking of the crushed tablets are common. Crystal-
line methamphetamine, also called “crystal meth”, “ice” 
or “shabu”, is usually of much higher purity than the tablet 
form. It is encountered on the illicit drug market as 
(crushed) colourless crystals of different sizes. In the case 
of crystalline methamphetamine, smoking, nasal insuffla-
tion and injecting are typical forms of consumption.306 
Information on seizures and use indicate that the market 
for both forms of methamphetamine is expanding. Sei-
zures of methamphetamine tablets and crystalline meth-
amphetamine generally increased in East and South-East 
Asia between 2008 and 2013 (see figure 70). Crystalline 
methamphetamine seizures in the region almost doubled 
over this period, while methamphetamine tablet seizures 
have risen at a more rapid rate resulting in an eight-fold 
increase.
304 Turkish National Police, Turkish Report of Anti-Smuggling and 
Organised Crime 2013 (Ankara, June 2014).
305 EMCDDA, European Drug Report 2014.
306 Terminology and Information on Drugs (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.03.XI.14); Recommended Methods for the Identifica-
tion and Analysis of Amphetamine, Methamphetamine and Their 
Ring-Substituted Analogues in Seized Materials: Manual for Use by 
National Drug Testing Laboratories (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.06.XI.1).
70
Unlike methamphetamine tablets, which, by and large, 
have remained a feature of the Mekong region, crystalline 
methamphetamine has become geographically widespread 
across East and South-East Asia.307 
Methamphetamine tablets are mainly manufactured in the 
Mekong region of East and South-East Asia, with seizure 
reports indicating that such tablets are mostly intended 
for markets within that subregion. Myanmar is perceived 
to be the main country of origin for methamphetamine 
tablets seized throughout the Mekong region and in some 
other parts of East and South-East Asia. Reports of meth-
amphetamine tablets originating in Myanmar and seized 
in China and Thailand indicate that increasing quantities 
are being trafficked from Myanmar across the shared bor-
ders of those countries.308 
Crystalline methamphetamine: 
increased interconnectedness
Although crystalline methamphetamine continues to be 
manufactured on a large scale in East and South-East Asia, 
a complex international trafficking pattern of crystalline 
methamphetamine originating in other parts of the world 
has evolved in recent years. For a number of years, crystal-
307 Based on expert perception on the use of main drugs of concern 
reflected in the Drug Abuse Information Network for Asia and the 
Pacific.
308 China, National Narcotics Control Commission, Annual Report 
on Drug Control in China 2014 (Beijing, 2014); Official com-
munication with the National Narcotics Control Commission of 
China, Ministry of Public Security, November 2014; Office of the 
Narcotics Control Board of Thailand, “Drug situation in Thailand 
and trends”, presented at the Thirty-eighth Meeting of Heads of 
National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, Asia and the Pacific 
(October 2014).
line methamphetamine has been trafficked from Africa to 
countries in East and South-East Asia, such as Cambodia, 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet Nam 
and more recently the Philippines.309 Recently, East and 
South-East Asian countries have also reported crystalline 
methamphetamine seizures perceived to have originated 
in Western Asia.310 Since 2013, shipments of crystalline 
methamphetamine seized in East and South-East Asia and 
Oceania have been perceived to have originated in Mexico. 
In particular, large consignments, perceived to have origi-
nated in Mexico, totalling more than 0.4 tons and 0.2 tons 
of crystalline methamphetamine, were reported to have 
been seized in Japan in 2013 and 2014, respectively.311 In 
2013, Australia, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea 
also reported the seizure of crystalline methamphetamine 
perceived to have originated in Mexico.312 
In North America, there may be an increase in crystalline 
methamphetamine trafficking from Mexico to the United 
States. According to the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration, between 2012 and 2013 the amount of 
methamphetamine seized in powder and crystalline form 
along the south-west border of the United States increased 
by 18.5 per cent.313 Moreover, increasing trafficking to 
the United States of methamphetamine in liquid form for 
later conversion to crystalline methamphetamine was 
reported.314 In 2013, Mexico also reported the seizure of 
more than 3.3 tons of liquid methamphetamine. However, 
not all of the crystalline methamphetamine manufactured 
in North America may be intended for the region. For 
instance, methamphetamine trafficked from Mexico to 
Japan is perceived to have increased in 2013, which further 
points to a more globalized crystalline methamphetamine 
market. 
309 UNODC, Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-type Stimulants and 
other Drugs: Challenges for Asia and the Pacific (November 2013); 
UNODC, Global Synthetic Drugs Assessment: Amphetamine-type 
Stimulants and New Psychoactive Substances (Vienna, 2014).
310 “Indonesia country report”, presented by the National Narcotics 
Board of Indonesia at the Global SMART Programme regional 
meeting, Yangon, 20 and 21 August 2014; National Police Agency 
of Japan, October 2014; Malaysia drug situation report, presented 
by the Royal Malaysian Police at the Twenty-fourth Anti-Drug Liai-
son Officials’ Meeting for International Cooperation, Jeju, Republic 
of Korea, 1-3 October 2014; and “Thailand country report”, pre-
sented by the Office of the Narcotics Control Board of Thailand at 
the Nineteenth Asia-Pacific Operational Drug Enforcement Confer-
ence, held in Tokyo from 18 to 20 February 2014.
311 Information provided by International Safety and Security Coop-
eration Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, August 2014; 
National Police Agency of Japan, October 2014.
312 Presentation by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency at the 
Nineteenth Asia-Pacific Operational Drug Enforcement Confer-
ence, held in Tokyo from 18 to 20 February 2014; presentation by 
the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office of the Republic of Korea, at the 
Global SMART Programme regional meeting, Yangon, 20 and 21 
August 2014; presentation by the Australian Federal Police at the 
Nineteenth Asia-Pacific Operational Drug Enforcement Confer-
ence, held in Tokyo from 18 to 20 February 2014.
313 United States, DEA, National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, 
2014 (November 2014).
314 Ibid.
FIG. 70. Crystalline methamphetamine and 
methamphetamine tablet seizures 
reported in East and South-East Asia, 
2009-2013
Source: Drug Abuse Information Network for Asia and the Pacific.
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
0
50,000,000
100,000,000
150,000,000
200,000,000
250,000,000
300,000,000
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Cr
ys
ta
lli
ne
 m
et
ha
m
ph
et
am
in
e 
(k
ilo
gr
am
s)
N
um
be
r o
f m
et
ha
m
ph
et
am
in
e 
ta
bl
et
s
Methamphetamine tablets
Crystalline methamphetamine
CHAPTER I
Synthetic drugs 71
WORLD 
DRUG 
REPORT2015
Regional shift in the “ecstasy” market?
In 2012, “ecstasy” seizures in East and South-East Asia 
and Oceania surged to almost 2 tons, just under the 2.3 
tons seized in Europe, but much higher than the 0.7 tons 
seized in the Americas. East and South-East Asia and Oce-
ania may be becoming an emerging driver of the global 
market for “ecstasy”, while seizures in the Americas have 
declined, dropping by 81 per cent between 2009 and 
2012. Although “ecstasy” seizures in East and South-East 
Asia and Oceania declined to 1 ton in 2013, seizures con-
tinued to be at a higher level than in 2008-2011, and in 
2014 multi-ton seizures were reported by law enforcement 
authorities in Australia315 and Myanmar.316 
Insufficient data are available to establish the size of the 
“ecstasy” market based on use figures for East and South-
East Asia and Oceania. Nevertheless, data on specific popu-
lation groups suggest widespread use in certain countries. 
In Indonesia, a national survey among transportation work-
ers in 2013 found that, at 1.4 per cent annual prevalence 
of use, “ecstasy” was the second most used drug after can-
nabis at 4.9 per cent.317 At 1.3 tons, Indonesia reported 
the largest quantity of “ecstasy” seizures in the world in 
2012, which was reportedly intended in its entirety for 
supplying the domestic market. This points to the presence 
of a large amount of “ecstasy” in the country in that year.
There have also been indications of “ecstasy” use emerging 
in the Mekong region. According to expert perceptions in 
2012, “ecstasy” use had increased in Cambodia, Thailand 
and Viet Nam. Although low levels of “ecstasy” seizures 
were reported in Cambodia and Thailand, seizures in Viet 
Nam increased to almost 0.2 tons in 2012.
The large amount of MDMA chemical precursors recently 
seized in East and South-East Asia and Oceania implies 
that there may be considerable “ecstasy” manufacture in 
these subregions. Based on commonly used MDMA man-
ufacturing methods, as outlined by the International Nar-
cotics Control Board, the almost 66,000 litres of safrole 
and 3,4-MDP-2-P seized in the region in 2011 and 2012 
could theoretically have been sufficient to produce about 
44 tons of “ecstasy”.318 This amount far exceeds the total 
“ecstasy” seized worldwide in both 2011 and 2012, which 
amounted to 9 tons. Although “ecstasy” is manufactured 
315 Australian Federal Police, “Media release: drugs worth $1.5 billion 
seized by Joint Organized Crime Group”, 29 November 2014.
316 Official government communication by the Central Committee for 
Drug Abuse Control of Myanmar, March 2015.
317 Indonesia, National Narcotics Board, Journal of Data on the Preven-
tion and Eradication of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: Year 2013 
(Jakarta, June 2014).
318 The calculation for East and South-East Asia is based on the con-
version ratios provided by the International Narcotics Control 
Board; Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used In The Illicit Manu-
facture Of Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances: Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board for 2012 on the Implementa-
tion of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (E/
INCB/2013/4).
in East and South-East Asia and Oceania, a decreasing 
number of “ecstasy” trafficking attempts from these coun-
tries are being intercepted in other parts of the world 
(see figure 71).
Links and interaction between new  
psychoactive substances and other 
drugs
In the past few years, a growing number of NPS have been 
sold on illicit drug markets. NPS available on the market 
may or may not share effects and profiles similar to the 
substances under international control that they are 
designed to mimic.319 
Only limited data series are available that allow the com-
parison of prevalence of use trends of NPS and other 
drugs. The annual prevalence of cannabis use among 
twelfth-grade students in the United States remained stable 
at 36.4 per cent between 2011 and 2013 and declined 
only slightly in 2014 to 35.1 per cent, while synthetic can-
nabinoid (“spice”) use almost halved from 11.4 per cent 
in 2011 to 5.8 per cent in 2014 (see figure 72). The per-
ceived harmfulness of synthetic cannabinoids among sec-
ondary school students (twelfth grade) increased between 
2012, the first year of measurement, and 2014, which may 
have contributed to the decline in use.320 Data from a 
recent qualitative study suggest that use of both herbal 
cannabis and synthetic cannabinoids may not be uncom-
mon. Users may choose one or the other depending on 
319 For more information, see UNODC, The Challenge of New Psycho-
active Substances (Vienna, March 2013).
320 United States, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Monitoring the 
Future: National Survey Results on Drug Use 1975-2014.
FIG. 71. Number of times countries in East and 
South-East Asia and Oceania have 
been identiﬁed as countries of origin 
for “ecstasy” seized in other regions 
worldwide, 2007-2013
Source: UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire, 2007-
2013.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
N
um
be
r o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s
72
the situation, for example preferring synthetic cannabi-
noids when trying to avoid a positive drug test result.321 
For some time, the market for “ecstasy” has been on the 
decline in several European countries and mephedrone 
and other NPS may have been serving as a substitute for 
“ecstasy”. However, annual prevalence data for the United 
Kingdom show that mephedrone use may have fallen 
below that of “ecstasy” in recent years (see figure 73).322 
Between 2010 and 2013, annual prevalence rates of both 
“ecstasy” use and mephedrone use among people aged 
16-24 in the United Kingdom have been on the decline. 
Mephedrone use among this population segment fell by 
almost two thirds from 4.4 per cent in 2010/11 to 1.6 per 
cent in 2012/13, while “ecstasy” use declined only from 
3.8 per cent to 2.9 per cent over the same period. Although 
the prevalence of mephedrone use among people aged 
16-24 in 2010/11 was 0.6 percentage points higher than 
that of “ecstasy”, by 2012/13 “ecstasy” use was almost twice 
as high as mephedrone use.
Despite a possible decline in the overall demand for 
mephedrone in the United Kingdom, high levels of use 
have been observed among some segments of the 
population. Mephedrone use appears to be particularly 
common in London dance clubs. Indeed, in the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales in 2012/13, at 4.4 per cent 
the highest mephedrone use rate was found among adults 
321 D. Perrone, R. D. Helgesen and R. G. Fischer, “United States drug 
prohibition and legal highs: how drug testing may lead cannabis 
users to spice”, Drugs: Education, Prevention, and Policy, vol. 20, 
No. 3 (2013), pp. 216-224.
322 While no clear link has yet been established, government activities 
aimed at raising awareness about the health risks associated with 
using NPS and the introduction of national controls for mephed-
rone, scheduled as a class B drug under the Misuse of Drugs Act in 
2010, took place simultaneously.
who had visited a nightclub on four or more occasions in 
the past month.323 Similarly, another survey of visitors to 
nightclubs in Rome in 2013 found that NPS were being used 
in addition to drugs such as cocaine.324 Polydrug use can 
involve unpredictable effects and poses a serious challenge 
for health-care providers.
According to EMCDDA, there has been a decline in the 
injecting of illicit drugs in Europe, but there have been 
recent reports of the injecting of NPS, particularly syn-
thetic cathinones.325 For instance, based on reports from 
the treatment and needle and syringe programmes in Hun-
gary, synthetic cathinone injecting has increased since 
2010, while injecting heroin use has declined. By 2012, 
the number of people in Hungary treated for injecting 
synthetic cathinone use accounted for about 34 per cent 
of people in that programme.326 Moreover, a needle and 
syringe programme in Bucharest reported in 2012 that 51 
per cent of people in the programme injected NPS (pri-
marily synthetic cathinones), 44 per cent injected heroin 
and 5 per cent injected both NPS and heroin.327 In Aus-
tria, a survey among people receiving treatment for drug 
use in Graz in 2010 identified that almost 60 per cent of 
people were injecting mephedrone;328 and the use of the 
323 United Kingdom, Home Office, Drug Misuse Declared: Findings 
from the 2012/13 Crime Survey for England and Wales (July 2013).
324 A. E. Vento and others, “Substance use in the club scene of Rome: 
a pilot study”, BioMed Research International, vol. 2014, (2014), pp. 
1-5.
325 EMCDDA, “Perspectives on drugs: injection of synthetic  
cathinones”, Perspectives on Drugs Series, 27 May 2014.
326 A. Pérterfi and others, “Changes in patterns of injecting drug use in 
Hungary: a shift to synthetic cathinones”, Drug Testing and Analysis, 
vol. 6, Nos. 7 and 8 (2014), pp. 825-831.
327 See footnote 325.
328 Marion Weigl and others, 2012 National Report (2011 Data) to the 
FIG. 72. Annual prevalence of cannabis and 
synthetic cannabinoid (“spice”) use 
among twelfth-grade students in the 
United States, 2011-2014
Source: United States, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Monitor-
ing the Future survey, national survey results on drug use, 1975-
2014.
FIG. 73. Annual prevalence of “ecstasy” and 
mephedrone use among people aged 
16-24 years in the United Kingdom, 
2010/11-2012/13
Source: United Kingdom, Home Office, Drug Misuse: Findings 
from the 2012/13 Crime Survey for England and Wales (July, 
2013).
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synthetic cathinone 4-MEC329 by people who inject drugs 
in Paris was reported in 2012.330 EMCCDA has also 
reported that injecting use of synthetic cathinones has 
emerged among specific population segments in Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Poland, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom.331 
Use data for NPS at the substance level are still limited. 
Among the reasons for this are that there is a large number 
of different NPS available on the market, and some of 
them are sold under street names that could imply a vari-
ety of different substances. For instance, the term “spice”, 
often used in reference to the use of synthetic cannabi-
noids, does not relate to a specific substance and could 
instead refer to a large variety of substances. Given that 
users can often not identify their actual substance of use, 
other sources of information gain in importance. Informa-
tion emerging from early warning systems on NPS has 
helped to identify the use of NPS and associated health 
risks at an early stage.332 In Sweden, for example, a toxico-
vigilance system documented widespread use of many dif-
ferent NPS mainly by adolescents and young male 
adults.333 Based on its European early warning system on 
NPS, EMCDDA has undertaken an increasing number 
of risk assessments of NPS (eight in 2014 alone, compared 
with only two in the period 2009-2013), documenting 
the presence of NPS associated with serious negative health 
consequences in the region.334 Early warning systems on 
NPS have also been established in a number of other coun-
tries to make information available on the emergence of 
NPS, health risks associated with their use and best prac-
tices to respond to those risks.
Number of new psychoactive  
substances reported
By December 2014, 95 Member States and territories had 
reported the emergence of NPS to the UNODC early 
warning advisory under the global Synthetics Monitoring: 
Analysis, Reporting and Trends (SMART) programme, 
with notable variations in the number and type of NPS 
EMCDDA by the Reitox National Focal Point: Austria — New  
Development, Trends and In-Depth Information on Selected Issues 
(Vienna, Gesundheit Österreich GmbH, 2012).
329 4-MEC is the chemical abbreviation of 4-methylethcathinone, a 
synthetic cathinone not under international control.
330 T. Néfau and others, “Drug analysis of residual content of used 
syringes: a new approach for improving knowledge of injected drugs 
and drug user practices”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 
26, No. 4, pp. 412-419.
331 EMCDDA, “Perspectives on drugs: injection of synthetic  
cathinones”, Perspectives on Drugs Series, 27 May 2014.
332 D. M. Wood and others, “Using poisons information service data 
to assess the acute harms associated with novel psychoactive sub-
stances”, Drug Testing and Analysis, vol. 6, Nos. 7 and 8 (2014), pp. 
850-860.
333 A. Helander and others, “Detection of new psychoactive substance 
use among emergency room patients: results from the Swedish 
STRIDA project”, Forensic Science International, vol. 243 (2014), 
pp. 23-29.
334 EMCDDA website, publication search.
encountered (see figure 74).335 The four countries or ter-
ritories that reported for the first time in 2014 were the 
Cayman Islands (Americas), Montenegro (Europe), Peru 
(Americas) and Seychelles (Africa). The majority of coun-
tries and territories that reported the emergence of NPS 
up to December 2014 were from Europe (39), Asia (27), 
Africa (14), the Americas (13) and Oceania (2). 
Up to December 2014, a total of 541 NPS had been 
reported to the UNODC early warning advisory (see 
figure 75). In 2014, 450 substances were reported, an 
increase from the 430 substances reported in 2013. 
Although this does not indicate a major increase, it is 
noteworthy that of the 450 substances reported in 2014, 
69 were reported to the advisory for the first time. The 
large increase in NPS reported to the advisory between 
2012 and 2013 was due to the expansion of data sources 
and data completeness in the system as well as increasing 
laboratory capacity to identify NPS.
In 2014, synthetic cannabinoids continued to account for 
the majority of NPS reported (39 per cent), followed by 
phenethylamines (18 per cent) and synthetic cathinones 
(15 per cent) (see figure 76). More synthetic cannabinoids 
and, to a lesser extent, synthetic cathinones were reported 
in 2014 than in 2013, with the majority of the other NPS 
substance groups remaining stable. Some decreases have 
been identified regarding NPS belonging to ketamine and 
phencyclidine-type substances, with only half the number 
reported in 2013 being reported in 2014 and a slight 
decrease in the number of reports for tryptamines. Of all 
reported substances in 2014, 69 were reported to the 
UNODC early warning advisory for the first time, 
including 25 synthetic cannabinoids, 16 phenethylamines 
and synthetic cathinones, 8 other substances and 2 
aminoindanes and tryptamines.
335 All data in the present section of this report were extracted from the 
UNODC early warning advisory on NPS, available at www.unodc.
org/nps, unless otherwise indicated.
FIG. 74. Number of countries and territories  
reporting new psychoactive substances, 
2008-2014
Source: UNODC, early warning advisory on NPS, 2008-2014.
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Using the early warning advisory for NPS, different pat-
terns in the emergence and persistence of these substances 
have been identified. There is frequently heterogeneity in 
the emergence of NPS at the country level, even within 
regions; that is, the overlap between different NPS found 
in one country and in a neighbouring country within a 
given period of time can be small. Some NPS have an 
established presence on the market and have been reported 
by a large number of countries over several years. These 
include ketamine (58 countries), khat (51 countries), 
mephedrone (46 countries) and JWH-018 (44 countries). 
More than a quarter of all countries reporting the emer-
gence of NPS worldwide have reported only one sub-
stance, most of which were reports of plant-based NPS 
and ketamine. About 47 per cent of countries reporting 
the emergence of NPS have identified 10 substances or 
less, while approximately 18 per cent have identified more 
than 100 different NPS since 2008.
Synthetic cannabinoids: the challenge 
of diversity 
Synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists, commonly 
referred to as synthetic cannabinoids, constitute the larg-
est, most diversified and fastest growing group of NPS on 
the market. Since 2004, many different synthetic cannabi-
noids have been detected in herbal smoking blends sold 
on the Internet and in specialized shops under a variety of 
brand names. These products typically contain dried and 
shredded plant material with no intrinsic psychoactive 
properties, but which is soaked in or sprayed with one or 
several synthetic cannabinoids. 
In 2014, 177 different synthetic cannabinoids were 
reported to the UNODC early warning advisory. The 
emergence of products containing synthetic cannabinoids 
on the market is not a new phenomenon; however, it is 
only since 2008 that their use has gained increasing popu-
larity as “legal cannabis substitutes”. Since then, the emer-
gence of hundreds of products containing different 
synthetic cannabinoids has been reported to the advisory 
by 58 countries and territories, and the attention of the 
international community has been drawn to their clan-
destine manufacture, the serious risks they pose to public 
health and society and the challenges for drug control.
Since the discovery of the cannabinoid receptors CB1 and 
CB2 in the 1980s, there has been continued growth and 
evolution of a series of chemical families of synthetic can-
nabinoids. Their emergence on the NPS market has been 
characterized by the introduction of successive structural 
modifications seemingly to keep their legal status ambigu-
ous. This can be illustrated by the emergence of naphthoy-
lindoles (e.g. JWH-018) and the more recent emergence 
of naphthoylindazoles (e.g. THJ-018) and indazole car-
boxamides (e.g. AKB-48).336 
The structural diversity and rapid development of new 
derivatives of synthetic cannabinoids pose serious chal-
lenges to legislative control at the national and interna-
tional levels. In response to these challenges, innovative 
legal approaches complementing the traditional control 
of drugs have been adopted at the national level by some 
countries to protect the population from health risks 
caused by the open sale of synthetic cannabinoids. An 
336 For more information, see UNODC, “Synthetic cannabinoids in 
herbal products” (Vienna, 2011).
FIG. 75. Number of new psychoactive  
substances reported, 2009-2014
Source: UNODC, early warning advisory on NPS, 2009-2014.
Note: This graph represents only the number of different NPS reported 
during the respective reporting year. Not all NPS reported in one year 
were necessarily reported in the following year(s). 
FIG. 76. Number of new psychoactive  
substances reported, by substance 
group, 2014
Source: UNODC, early warning advisory on NPS, 2014.
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example of this approach is the control of synthetic can-
nabinoids based on their effect on the brain recently used 
in some countries, including the United States and Lux-
embourg. The United States introduced the neurochemical 
approach to control synthetic cannabinoids or “cannabi-
mimetic agents”, under the Synthetic Drug Abuse Preven-
tion Act 2012 and defined them as “any substance that is 
a cannabinoid receptor type 1 (CB1 receptor) agonist as 
demonstrated by binding studies and functional assays” 
within defined structural classes. The definition includes 
a group of substances with possible chemical variations, 
but which have a specific effect through binding to the 
CB1 receptor.
During its fifty-eighth session, in March 2015, the Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs decided to place 10 NPS under 
international control, among them two synthetic cannabi-
noids, JWH-018 and AM-2201, which were added to 
Schedule II of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
of 1971.
The transient nature of new  
psychoactive substances
Although a growing number of NPS are being reported 
by a larger number of countries every year, some NPS are 
found to be transient. For instance, of the 541 NPS 
reported up to December 2014, 16 substances had not 
been reported since 2012 and 49 had not been reported 
since 2013. Several NPS have only been reported by a 
small number of countries in a particular year and some 
substances seem to have disappeared from the market 
entirely. For example, the tryptamine 5-MeO-DPT337 was 
reported by eight countries between 2009 and 2012, but 
since then there have been no further reports of its avail-
ability by countries submitting to the UNODC early 
warning advisory. Other substances such as the synthetic 
cannabinoid CP-series have shown large variations in 
market availability since 2009. For example, the CP-47,497 
series was first reported by four countries in Europe in 
2009, but in 2012 only two countries in Europe reported 
its presence to the advisory, whereas 10 countries reported 
its presence in 2013, as did six countries in 2014. Com-
pared with other synthetic cannabinoids (e.g. aminoalky-
lindoles), the synthesis of non-classical cannabinoids such 
as the CP-series is elaborate and complicated, which may 
have influenced this pattern.338 
Enhancing efforts for an integrated 
response
The market for synthetic drugs is expanding and is becom-
ing increasingly interconnected. Moreover, the synthetic 
drugs market has become increasingly diversified with a 
337 5-Methoxy-N,N-dipropyltryptamine (5-MeO-DPT) is a tryptamine 
not under international control.
338 See Recommended Methods for the Identification and Analysis of Syn-
thetic Cannabinoid Receptor Agonists in Seized Material: Manual for 
Use by National Drug Analysis Laboratories (ST/NAR/48).
growing number of NPS available worldwide and an 
expanding market for crystalline methamphetamine in the 
United States and Europe. Further information and data 
are needed, however, to improve analysis of the relation-
ship between NPS and substances under international 
control, while continuing to monitor emerging develop-
ments in the NPS market. Data on recent developments 
in polydrug use and injecting drug use involving NPS also 
remain limited. As these particular forms of drug use pose 
a serious challenge for treatment and health-care provid-
ers, information exchange and enhanced cooperation at 
the national and regional levels is crucial for establishing 
an effective response. Given the rapidly changing nature 
of the synthetic drugs market, there is a continued need 
for analysis of the scope and magnitude of the synthetic 
drugs problem based on forensic and scientific data and 
qualitative information.
H. CONCLUSIONS
Drug-use prevention and treatment:  
a change of perspective
New data remain insufficient to determine if substantial 
changes have occurred in the magnitude of drug use glob-
ally. Information is available only for western countries 
and does not reflect the situation in the highly populated 
regions of Asia and Africa. Yet the fact that an estimated 
27 million people worldwide suffer from drug-use disor-
ders shows that a large population is in need of health 
interventions, although only one in six of these people has 
access to treatment. A growing body of research has high-
lighted that drug-related health interventions can be effec-
tive and State and non-State actors now have the scientific 
basis for planning appropriate interventions. 
Research shows the need to rethink drug-prevention strat-
egies and shift the focus from counter-productive, fear-
arousing messages to a more positive approach recognizing 
that children and youth start to use drugs in the context 
of personal or environmental vulnerabilities that are largely 
out of their control. Effective drug prevention can provide 
children and youth with the skills and opportunities to 
develop safe and healthy behaviour in their families, 
schools and communities. 
There is no cure-all remedy for problem drug use. Drug 
use is a multi-faceted chronic health condition that 
requires long-term and continued care. Likewise, there is 
a need to revisit how success in drug treatment is meas-
ured, as treatment effectiveness on a person’s overall well-
being can be evaluated only when the treatment is ongoing, 
not before or after treatment. 
Where are increased quantities of  
opiates going?
The cultivation and production of opiates has been stead-
ily increasing since 2009, reaching record levels in 2014. 
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But existing data on seizures and opiate use do not yet 
reveal a big shift in the global opiate market beyond the 
United States, where a resurgence in the heroin market is 
currently under way. The apparent stabilization in traf-
ficking and demand for opiates can be explained by the 
fact that opiates may take a few years to reach destination 
countries, or that changes in the demand for opiates are 
going undetected. For example, Africa is being increasingly 
targeted by traffickers as a transit hub for heroin from 
Afghanistan and may be developing into a non-negligible 
consumption market. 
Afghanistan is supplying 90 per cent of Canada’s heroin 
and may be increasingly supplying the United States. Sei-
zures indicate that heroin from Afghanistan currently 
accounts for relatively few cases in the United States, but 
this may be changing. The reach of organized criminal 
networks is increasingly global and organized criminal 
groups are increasingly sophisticated and versatile, posing 
new challenges for national law enforcement agencies, 
whose strategies and interventions need constant revision. 
A prime example is the dark net, an anonymous online 
marketplace used for the illicit sale of a wide range of 
products including drugs. International cooperation and 
inter-agency collaboration has proved crucial in counter-
ing drug trafficking on the dark net but, as dark web tech-
nology grows and becomes increasingly accessible, and 
drug trafficking moves increasingly into the dark markets, 
such interventions may need to be rethought.
Changing the perception of cannabis
Amid the growing public debate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the legalization of cannabis, and in the 
context of its actual legalization in some States, there is 
growing evidence that it is time to change the widespread 
perception of cannabis as an illicit drug without serious 
health consequences. The current cannabis market is far 
more complex and sophisticated than in the past and there 
is a far larger variety of cannabis products on the market 
than ever before, some of which appear to be more harm-
ful than their predecessors. Highly potent strains of herbal 
cannabis, such as sinsemilla, which have high THC con-
tent (the main psychoactive ingredient) coupled with low 
CBD content (a cannabinoid with anti-psychotic proper-
ties), are becoming increasingly popular in some markets. 
Given that there is growing evidence of links between 
cannabis use and some forms of mental illness, these devel-
opments may lead to even greater morbidity; an issue 
worthy of close monitoring.
New psychoactive substances: taking  
a pragmatic approach to the problem
Different countries report that NPS continue to prolifer-
ate in the marketplace, in terms of both quantity and 
diversity, although some are of a transient nature and dis-
appear as quickly as they materialize. However, the paucity 
of data on the harmfulness and prevalence of use of NPS 
makes it difficult to facilitate risk assessment at the inter-
national level. There is an overriding challenge requiring 
enhanced efforts by some countries to understand whether 
or not certain NPS are replacing other “traditional” drugs, 
either in the short or the long term, or if they are merely 
supplementing the range of existing drugs under interna-
tional control. There is also a need to identify the most 
prevalent, most persistent and most dangerous of the some 
500 potentially harmful NPS that require action at the 
international level. Little may be known about the size 
and nature of the increasingly diversified NPS market, but 
given that injecting NPS poses a particular health threat 
to users, this rapidly evolving and dynamic phenomenon 
requires an adequate response.
Time to consider prison health an  
integral part of public health 
Drug use, including injecting drug use, takes place in the 
prison environment. In some countries, there is clear evi-
dence that drug use is higher among prison populations 
than in the community outside. Prison is a high-risk, con-
trolled environment where drug use is prohibited but it 
can occur and often does so in unsafe conditions. Prison 
environments are characterized by high levels of infectious 
diseases (in particular HIV, but also hepatitis C and tuber-
culosis) as well as limited access to prevention and treat-
ment, which increases the risk of contracting blood-borne 
viruses. The rapid turnover of a large number of people 
between the prison environment and the wider communi-
ties outside prison calls for strategies that consider prison 
health an integral part of public health, with a correspond-
ing level of continuity of care. Equality of care for people 
held in prisons is a basic right guaranteed under interna-
tional law. 
Premature deaths remain unacceptably 
high among people who inject drugs 
Among all people who use drugs, PWID face some of the 
most negative health outcomes. In spite of the fact that 
effective, evidence-based interventions are available for 
preventing overdose deaths and for the prevention, treat-
ment and care of PWID living with HIV, premature death 
is common among this group. Considering that overdose 
deaths are preventable, continued efforts could address 
this through a number of interventions. Prime among 
these is the administration of naloxone, which can imme-
diately reverse the effects of opioid overdose. Making 
naloxone available and easily accessible, and empowering 
first aid workers and drug users’ peers and family members 
with the necessary skills to administer naloxone, is a life-
saving intervention. The health consequences of injecting 
drug use go beyond the risk of overdose and in many 
regions and countries PWID experience high levels of HIV 
infection. There is therefore an urgent need to scale up 
evidence-based comprehensive harm reduction services to 
reach the goal of ending AIDS by 2030.
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Origin of alternative development
As one of the three pillars of the international community’s 
“balanced approach” towards drug control, alternative 
development, along with crop eradication and interdic-
tion, has been a key supply reduction strategy for several 
decades. At its twentieth special session, devoted to coun-
tering the world drug problem together, the General 
Assembly defined alternative development as a “process to 
prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants con-
taining narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
through specifically designed rural development measures 
in the context of sustained national growth and sustain-
able development efforts in countries taking action against 
drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural character-
istics of the target communities and groups, within the 
framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution 
to the problem of illicit drugs”.1
While this definition is used at the international level, dif-
ferent definitions reflecting new strategies and approaches 
towards alternative development have been developed by 
a wide variety of implementing countries, donors and prac-
titioners. Alternative development is a concept in constant 
flux, as can be seen by the amount of international confer-
ences, expert working groups and seminars at which ways 
to refine the concept and approaches of alternative devel-
opment have been analysed and discussed in recent years.2 
At these events, best practices and lessons learned from 
implementing alternative development programmes while 
improving current alternative development policies and 
approaches have been identified and shared. At the same 
time, such events have sought to broaden the involvement 
of States Members of the United Nations in discussions 
on alternative development, satisfying the growing interest 
in this issue area in recent years. The adoption by the Gen-
eral Assembly of resolution 68/196, on the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Alternative Development, was an 
important step in this process. An increasing number of 
countries are supporting or implementing alternative 
development interventions, and the importance of alter-
native development is reconfirmed each year through reso-
lutions adopted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 
During the Presidency of Germany of the Group of Seven 
in 2015, alternative development will be among three pri-
orities in the field of fighting organized crime and terror-
ism, along with combating wildlife trafficking and 
countering the financing of terrorism. 
1 Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication 
of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development (General 
Assembly resolution S-20/4 E).
2 Annex II (see the online version of this report) contains an overview 
of the most important events that have taken place since 2001.
As mentioned above, the other mutually reinforcing ele-
ments in the “balanced approach” to a reduction in drug 
supply are crop eradication programmes and law enforce-
ment measures to counter illicit cultivation, production, 
manufacture and trafficking.3 Alternative development 
should be implemented in concert with broader drug con-
trol strategies of that nature, taking into account demo-
graphic, cultural, social and geographic considerations. 
But while such strategies are implemented at the national, 
regional or subregional levels, alternative development is 
predominantly aimed at small-scale farmers. Alternative 
development is aimed at identifying and helping to address 
not only the driving factors, but also the underlying root 
causes of the cultivation of illicit crops — lack of develop-
ment, marginalization, poverty and, thus, overall human 
insecurity — and to do so in a sustainable way.
Alternative development continues to be relevant as long 
as drug crops are grown illicitly and development and 
security challenges that are specific to areas where drugs 
are cultivated remain. However, it offers no quick-fix solu-
tion to the supply side of the illicit drug economy as a 
stand-alone strategy. Previous evaluations of alternative 
development have already shown that success is very situ-
ation specific and that there are few, if any, practices that 
can be plugged into a template. As was noted in the Report 
of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2005, “there 
is no manual or definitive guidelines for alternative 
development”.4 However, with the adoption of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development, 
a set of general guidelines that contain good practices for 
planning and implementing alternative development now 
exist.
Purpose of alternative development
Alternative development is sometimes described as “con-
ventional rural development applied to a drug-producing 
area”, “development in a drugs environment” or “devel-
opment-oriented drug control”.5 This does not mean that 
the purpose of alternative development is limited to purely 
counter-narcotics objectives. National strategies may vary, 
but the specific purpose of alternative development in its 
present, broader meaning is to contribute to economic 
development (especially in rural areas) in order to target 
the underlying factors and root causes of illicit drug 
economies. 
 
3 See the Political Declaration adopted by the General Assembly at 
its twentieth special session (General Assembly resolution S-20/2, 
annex), para. 18.
4 E/INCB/2005/1, para. 23.
5 See David Mansfield, “Development in a drugs environment: a 
strategic approach to ‘alternative development’”, a discussion paper 
by the Development-oriented Drug Control Programme (DDC)” 
(Eschborn, Germany, 2006).
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In contrast to development in general, the alternative 
development objectives of strengthening the economic 
and social development of the target areas are not, on the 
whole,  an end in themselves; they are a way of approach-
ing the objectives of reducing the supply of raw material 
for producing drugs and for re-establishing a legal econ-
omy in drug-producing areas. The way that the dual pur-
pose of alternative development is approached differs from 
context to context. Some areas without illicit drug cultiva-
tion, but with a serious risk of developing it, may require 
a focus on traditional rural development. Such interven-
tions have been included in alternative development pro-
grammes under the banner of “preventive alternative 
development”, showing how close alternative development 
and traditional rural development can be. Alternative 
development is aimed at contributing to an enabling envi-
ronment for long-term rural development without illicit 
cultivation. Through its holistic approach, it plays the role 
of catalyst in boosting development in areas with particular 
challenges related to the illicit drug economy (drug traf-
ficking, violence, weak rule of law, etc.), which are areas 
where few international development agencies operate.
The present chapter focuses on the strategy of alternative 
development and its relation to illicit crop cultivation and 
supply reduction. It begins with a review of how the 
approach and terminology surrounding alternative devel-
opment have evolved since the 1970s, together with the 
implications of these changes, and strategic elements that 
have contributed to the success of alternative development 
interventions are identified and analysed. Special attention 
is dedicated to reviewing the indicators used to evaluate 
alternative development programmes and the findings of 
such evaluations, including with regard to how a pro-
gramme can effectively contribute to an enabling environ-
ment in which illicit cultivation disappears over time, 
human development prospers and general economic devel-
opment benefits both the individual and the community. 
Lastly, it is highlighted in this chapter how the alternative 
development approach relates to the rule of law, how it 
addresses the broader economy linked to illicit markets 
and how it relates to the wider development agenda. It is 
intended that this will provide a thorough contribution 
to the discussion on how alternative development can be 
taken forward in coming years.
B. SETTING THE SCENE
Emerging in the late 1980s from the more narrowly 
focused crop substitution initiatives of the 1970s and the 
integrated rural development approach of the 1980s, the 
concept of alternative development has been implemented 
around the world for over 40 years. Its evolution effectively 
began in Thailand in the 1960s, but it has also been imple-
mented in the Andean region since the early 1980s, in the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Myanmar and Pakistan since the early 1990s and Afghani-
stan since the late 1990s.
The concepts of “crop substitution”, followed by “inte-
grated rural development” and subsequently “alternative 
development”, were promoted by the United Nations 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC),6 one of the 
predecessor organizations of the United Nations Interna-
tional Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),7 
which further refined the concept of alternative develop-
ment. Alternative development initiatives are now applied 
in most of the main countries of illicit opium or coca 
production and to a lesser extent in areas where cannabis 
is cultivated. 
There is no universal consensus on the precise meaning of 
the different concepts relating to alternative development. 
Overlap exists, official definitions are scarce, and indi-
vidual authors emphasize different elements. In the first 
decade of the new millennium, some alternative develop-
ment projects were called “alternative livelihood” projects,8 
emphasizing the human dimension of those interventions. 
Others were categorized as “development-oriented drug 
control”,9 “rural development in drug-producing areas”,10 
“regional development”11 or “food security”12 projects. 
Despite the variety of names employed, this chapter uses 
the term “alternative development”, which is the term gen-
erally accepted among States Members of the United 
Nations. It is the term used in the definition presented in 
the introduction and in the discussion below of the broad 
concept, which evolved to incorporate several new 
elements.
Crop substitution 
The concept of crop substitution can be traced back to its 
origin in opium poppy-producing countries of South-East 
Asia and, later, South-West Asia. It was mainly a reaction 
to the unintended consequences of forced eradication.13 
6 United Nations International Drug Control Programme, “Alterna-
tive development as an instrument of drug abuse control”, Techni-
cal Information Paper, No. 5 (1993).
7 In 1997, UNDCP and the Centre for International Crime Preven-
tion (CICP) were merged to form the United Nations Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), which was 
renamed UNODC in October 2002. 
8 For example, the Alternative Livelihoods Program sponsored by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
launched in December 2004, and the Research in Alternative Live-
lihoods Fund (for Afghanistan for the period 2004-2008), funded 
by the Department for International Development of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
9 General Assembly resolution 68/196, para. 18 (u).
10 German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), “Rethinking 
the approach of alternative development: principles and standards 
of rural development in drug producing areas”, 2nd ed. (2013). 
11 For example, the Chapare regional development project in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, which was initiated in 1983 by 
USAID and the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
12 For example, the UNODC food security programme for Myanmar, 
sponsored by the European Union, started in January 2009, and 
the Phongsaly alternative livelihood and food security project of 
UNODC, started in January 2011.
13 UNDCP, “Alternative development as an instrument of drug abuse 
control”.
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One unintended result of forced eradication was that in 
some areas growers who received no assistance developed 
opposition to the Government and came under the greater 
influence of drug traffickers and insurgent groups, thus 
posing a potential risk to national security.14 
Against that background, countries facing the problem of 
illicit opium poppy cultivation started to experiment with 
direct compensation schemes, that is, direct subsidies to 
farmers to keep them growing licit crops or encourage 
them to give up opium poppy cultivation. That approach 
largely failed as farmers migrated and started cultivating 
opium poppy elsewhere.15 Governments also started 
implementing crop substitution programmes. For exam-
ple, Thailand started to adopt this approach in the late 
1960s, introducing alternative crops and allowing for tran-
sition periods of six to eight years before undertaking erad-
ication.16 The first crop substitution programme involving 
the United Nations started in Thailand in 1971, in line 
with the country’s National Socioeconomic Development 
Plan, which was later followed by similar projects in 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic, Myanmar and Pakistan. In the 1980s, 
Colombia and Peru introduced compensation schemes. 
The initial methodology promoted crops that would gen-
erate a level of income for the farmer that was similar to 
that earned from illicit crops, but that initial focus was 
very restrictive. The target areas were primarily traditional 
growing areas where subsistence economies prevailed. No 
provisions were made to link the production chain with 
value-added activities and markets. As new illicit crop pro-
duction areas emerged, several of the underlying hypoth-
eses were not valid or were only partially valid. Moreover, 
the initial successes of the narrow “crop substitution” 
approach often turned out to be of limited duration.17 It 
also became clear that without additional assistance to 
farmers to increase their participation in the value-added 
chain, alternative products were, in most cases, not com-
petitive enough to create sustainable alternative 
livelihoods. 
Integrated rural development 
The initial approach was broadened in Asia in the 1980s, 
taking the form of the concept of “integrated rural devel-
opment”. At the international level, UNFDAC could be 
considered a pioneer in steering the concept of an “inte-
grated approach”. Recognizing the need for a comprehen-
sive and balanced approach, in the late 1980s, UNFDAC 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 18. 
16 Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000: A 
Thirty-year Journey (Chiang Mai, Thailand, Silkworm Books, 2001), 
pp. 69-80.
17 David Mansfield, “Alternative development: the modern thrust of 
supply-side policy”, in Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LI, Nos. 1 and 2 
(1999), pp. 19-43.
was the first agency to make use of the concept of master 
plans for drug-producing countries.18 By that time, coun-
tries were able to benefit from the lessons already learned 
to address some of the limitations of crop substitution. 
For example, in Colombia, the first interventions in the 
southern part of the Department of Cauca (1985) and the 
northern part of the Department of Nariño (1989) sought 
to incorporate a dual focus on crop substitution and inte-
grated rural development.19 The early interventions in 
Peru, from 1985 onward, were not limited to crop substi-
tution either, as the Andean countries, with support from 
UNDCP, were able to benefit from lessons learned in other 
countries. The Plurinational State of Bolivia gradually 
shifted from a crop substitution approach to a broader, 
integrated rural development approach from 1983 onward, 
complementing interventions focusing on the quality of 
life and investments in social and road infrastructure.20
In the integrated rural development approach, there was 
a need to enable farmers in areas of illicit crop production 
to effectively compete, with their licit products, with well-
established networks for production, distribution and mar-
keting. Thus, economic and technical provisions had to 
be made to ensure the marketing, storage and transport 
of new products. The new concept of integrated rural 
development also sought to improve the overall quality of 
life of the target population by addressing not only income 
but also education, health, infrastructure and social 
services.21 
That concept also sought to redress the narrow emphasis 
on crop substitution and instead promote the overall inte-
gration of traditional areas of cultivation into the eco-
nomic and social mainstream. It combined relatively heavy 
infrastructure investment, such as road construction, to 
overcome the inaccessibility of certain areas, with a wide 
range of other inputs aimed at opening up remote and 
underdeveloped areas of traditional cultivation.22 In doing 
so, it consolidated crop substitution by combining it with 
a number of other initiatives, such as food-for-work 
schemes; various other new income-generating opportuni-
ties; social development initiatives aimed at improving 
education, health, access to potable water and sanitation; 
18 The concept of “integrated rural development” was also referred to 
in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, article 14, para. 3.
19 Carlos Zorro Sánchez, “Algunos desafíos del desarrollo alternativo 
en Colombia”, Pensamiento y Cultura, vol. 8, No. 1 (2005), p. 112; 
Colombia, Department of National Planning, “Programa de desar-
rollo alternativo”, document CONPES No. 2734 (Bogotá, 1994), 
sect. B. 
20 See, for example, the Proyecto de Desarrollo Regional Chapare (1983-
1992); Fernando B. Salazar Ortuño, “Límites de los programas de 
desarrollo alternativo” in De la Coca al Poder: Políticas Públicas de 
Sustitución de la Economía de la Coca y Pobreza en Bolivia, 1975-
2004 (Buenos Aires, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales-
CLACSO, 2008), p. 245.
21 UNDCP, “Alternative development as an instrument of drug abuse 
control”.
22 Ibid. 
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and infrastructural projects to improve access to markets.23 
An interesting example is the Thai-German Highland 
Development Programme implemented between 1981 
and 1998, which is widely considered a success.24 
Alternative development
At the local level, integrated rural development proved 
successful to an extent, not only in Asia but also in several 
coca-producing areas of the Andean countries. However, 
from a broader perspective, it could be observed in the late 
1980s that illicit drug crop production was being relocated 
from areas typically affected by illicit cultivation to many 
new areas of cultivation, prompting a further reappraisal 
and refinement of the approach taken. It became clear that 
any narrow, microeconomic approach would be insuffi-
cient.25 Instead, a broader rural development approach 
was required to address the factors driving cultivation in 
illicit drug economies, the lack of marketing infrastructure, 
public services and agricultural know-how, and the rela-
tive profitability of illicit crops compared with licit crops 
in these circumstances. 
This resulted in an even broader strategy of “alternative 
development”, developed at the international level by 
UNFDAC in the second half of the 1980s, which sought 
to improve the integration of regional development assis-
tance with law enforcement initiatives,26 while promoting 
the appropriate coordination and sequencing of those 
interventions. Flexible law enforcement in countering 
illicit cultivation — with law enforcement interventions 
being carefully timed in order to be supportive of the 
development effort, and undertaken once the basic condi-
tions for acceptable alternative living standards had been 
achieved — was considered to be an integral and funda-
mental part of alternative development. Alternative devel-
opment interventions sought to have a more sustainable 
impact by creating local organizations and farmers’ asso-
ciations to facilitate the production, distribution and mar-
keting of products. 
The alternative development approach also emphasized 
the need to integrate local alternative development activi-
ties into regional and national development efforts, in rec-
ognition of the fact that drug crop cultivation was 
intertwined with various development, security and gov-
ernance-related issues that went well beyond the microeco-
nomics and agronomy of coca, opium poppy and cannabis 
cultivation.27 Against that background, a number of ini-
23 Mansfield, “Alternative development: the modern thrust of supply-
side policy”.
24 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, pp. 95-97 and 
109-111.
25 UNDCP, “Alternative development as an instrument of drug abuse 
control”.
26 Mansfield, “Alternative development: the modern thrust of supply-
side policy”.
27 UNDCP, Alternative Development in the Andean Area: The UNDCP 
Experience, revised edition (United Nations publication,  
Sales No. E.01.XI.4). 
tiatives were developed in the attempt to integrate drug 
control, including alternative development, into broader 
national development plans, revive and expand the legal 
sectors of the economy and provide a framework for sound 
economic policies to generate demand for diversified eco-
nomic growth and job creation. 
Some alternative development programmes, in Thailand 
for example, had already successfully implemented such 
broader approaches from the 1970s onward under royally 
initiated projects and other programmes. In Colombia, a 
broader alternative development approach was initiated 
in 1990 in the departments of Guaviare, Caquetá and 
Putumayo under the auspices of UNDCP.28 In Peru, the 
adoption of the alternative development approach started 
in 1995, building on the 10 years of lessons learned since 
the first crop substitution projects in 1985.29 By the early 
1990s, the Plurinational State of Bolivia had developed 
alternative development projects, based on lessons learned 
in the Chapare Region.30 
Alternative livelihoods
In the first decade of the new millennium, alternative 
development projects were sometimes also called “alterna-
tive livelihood” projects in an attempt to change the focus 
and emphasize the human dimension in the alternative 
development process. This concept became particularly 
popular in Afghanistan after the end of the Taliban regime 
(2001-2002) and was officially adopted in the 2006 
Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. The aim of the 
alternative livelihood approach, as stated in the Strategy, 
was to strengthen and diversify alternative livelihoods that 
freed farmers and other rural workers from dependence 
on opium poppy cultivation and encourage the growth of 
the licit economy.31 In 2012, the National Alternative 
Livelihood Policy, developed by the Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics in collaboration with UNODC, was endorsed 
by the Government of Afghanistan and the international 
community. In other places, such as in the Andean region, 
the term “alternative livelihood” has not been widely 
adopted and “alternative development” is the name most 
commonly used to describe the approach taken, but that 
does not mean that the philosophy indicated by the term 
“alternative livelihoods” has never been introduced in Latin 
America. 
 
28 Colombia, Department of National Planning, “Programa de desar-
rollo alternativo”. 
29 Alternative Development in the Andean Area: The UNDCP Experi-
ence, revised edition.
30 For example, the USAID-funded projects under the 1991 alter-
native development strategy in areas such as Chapare and the 
associated Valles Altos; and USAID/Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
“Alternative development strategy” (1991), pp. 2-3.
31 Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, “National drug control 
strategy: an updated five-year strategy for tackling the illicit drug 
problem”, (Kabul, January 2006), p. 21.
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Although very similar to “alternative development”, the 
concept of “alternative livelihoods” could be considered 
to put special emphasis on identifying the motivations and 
factors influencing household decisions before designing 
interventions. Broad-based rural development is necessary, 
but it does not in itself sufficiently address the specific 
drivers of opium poppy cultivation.32 While income gen-
eration is important, the alternative livelihood approach 
also looks at other “livelihood assets” such as health and 
education, access to land and water, livestock and forest 
resources, access to credit, tools, equipment, infrastructure 
and community support. Like alternative development, 
as that approach has been used in the past decade, the 
alternative livelihoods approach stresses integrating local 
development efforts and counter-narcotics objectives into 
broader national development strategies and programmes 
in an attempt to better respond to the underlying causes 
of drug-crop cultivation and to create links with the wider 
State-building agenda. 
A concept in flux
In practice, the distinction between the alternative devel-
opment and the alternative livelihoods approach is not 
always clear-cut. Several of the new ideas found in the 
alternative livelihoods approach have found their way into 
projects that continue to be called “alternative develop-
ment”. At the same time, many of the interventions offi-
cially labelled as “alternative livelihood” interventions 
have, in practice, had approaches similar to alternative 
development interventions,33 as they consisted of single-
sector development initiatives. The 2006 Afghan National 
Drug Control Strategy made a specific reference to alter-
native livelihoods as the main approach to addressing illicit 
cultivation.34 Meanwhile, other strategies, such as the 
approaches adopted by the European Union, Colombia 
and Peru, continue to use the concept of alternative devel-
opment to address underlying drivers of illicit cultivation 
(for example, marginalization and poverty) in a way that 
is very similar to the alternative livelihoods approach.35 
This confirms that in practice the distinction between the 
two concepts is increasingly blurred. 
32 David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Alternative livelihoods: substance 
or slogan?” Briefing Paper Series (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit, October 2005), p. 10.
33 Ibid.
34 Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, “National drug control 
strategy: an updated five-year strategy for tackling the illicit drug 
problem”, p. 40.
35 Council of the European Union, “The EU approach on alternative 
development”, Cordrogue No. 44 (18 May 2006); Peru, Office of 
the President of the Council of Ministers and the National Com-
mission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA), 
Estrategia Nacional de Lucha contra las Drogas 2012-2016 (Febru-
ary 2012); Colombia, Department of National Planning, Política 
Nacional de Erradicación Manual de Cultivos Ilícitos y Desarrollo 
Alternativo para la Consolidación Territorial, document CONPES 
No. 3669 (Bogotá, 2010), p. 8.
Geographical location of alternative 
development
A total of 23 countries reported to UNODC that they 
had implemented alternative development programmes 
during the period 2010-2013.36 Those countries include 
all of the main coca-producing countries (Bolivia (Pluri-
national State of ), Colombia and Peru), the two main 
opium-producing countries (Afghanistan and Myanmar) 
and a number of other countries with illicit opium pro-
duction (including Egypt, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Pakistan, Thailand and Viet Nam). Alternative 
development initiatives were also implemented in some 
of the cannabis-producing countries (notably Morocco 
and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia and the Philippines). 
That number also included other countries in South 
America (Ecuador and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of ), which reported mostly “preventive alternative devel-
opment”), in Central America (El Salvador and Guate-
mala), the Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago), Asia 
(Malaysia) and a few countries in Africa. In addition, Alba-
nia, Côte d’Ivoire, India, Mexico and Nigeria have plans 
to implement alternative development activities. Map 1 
shows the countries that implemented domestic projects 
during the period 2010-2013. 
Resources allocated to alternative 
development
Beneficiaries of alternative development 
There are numerous challenges in identifying the budgets 
allocated to alternative development interventions and in 
calculating the number of their beneficiaries. A further 
problem, in comparing data at the international level, is 
that the definition of alternative development differs from 
country to country. Moreover, in a number of cases, alter-
native development projects form part of broader rural 
development programmes and/or are implemented by vari-
ous national and international organizations. As a result, 
it is often the case that data of this nature are not collected 
in a comprehensive manner at the national level. Although 
alternative development programmes today are increas-
ingly supported by national strategies and national budg-
ets, data that quantify the magnitude of alternative 
development interventions are scarce. 
Table 1 reflects the limited information available on 
national budgets allocated to alternative development in 
2013 and on beneficiaries. Intended beneficiaries of alter-
native development received, on average, direct and mainly 
indirect in-kind benefits of an annual value of a few hun-
dred dollars for each family cultivating illicit crops. The 
percentage of national budgets allocated to alternative 
development, in the main coca-producing countries, 
ranged from the equivalent of 5 per cent to almost 30 per 
cent of the income derived from illicit cultivation. 
36 See the methodology section in the online version of this report.
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TABLE 9. Beneﬁciaries of alternative development programmes, estimated number of households 
that illicitly cultivate drug crops, farmers’ income from illicit crops, and national  alternative 
development budgets, 2013 (unless otherwise indicated)
Sources: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013 (Vienna, December 2013); UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2013; UNODC, 
Perú Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013, June 2014; UNODC, Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey 2013 (June 2014); UNODC, Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013 (June 2014).
a Showing year of estimate in parenthesis.
b No data were available for 2013; latest available data were for 2010 (248,700 households); between 2010 and 2013 the areas under opium culti-
vation increased, however, by 70 per cent and by more than 80 per cent by 2014.  
c This total includes beneficiaries of preventive alternative development (households not directly involved in coca cultivation) during the  
period 2003-2012.
d As reported by the Vice-Ministry of Coca and Integral Development; in the light of the number of households that live in coca-producing 
regions, this figure suggests that practically all farmers living in areas of coca cultivation benefited from alternative development interventions.
Country
Estimated 
number of 
households 
involved in illicit 
cultivationa
Farmers’ total 
income from 
cultivation of 
coca or opium  
(millions of  
dollars)
Beneficiaries of 
alternative 
development 
(number of 
households)a
Domestic 
budget for 
alternative 
development 
(millions of  
dollars)
Domestic  
alternative  
development, as  
percentage of 
illicit crop income
A. Asia (illicit opium production)
Afghanistan b 950 − − −
Myanmar − 540 − − −
Lao People’s  
Democratic Republic
− 42 − − −
B. Latin America (illicit coca production)
Peru 121,000 (2013) 496 72,000 (2013) 48 10
Colombia 61,700 (2013) 313
156,000c  
(2003-2013)
92 29
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
− 283
60,000d  
(2009-2014)
14 5
MAP 4. Member States implementing domestic alternative development projects (as reported to the 
United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime), 2010-2013 
Sources: UNODC annual report questionnaire and UNODC alternative development projects. Only countries providing sufficient informa-
tion on the implementation of alternative development projects are included.
Note: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined 
boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined.
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General overview of donor contributions to 
alternative development 
Over the past four decades, alternative development has 
largely been funded by external donors, including coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in North America, Europe and 
Oceania, and non-OECD countries such as China, Iran 
(Islamic Republic of ), Saudi Arabia and Thailand (see 
map 2). In recent years, there has been a trend towards 
more project funding by countries that were traditionally 
recipients of such assistance, such as Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of ), Colombia, Peru and Thailand. 
Magnitude of funds allocated to alternative 
development by donors 
The level of funds allocated by donors to alternative devel-
opment can be considered an indication of the importance 
that the international community has attached to this 
strategy. 
Most available financial data on alternative development 
are currently provided by OECD donor countries. How-
ever, those data only partially reflect the overall efforts 
undertaken in this area as there are additional donors from 
among non-OECD countries, and national efforts made 
by the recipient countries are not included in those statis-
tics. That latter factor does not create much of a problem 
in the analysis of alternative development activities in low-
income countries, but in middle-income countries the 
discrepancies between donor-funded and overall alterna-
tive development activities can be substantial. 
According to the OECD International Development 
Statistics,37 in the period from 1998, when the Political 
Declaration and its associated Action Plan on International 
Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and 
on Alternative Development were adopted by the General 
Assembly, to 2013, global commitments by OECD coun-
tries for providing alternative development in developing 
countries amounted in total to, on average, $219 million 
per year (as expressed in 2012 dollars), of which 89 per 
cent was for agriculture-related alternative development 
and 11 per cent was for non-agriculture-related alternative 
development activities such as income opportunities in 
other sectors, social and physical infrastructure and non-
agricultural training and capacity-building. The statistics 
cited above do not include alternative development pro-
jects funded by non-OECD countries, such as China, 
Thailand and some of the Gulf countries.
37 A first review of such statistics and a historical overview of the 
involvement of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
in alternative development and narcotics control activities can be 
found in William Hynes and Deborah Alimi, “Why illicit drugs 
cannot be ignored in the post-2015 development agenda”, docu-
ment DCD/DAC/GOVNET (2014) 7, revised edition (November 
2014). 
MAP 5. International assistance to alternative development, 1998-2013: average annual  
commitments made by donor countries for alternative development, and the main recipient 
countries
Sources: OECD Creditor Reporting System Aid Activities database and UNODC annual report questionnaires. The map indicates only 
those countries receiving assistance valued at more than $100,000 per annum. 
* In addition to individual EU Member States, the European Union is also a major donor of alternative development assistance.
Note: The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undetermined 
boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. A 
dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falk-
land Islands (Malvinas). 
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Despite decades of discussion about alternative 
development being a key pillar of drug control at the 
national and international levels, the overall amounts 
committed by OECD countries for alternative 
development in the period 1998-2013 were very low in 
comparison to the amounts committed as part of general 
development cooperation. Alternative development 
commitments accounted for just 0.2 per cent of overall 
global development assistance ($133 billion per year), or 
3.6 per cent of assistance directed towards agriculture, and 
they were the equivalent of 12.3 per cent of the amount 
committed to rural development. 
The funds actually spent were of a magnitude similar to 
the commitments. Data in that regard, however, were 
available for a more limited time frame, with $245 million 
per year having been spent by OECD donors over the 
period 2002-2013, equivalent to 0.2 per cent of all dis-
bursements related to development assistance. 
Data on donor commitments show that the agreement 
reached by countries in the Political Declaration adopted 
by the General Assembly at its twentieth special session 
and the Action Plan on International Cooperation on the 
Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative 
Development had a tangible impact in promoting the allo-
cation of donor resources for alternative development. 
Global alternative development commitments made by 
the OECD countries rose more than five-fold between 
1998 and 2008. However, the subsequent Political Dec-
laration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter 
the World Drug Problem, adopted by the General Assem-
bly in 2009, was not followed by a similar increase: finan-
cial commitments fell by 51 per cent between 2009 and 
2013 (see figure 1). That decline cannot be attributed to 
any general decline in resources made available by OECD 
donors because overall OECD donor commitments con-
tinued to increase during that period. As a consequence, 
the proportion of overall development assistance that was 
alternative development assistance, which had increased 
from 0.1 per cent in 1998 to 0.3 per cent in 2008, fell 
back to 0.1 per cent of overall development assistance by 
2013.
Data on actual disbursement of funds show a trend similar 
to that on commitments (see figure 2). Two possible expla-
nations for that trend are: (a) that the initial momentum 
created for alternative development in 1998 was not main-
tained after 2009; and (b) that alternative development 
assistance was — as actually requested in the 2009 Political 
Declaration — partly mainstreamed and integrated into 
broader regional development plans and thus some inter-
ventions might no longer have been categorized as “alter-
native development”. Annual commitments designated 
for the category of “rural development” in the period 
2009-2013 were 50 per cent greater than in the period 
1998-2008. That increase may have compensated for the 
decrease in the resources allocated to the category of “alter-
native development” between 2009 and 2013. 
FIG. 77. Trends in global commitments to providing development assistance and alternative  
development made by donor countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation  
and Development, 1998-2013
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (data extracted on 19 December 2014).
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A decrease in assistance from external donors does not 
necessarily result in a decrease in a country’s overall finan-
cial resources for alternative development. For example, 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Colombia and Peru sub-
stantially increased their allocation of national resources 
to alternative development and, through that increased 
domestic funding, countered the decline in donor 
resources, thus maintaining sustained financial support 
for alternative development on their own territory. 
Average annual development assistance reported by OECD 
donor countries, as related to “narcotics control”38 (exclud-
ing alternative development), was far lower in the period 
2009-2013 than the period 1998-2008 (89 per cent lower) 
(see figure 3), mainly reflecting a downward trend that 
began in 2007.
Principal alternative development donors
Identifying the principal donors of alternative develop-
ment assistance is challenging, as statistics may be affected 
by the different categories that countries use for their allo-
cation funds. Statistics in this regard should therefore be 
38 The figures for the category “narcotics control” include “devel-
opment-related” anti-narcotics activities such as educational pro-
grammes and awareness-raising campaigns to restrict distribution of 
illicit drugs, as well as training of police and customs officers. Not 
included here are donor activities to destroy crops, interdict drug 
supplies or train and finance military personnel in anti-narcotics 
activities. See the purpose codes of the OECD Creditor Report-
ing System Aid Activities database (valid for reporting up to and 
including 2014 flows), available at www.oecd.org.
used only to identify the largest donors in this area, rather 
than be taken as an exact measurement. 
According to OECD international aid statistics (its Credi-
tor Reporting System), of the 28 countries belonging to 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee,39 
19 countries provided “agricultural alternative develop-
ment” over the period 1998-2013, totalling, on average, 
$195 million per year for the OECD donors, compared 
with the assistance provided by 14 OECD countries over 
the period 1998-2008 totalling $176 million per year. The 
major donors appear to have been the United States, 
followed by European Union institutions, Canada and 
some individual European countries, notably the Nether-
lands and Germany. A similar picture emerges with respect 
to funds actually disbursed. 
The amounts spent on assistance designated as “non-
agricultural”40 alternative development over the period 
39 The 28 countries of the OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. In 
addition, the European Union is a member of the Committee.
40 The application of the “non-agricultural alternative development” 
category has been proscribed in OECD Creditor Reporting System 
purpose codes (valid for reporting up to and including 2014 flows; 
available at www.oecd.org), to be applied for “projects to reduce 
illicit drug cultivation through, for example, non-agricultural 
income opportunities, social and physical infrastructure”. 
FIG. 78. Trends in gross disbursements of alternative development provided by donor countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002-2013
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (data extracted on 19 December 2014).
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1998-2013 amounted to $23.2 million per year, which 
was significantly less than the amounts spent on “agricul-
tural alternative development”. The annual amounts spent 
on “non-agricultural alternative development” over the 
2009-2013 period were almost 40 per cent lower than over 
the 1998-2008 period. The major contributors were the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the United States, followed by European Union insti-
tutions, Finland and Australia. 
Main recipients of agricultural alternative 
development funds
Based on OECD development aid statistics on funds com-
mitted to agricultural alternative development assistance 
over the period 1998-2013, the largest shares of donor 
assistance, as shown in figure 4, were committed to coun-
tries in South America (118 million constant 2012 dollars 
or 60.4 per cent of the total), notably Colombia (33.3 per 
cent), Peru (16.8 per cent) and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia (8.3 per cent), followed by countries in Asia (37.6 
per cent), most notably Afghanistan (36.2 per cent). Sta-
tistics on disbursements (i.e. funds actually spent) show a 
similar pattern. Far smaller amounts were received by the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Thai-
land. While the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Myanmar are largely dependent on foreign assistance, 
Thailand has been able to finance the bulk of its require-
ments for alternative development from local resources, 
and some of its alternative development projects have even 
become economically self-sufficient.
Comparing the period 2009-2013 (following the 2009 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action) to the period 
1998-2008 (following the twentieth special session of the 
General Assembly), funds committed by international 
donors to agricultural alternative development increased 
in Afghanistan (from $64 million per year in the period 
1998-2008 to $85 million per year in the period 2009-
2013) and in Colombia (from $52 million to $94 million), 
while they decreased in Peru (from $35 million to 
$28 million) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (from 
$17 million to $14 million). 
Gross disbursements for agricultural alternative develop-
ment decreased by two thirds between 2009 and 2013 in 
the four main recipient countries (see table 2), with the 
strongest decline in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
(98 per cent). In some countries, the resources allocated 
to alternative development projects did not decrease, how-
ever, as additional domestic funds (particularly in the 
Andean region) compensated for some of the decline in 
funds from external donors. 
FIG. 79. Trends in global commitments by do-
nor countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment to providing funds for rural  
development, alternative development 
and narcotics control, 1998-2008  
and 2009-2013
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online data-
base (data extracted on 19 December 2014).
FIG. 80. Agricultural alternative development 
assistance committed by donor coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, by  
recipient country, annual average in 
the combined period 1998-2013 
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online data-
base (data extracted on 19 December 2014).
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Putting donor assistance into perspective
Amounts received from external sources and allocated for 
alternative development purposes have so far been rather 
modest when compared with the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of recipient countries and overall alternative devel-
opment assistance provided by the domestic authorities 
in drug-producing countries. Expressed as a proportion 
of overall economic activity, gross donor disbursements of 
agricultural alternative development funds amounted, on 
average, to just 0.06 per cent of GDP in the four main 
recipient countries over the period 2009-2013, with the 
largest proportion reported in Afghanistan (0.9 per cent 
of GDP). Moreover, the proportion in all four main recipi-
ent countries declined from an average of slightly more 
than 0.1 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 0.03 per cent in 
2013 (see table 3).
Expressed as a proportion of overall development assis-
tance, “agricultural alternative development” accounted 
TABLE 10. Gross disbursements for agricultural alternative development assistance by donor  
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009-2013, 
and of alternative development assistance by national authorities in 2013
Sources: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (data extracted on 19 December 2014); UNODC, annual reports 
questionnaire; Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, Division for Programmes to Combat Illicit Cultivation, Administrative Unit for  
Territorial Consolidation, October 2014. 
Agricultural alternative development disbursement  
from external sources
(millions of constant 2012 dollars)
Alternative  
development 
reported by national 
authorities (2013) 
(millions of constant 
2012 dollars)2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Average 
1999-
2013
Percentage 
of total
Afghanistan 266.4 161.2 104.6 86.8 43.1 132.4 46.8 −
Colombia 118.2 73.1 51.1 58.0 77.8 75.7 26.7 92 
Peru 28.1 29.6 28.6 27.8 25.6 27.9 9.9 48 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
37.8 36.7 21.3 8.3 0.6 21.0 7.4 14
Subtotal 450.6 300.6 205.7 180.9 147.0 257.0 90.8 
Other developing 
countries
55.4 21.7 27.7 17.9 7.9 26.1 9.2 
All developing  
countries
506.0 322.3 233.4 198.7 155.0 283.1 100.0 
TABLE 11. Gross disbursements for agricultural alternative development assistance made by  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development donor countries, expressed as 
a proportion of gross domestic product, period 2009-2013, and alternative development 
from domestic sources, expressed as a proportion of gross domestic product, 2013 
Sources: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (data extracted on 19 December 2014) and World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (data extracted on 30 December 2014) and reports by national authorities to UNODC.
 
 
 
Agricultural alternative development assistance Alternative development  assistance
From external sources 
(percentage of recipients’ gross domestic product)
From domestic sources  
(percentage of recipients’ 
gross domestic product)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 1999-2013 2013
Afghanistan 2.10 1.17 0.72 0.52 0.25 0.88 −
Colombia 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Peru 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
0.25 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.08
Subtotal 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 −
Other developing 
countries
0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0 0.0002 −
All developing  
countries
0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 −
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for an average of 3 per cent of all development assistance 
in the four main coca-producing and opium-producing 
countries in the period 2009-2013 (see table 4).
Gross disbursement of alternative development funds in 
the six main opium-producing and coca-producing coun-
tries amounted to close to $150 million in 2013. This was 
equivalent to 6 per cent of farmers’ total income from 
opium and coca production ($2.6 billion) in those six 
countries in 2013 (varying from 0.1 per cent in Myanmar 
to 25 per cent in Colombia). In some cases, assistance 
provided to the beneficiaries of alternative development 
interventions was sufficient to make a difference, although 
the data also indicate that when the value of interventions 
lay below certain thresholds, they had insufficient impact.
C. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL ALTERNA-
TIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
National alternative development  
strategies
The review of national alternative development strategies 
shows that the evolution of alternative development at the 
country level is dynamic and versatile. Yet not all countries 
that implement or support alternative development have 
separate, stand-alone alternative development strategies or 
action plans. Most countries, in fact, make alternative 
development one of the pillars of a broader drug control 
strategy. Based on country-specific information provided 
to UNODC through the annual report questionnaires 
for the period 2010-2013, and other communications, 
table 5 shows, by category, countries that support, plan to 
support or implement alternative development projects in 
one way or another. Summary tables of national strategies 
can be found in the annex of the online version of this 
report.
When it comes to national strategies, almost all countries 
state that the impact of programmes is assessed in terms 
of the eradication of extreme poverty, gender equality and 
women’s empowerment, and environmental sustainability 
(as reported in the annual report questionnaires, 2010-
2013). All national strategies — characterized by cross-
ministerial engagement — are embedded in or linked to 
broader national development strategies, albeit in different 
ways. For example, in Afghanistan, the strategy is linked 
to the National Development Strategy, but it falls under 
the counter-narcotics strategy. In Colombia, the strategy 
for alternative development is embedded in the National 
Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction, 
implemented by the Administrative Unit for Territorial 
Consolidation. Colombia’s current national strategy has a 
cross-cutting focus combining supply reduction (reduc-
tion of illicit crops), alternative development and environ-
mental management.41 This allows for the incorporation 
of new policy elements — and therefore more government 
institutions join the efforts to reduce illicit cultivation — 
in the search for an increasingly integral drug control 
policy.42 
In Ecuador, alternative development is embedded within 
the national strategy of equality and solidarity. In the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, the drug control strategy 
is closely related to the overarching objective of poverty 
reduction. In Morocco, where alternative development 
falls under national drug control strategy, l’Initiative 
Nationale de Développement Humain contributes to the 
improvement of development indicators in the areas con-
cerned. In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the strategy 
for alternative development is embedded within the 
broader rural development plans, but with the specific 
objective of limiting coca cultivation to designated areas 
for the legal use of coca leaves. In Germany, the support 
41 Colombia, Department of National Planning, Política Nacional de 
Erradicación Manual de Cultivos Ilícitos y Desarrollo Alternativo para 
la Consolidación Territorial, p. 9.
42 Ibid.
TABLE 12. Gross disbursements for agricultural alternative development assistance provided by donor 
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as a proportion 
of total development assistance, 2009-2013, as a percentage of total development  
assistance 
Source: OECD, International Development Statistics online database (data extracted on 19 December 2014).
 
Gross disbursements 
(percentage of total development assistance of recipient country)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 2009-2013 
Afghanistan 4.6 2.4 1.6 1.3 0.8 2.1 
Colombia 11.8 7.4 4.9 7.2 8.9 8.0 
Peru 4.1 3.7 3.6 4.9 4.8 4.1 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5.2 4.1 3.0 1.2 0.1 2.8 
Subtotal 5.5 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 3.0 
Other countries 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Total 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
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strategy for alternative development is completely embed-
ded within a broad strategy of social economic develop-
ment in rural areas.  
In line with the Millennium Development Goals, all coun-
try strategies address food security and quality of life in 
terms of broader socioeconomic indicators. They all focus 
in one way or another on establishing farmers’ organiza-
tions and include local communities in the design, plan-
ning, implementation and evaluation of programmes and 
often have a specific focus on ethnic minorities or indig-
enous peoples. 
On a broader level, all national strategies or plans reviewed 
in this section clearly have a balanced approach, comple-
menting alternative development with other supply reduc-
tion strategies (particularly law enforcement and 
interdiction), but also with drug demand reduction strate-
gies (prevention, treatment and rehabilitation). Other 
commonly integrated strategies — sometimes as a cross-
cutting theme or as a separate policy — are promoting 
good governance and strengthening State institutions or 
the rule of law, as found in the strategies of 12 countries. 
The objectives of national strategies are in line with 
international documents. They sometimes relate to crop 
substitution or other agricultural production-related 
elements such as marketing (found in at least seven 
countries), or to policies for crop eradication and 
prevention and addressing the drivers of illicit cultivation 
(in nine countries). Some strategies also introduce new 
approaches and link alternative development to quality of 
life, human rights, the rule of law or environmental 
protection (seven countries). 
Overall, national strategies are in line with the definition 
of alternative development found in the Action Plan on 
International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit 
Drug Crops and on Alternative Development, adopted at 
the twentieth special session of the General Assembly. 
However, countries set very different priorities and use 
very different approaches, both within and beyond their 
drug control components. This leads to the development 
of very different projects and interventions that are tailored 
to existing and new challenges that require multidimen-
sional, multifaceted responses.
The wide range of national strategies and the variety of 
ways they are implemented on the ground confirm that 
the evolution of alternative development is driven at the 
country level or even the local level. At the international 
level, a process of connecting “local to global” is currently 
taking place, in which best practices and lessons learned 
from local experiences within national strategies — which 
will probably continue to be very different in years to come 
— are exchanged. That process reinforces efforts by 
UNODC, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other 
entities to foster more South-South cooperation, as also 
recommended in the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Alternative Development.43
43 See para. 14.
TABLE 13. Countries involved in alternative development, 2010-2013a
a Only countries that provided some details about their alternative development strategy, programme, plan or activities have been included.
b Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iran (Islamic Republic of ), Lithuania and the United Kingdom all report that at least part of this support is to 
address illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.
c The Netherlands has no specific alternative development strategy but contributes to various projects that are part of wider economic development 
programmes to improve security and stability in regions with illicit cultivation.
d Peru supports countries abroad through the regional framework of the Andean Community.
Countries with alternative development programmes  
or projects on their soil
Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Indonesia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Morocco, Peru, Philippines 
and Thailand
Countries with a strategy or national plan to support  
alternative development abroadb
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Canada, China, Denmark, Ecuador,  
Finland, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lithuania, 
Netherlands,c New Zealand, Peru,d Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United 
Kingdom and United States
Countries that implement or support preventive  
alternative development
Afghanistan, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, 
France, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Morocco, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam 
Countries with a stand-alone national alternative  
development strategy
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ecuador, Germany, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines and Thailand
Countries with an alternative development strategy 
within a broader national economic development plan
Colombia, Mexico, Myanmar, Trinidad and Tobago and Viet Nam
Countries planning to implement or support  
alternative development interventions
Albania, Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nigeria and  
Russian Federation
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Preventive alternative development
Some countries have a particular focus on preventive alter-
native development. However, the policy of Ecuador 
focusing on rural development is, for example, very dif-
ferent from the preventive policies of Trinidad and Tobago 
targeting urban youth within the prevention strategy 
linked to drug trafficking and other crimes. Elsewhere, the 
link between alternative development and drug trafficking 
in Indonesia is interesting as it moves the alternative devel-
opment strategy away from the general focus on farmers 
in rural areas. Another example of an alternative develop-
ment intervention that does not target farmers who cul-
tivate coca, but rather adopts preventive alternative 
development strategies, is the assistance given to commu-
nities in the Ciénaga Grande of Santa Marta in Colombia. 
Largely dependent on fishing and fish farming44 and 
located on strategic routes for trafficking Colombian 
cocaine to the Caribbean Sea, these communities have 
been the victims of conflict between paramilitary and guer-
rilla forces, and members of the communities have been 
recruited, sometimes by force, by drug traffickers and/or 
illegal armed groups. The aim of preventive alternative 
development interventions is to prevent such situations, 
in addition to boosting socioeconomic development. 
44 Colombia, Department for Social Prosperity and the Administrative 
Unit for Territorial Consolidation, “Pescadores de los palafitos de 
la ciénaga grande pasaron de víctimas a productores”, August 2013. 
Available at www.consolidacion.gov.co. 
D. CHALLENGING CONTEXT OF 
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Expectations about the impact of alternative development 
programmes should take into account the limitations of 
such programmes, which are characterized by relatively 
modest funding and a limited scope and which face chal-
lenges that general rural development programmes nor-
mally do not. One such challenge is the nature of the 
locations where alternative development programmes are 
implemented: marginalized, isolated areas with limited 
government control, unclear land rights and lack of infra-
structure. Another is the poor conditions of beneficiaries 
(conditions of poverty and marginalized communities with 
low socioeconomic indicators, whose members sometimes 
live in fear of violence, along with other tensions) and the 
lack of understanding or trust between beneficiaries and 
other involved parties, such as governmental agencies. 
These conditions are very relevant as they would generally 
disqualify such areas as targets for traditional rural devel-
opment initiatives. 
Marginalization and poverty
Alternative development programmes often involve ben-
eficiaries that are marginalized — socially, economically 
or geographically — from the main societal groups and 
suffer from poor socioeconomic conditions. This may 
involve a “marginalized zone within a marginalized region”, 
such as the municipality of La Asunta in Los Yungas de la 
Paz, in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which is poor, 
difficult to access and highly dependent on coca cultiva-
PREVENTIVE ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ECUADOR
In Ecuador, preventive alternative development consists of measures to enhance the inclusion of the local com-
munity in productive, socioeconomic and environmental protection projects, so as to reduce the vulnerabilities 
that lead to their involvement in illicit activities. At present, Ecuador has preventive alternative development pro-
jects in six regions. For example, in Engunga, in the Province of Santa Elena, preventive alternative development 
is focusing on reactivating the cultivation of shrimp on six shrimp farms (covering 29 ha). The income generated 
for 840 families has also made it possible to invest in three microprojects — a community shop, a recreational 
centre and a pharmacy — while investing in tourism (tours using small boats). The next steps are to scale up the 
shrimp farms, create a brand (and certiﬁcation of the status of “preventive alternative development”) and enter 
the national and international markets for frozen shrimp.
Another project consists of establishing a cacao-processing plant in the area of 18 de Noviembre in the Province 
of Sucumbíos. The ﬁrst step was the creation of a farmers’ association of 100 founding members and the plac-
ing of 1 ha of land in the name of the association to build the plant, which is currently at the ﬁnancing stage. 
A collection centre will also be created so that the processed cacao can be sold directly to private companies 
without going through intermediaries in the marketing chain. It is expected that 1,800 families will beneﬁt from 
the plant, and that the cacao, which is certiﬁed as a product of “preventive alternative development”, will reach 
both national and international markets.
In 2012, Ecuador made a presentation to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on the concept of introducing a global 
stamp for products of alternative development, which would strengthen international marketing opportunities for 
alternative development products bearing the stamp. Products marketed under the global stamp could beneﬁt 
from special marketing regimes, similar to those for Fairtrade and organic products, stressing the product’s origin 
and its links with strategies for addressing illicit cultivation and/or environmental protection. 
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tion.45 It may also involve marginal ethnic groups in iso-
lated areas, such as the Hmong, Karen, Akha and Lisu 
ethnic groups in the Highlands of Thailand, a country in 
which alternative development has been accompanied by 
a State policy of integrating such ethnic groups into soci-
ety through development and better access to education, 
health care and other necessary infrastructure.46 Similarly, 
in Colombia, the Kogui, Arhuaco, Kankuamo and Wiwa 
indigenous communities, among others, are or have been 
beneficiaries of alternative development. In addition, many 
beneficiaries of alternative development programmes are 
migrants or the descendants of migrants. Thus, problems 
associated with migration need to be considered when 
programmes are implemented. For example, a survey con-
ducted in the coca-producing valleys of Peru in 2013 
found that only 38.4 per cent of the heads of beneficiary 
households were born in the region, while 61.6 per cent 
of beneficiaries were from other regions.47
45 Daniel Brombacher, “Informe final: asesoría de proyecto—reco-
mendaciones para el establecimiento de una línea de base”, report 
on project BOL/I79 (sustainable and integrated management of 
natural resources in the tropics of Cochabamba and the Yungas of 
La Paz) (Eschborn, GIZ, 28 April 2011), sect. 1.1. 
46 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 167.
47 DEVIDA, Encuesta Anual de Evaluación de Impacto del Desarollo 
Alternativo 2013.
While not all illicit cultivation is driven by poverty, most 
areas where illicit crops are grown are characterized by 
poverty.48 This applies to coca-producing countries in 
South America, cannabis resin-producing countries such 
as Morocco, and opium-producing countries in Asia, nota-
bly Afghanistan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Myanmar and Pakistan. Beneficiary populations are rarely 
homogeneous but they often consist of people who can 
be considered to be “those at the bottom of the social 
pyramid”.49 They tend to be small-scale subsistence farm-
ers working on small plots of land (a few hectares or less) 
that they do not legally own, artisanal fishermen, handi-
craft workers or land labourers.50 
In remote areas of Myanmar, opium is primarily cultivated 
as a cash crop to compensate for financial shortfalls and 
is often grown because few alternative crops are available 
and due to the need to provide basic necessities for fami 
48 Transnational Institute, Bouncing Back: Relapse in the Golden Trian-
gle (June 2014), pp. 7 and 65.
49 Regional evaluation report, alternative development in the South 
American Andes: report of findings, input for Alternative Develop-
ment: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final Synthesis Report (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.XI.13). 
50 Mansfield, “Development in a drugs environment: a strategic 
approach to ‘alternative development’”, p. 5. 
MYANMAR: REDUCING THE IMPORTANCE OF OPIUM AS A SOURCE 
OF INCOME BY BALANCING SHORT-TERM FOOD SECURITY NEEDS 
WITH LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY 
In Myanmar, the average area of poppy cultivation per opium poppy-growing household more than doubled, 
from 0.17 ha in the period 2002-2003 to 0.43 ha in 2013, which implies an increased dependency on opium 
cultivation. Socioeconomic village surveys conducted in connection with the annual opium poppy survey show 
that signiﬁcantly higher proportions of households are in debt and are exposed to food insecurity in opium 
poppy-growing villages than in non-poppy-growing villages. Opium cultivation provides a means of earning cash 
income to purchase food in months when a household’s food resources have been depleted. Moreover, wages 
earned from labour related to opium poppy cultivation are an important source of additional income for many 
households. That fact should be taken into account when designing alternative development projects, because a 
reduction in opium poppy cultivation not only results in a loss of income from opium production but also removes 
an opportunity to generate income from wage labour.a 
While previous interventions mainly addressed food insecurity, the recently developed UNODC alternative devel-
opment project in South Shan, Myanmar,b has shifted the focus to a longer-term sustainable approach that 
balances the cultivation of permanent crops in agroforestry systems with the production of high-value food crops 
and reforestation activities to ensure environmental sustainability. Lessons learned and successful experiences 
from other parts of the world, in particular Peru and Thailand, were instrumental in deﬁning this new approach. 
The strategy will include a land registration and titling process to assure the long-term investment of farmers in the 
project. To improve and assure food security for beneﬁciary farmers, permanent crop systems will be implemented, 
together with short-term food crops. Productive activities will be oriented towards high-quality products so as 
to reach premium markets, and farmer enterprises will be set up so that farmers can assume future processing 
and commercializing activities themselves. The project will be carried out in former or ongoing conﬂict areas, 
and the planned alternative development work is also intended to contribute to a peacebuilding process in the 
respective areas.
a UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2013 (Bangkok, 2013).
b UNODC project proposal on alternative development in South Shan townships affected by opium poppy cultivation, 2015-2017.
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lies. 53 Overall income levels 
in the northern part of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic and 
northern Thailand (the main opium-pro-
ducing areas in those two countries) are lower 
than in other parts of the countries. Similarly, the main 
cannabis cultivation areas in Morocco are located in the 
Rif Region, one of the country’s poorest regions, where 
farmers cultivating cannabis were found to earn less than 
the average income.54 In Peru, the Human Development 
Index, which combines statistics on life expectancy, edu-
cation and income, showed that indices of development 
were, on average, 60 per cent higher in non-coca-cultivat-
ing districts than in coca-cultivating districts in 2012. 
Moreover, overall improvements as measured by the 
Human Development Index were stronger in districts 
without coca cultivation than in corresponding areas of 
coca cultivation (0.08 points).55 In the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, the main coca-producing centres, Yungas de 
La Paz and Trópico de Cochabamba, are also located in 
provinces with below-average incomes. Similarly, in south-
ern Afghanistan, where the country’s opium production 
is concentrated, the overall per capita income of farmers 
was below the national average in 2013.56 
Isolated areas with limited government 
control, often affected by tension, inse-
curity and conflict
One of the key particularities and difficulties of alterna-
tive development in comparison to development efforts 
in general is that the illicit cultivation of drugs often takes 
place in areas with weak rule of law and where there is a 
51 UNODC and Acción Social, Voces del Campo Joven: Crónicas de 
Líderes Jóvenes Campesinos, Mónica Cortés Yepes and Francisco 
Duque Quintero, eds. (Bogotá, 2009), p. 38. 
52 Project XSPK26, implemented by UNODC in Oudomxay  
Province, with financial assistance from Germany.
53 UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2014 (Bangkok, 2014),  
p. 60.
54 UNODC, “Morocco cannabis survey 2004: executive summary” 
(May 2005).
55 UNODC, “Analytical brief: coca crops and human development” 
(February 2014).
56 UNODC and Ministry of Counter-Narcotics of Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014, February 2015. 
“need to achieve socioeconomic pacifica-
tion and stabilization of the areas affected 
by the domination and violence of drug 
traffickers” or illegal armed groups.57 As 
many areas of illicit cultivation are isolated 
and often plagued by ethnic and other con-
flicts or political instability, government con-
trol over them is limited. This means that 
people in such areas have limited or no access to 
basic services including education, sanitation and 
health care.58 According to one evaluation report, “conflict 
deriving from social decomposition [is] endemic to com-
munities with illicit crops, but overt violent conflict deriv-
ing from the drug trade and criminality, or from insurgent 
movements, is not uncommon”.59
It is therefore often difficult to justify development assis-
tance on purely economic grounds in such isolated areas.60 
Alternative development activities are sometimes the only 
institutionalized development interventions in such 
regions. By bringing in a State presence and development 
assistance, alternative development can open the door to 
the introduction — or reintroduction — of the rule of 
law in areas outside national government control. A good 
example is Thailand, where many of the initial interven-
tions in highland tribe areas were prompted by national 
security concerns, and thus had as a key initial objective 
to “instil a feeling of loyalty to Thailand among the hill 
tribes”61 through development programmes to integrate 
marginalized populations into mainstream society. Over 
the subsequent decades, the economic well-being of the 
hill tribes clearly improved, partly due to alternative devel-
opment, as did the rule of law situation in those regions.62 
Similarly, a household survey among farmers in Peru, done 
as part of global evaluation of alternative development, 
found that peace and security, two preconditions of effec-
tive rule of law, were the most often-cited major long-term 
impacts of alternative development (88 per cent). The 
thematic evaluation of alternative development in Colom-
bia indicated that alternative development actually helped 
create and sustain a “culture of legality” in the intervention 
areas.63
In areas where there is violence in the context of organized 
crime or armed conflict by groups aimed at bringing down 
57 Alternative Development in the Andean Area: The UNDCP  
Experience, revised edition, p. 7.
58 UNODC, World Drug Report 2000 (United Nations publication,  
Sales No. GV.E.00.0.10), p. 142.
59 Regional evaluation report, alternative development in the South 
American Andes: report of findings, input for Alternative Develop-
ment: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final Synthesis Report, p. 9.
60 UNDCP, “Alternative development as an instrument of drug abuse 
control”.
61 Director General of the Public Welfare Department (1964), quoted 
in Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 47.
62 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000. 
63 UNODC, “Alternative development programme in Colombia: 
independent evaluation” (Vienna, November 2014). 
In the short 
term, alternative development is also about 
food security. A beneficiary in the Sierra Nevada of Santa 
Marta, Colombia, says: “One of the conditions was substituting illicit 
crops with food crops and rearing small animals such as pigs and chickens; 
we all started to plant plantain, cassava, squash, papaya, caster bean and 
cacao.”51 A farmer in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic who actively partici-
pated in project activities in Oudomxay Province that were aimed at improving rice 
production52 explains, in answer to a question on whether he would continue to 
adopt the techniques introduced under the project and plant hybrid rice even 
though he found it not as tasty as the local variety: “Definitely, I will adopt 
and sell the rice for profit, then buy for our consumption, it’s not that 
difficult. The most important thing is that we have high 
production so that we have enough rice for the 
year round.”
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the government and/or controlling territory (such as the 
Shining Path in Peru, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), ethnic insurgent groups in Myanmar 
and Taliban and other non-State armed groups in Afghani-
stan), the effectiveness of alternative development has been 
questioned.64 As a result, since 2007, the Government of 
Colombia has paid more attention to the role of illicit 
drugs as an instrument used by illegal armed groups to 
maintain control over territories where the State has no 
presence. Part of the rationale behind the new policy was 
the perceived lack of sustainability of both crop eradica-
tion and alternative development efforts.65 The Colom-
bian Government deemed that those efforts had suffered 
from weak State presence and support66 and that the prob-
lem was not so much a result of the ineffectiveness of crop 
eradication or alternative development in itself, but due 
more to the fact that citizens were unable to exercise their 
rights and benefit from basic services of the State.67 Simi-
lar experiences have been reported in Afghanistan. A recent 
evaluation report found the following:
The counter-narcotics and development effort in Nan-
garhar has also fallen into disarray. Since 2013 eradi-
cation has been all but impossible in many of the 
southern districts where the crop has been concen-
trated. The kind of strategy used in each of the previ-
ous bans imposed in Nangarhar, where farmers were 
deterred from planting using a combination of nego-
tiation, the promise of development assistance and 
the show of force through the roll-out of security per-
sonnel and infrastructure, is no longer an option. The 
failure to deliver on past promises, the harmful impact 
that successive bans had on large sections of the rural 
population, and a perception that government forces 
do not have sufficient coercive power to impose their 
will without the support of United States military 
forces, has rendered this approach unworkable, espe-
cially in the unruly southern districts where the 
Afghan State does not have a history of control.68 
The new drug control model in Colombia provides an 
interesting example of the role that alternative develop-
ment may play in such difficult areas. In 2007, the Mac-
arena Integral Consolidation Plan was implemented as a 
pilot project for what would later become the national 
policy for territorial consolidation and reconstruction. The 
pilot project treated the control of territory, by illegal 
64 Regional evaluation report, alternative development in the South 
American Andes: report of findings, input for Alternative Develop-
ment: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final Synthesis Report,  
pp. 4-5.
65 Colombia, Department of National Planning, Política Nacional de 
Erradicación Manual de Cultivos Ilícitos y Desarrollo Alternativo para 
la Consolidación Territorial, p. 29. 
66 Colombia, Centre for the Coordination of Integrated Action, “Plan 
de consolidación integral de la Macarena” (Bogotá, August 2008). 
67 Ibid. 
68 David Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW on Opium 
Production. Nangarhar: A Case Study (2015). 
armed groups in particular, as the root of the problem.69 
In areas where there is a lack of State presence and control, 
armed groups can use their control over territories in a 
predatory manner by illegally exploiting communities and 
economic resources. 
Another important factor that can explain the link between 
conflict and illicit cultivation is that beneficiaries may be 
migrants who have voluntarily migrated or been forcibly 
displaced from other areas because of threats, violence or 
conflict and have had to find livelihoods in new areas. 
Alternative development interventions subsequently have 
to take into account the weak social fabric and lack of trust 
found in such areas. As explained in an evaluation of alter-
native development in the South American Andes:
This historical dynamic, steeped in violence, has 
given rise to an individual psychology whose essence 
is fear and deep mistrust … directed not only at the 
“outsider”, which includes a State that has long 
neglected its rural citizens, but also at others in the 
community.70
The existence of indirect and direct linkages between con-
flict and illicit drug cultivation, whether related to social 
strife, migration or the presence of illegal armed groups, 
means that alternative development must also deal with 
conflict mitigation or resolution. Depending on the local 
context, this may mean that the support strategy of alter-
native development helps households and communities 
cope with the causes and consequences of conflict.
E. DRIVERS OF ILLICIT CULTIVATION
No single factor can explain why farmers grow illicit crops. 
Illicit cultivation is driven by situation-specific combina-
tions of vulnerability and opportunity factors. As survival 
and subsistence are real considerations for many house-
holds that engage in illicit crop cultivation, they are fre-
quently risk-averse and take a variety of elements into 
account when they make decisions on narcotic crop cul-
tivation. Alternative crop cultivation depends on many 
factors: possession of the requisite skills and knowledge 
for growing such crops; geographical and environmental 
factors, such as climate, the availability of water and arable 
land, and proximity to market; household-specific socio-
economic factors, such as level of income, existing employ-
ment opportunities, access to credit and size of landholding; 
developmental facilities such as access to roads, the power 
grid and educational and health services; and sociopoliti-
cal and institutional factors, such as security, government 
control and rule of law. 
69 Colombia, Centre for the Coordination of Integrated Action, “Plan 
de consolidación integral de la Macarena”, pp. 3-5. 
70 Regional evaluation report, alternative development in the South 
American Andes: report of findings, input for Alternative Develop-
ment: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final Synthesis Report, p. 5.
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While the risk factors for illicit cultivation vary from 
region to region, the specific nature of illicit crops with 
respect to agronomic aspects, durability of the product, 
price and ease of sale, among other things, tends to be one 
of the reasons for their cultivation. All major illicit crops 
are also particularly attractive because they produce quick 
returns from non-perishable products. In Afghanistan, 
opium provides a convenient, portable and durable store 
of value for rural households, which is particularly con-
venient in an insecure and uncertain environment. Opium 
is also an important, if not the only, means of accessing 
rural credit; its cultivation seems to be intrinsically linked 
to informal rural credit in source areas, where opium cul-
tivators gain preferential, if not sole, access to informal 
credit arrangements.71 In the Lao People’s Democratic 
71 UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International 
Problem (New York, 2003).
INCOME GENERATION 
Many factors inﬂuence the decision to cultivate illicit crops. Income generation, particularly differences in the 
income derived from licit and illicit crops, is just one element in a complex mix of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives, but it can explain some of the ﬂuctuations in illicit cultivation. 
In Afghanistan, for example, the ratio of income per hectare from opium cultivation to income per hectare 
from wheat cultivation, which can be interpreted as an indicator of the appeal of cultivating opium poppy, was 
close to 10:1 during the 2004-2007 period ($5,200 per ha under poppy cultivation versus $545 per ha under 
wheat cultivation in 2007). During that period, the area under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased by 
47 per cent. By 2009, the ratio of income from opium cultivation to income from wheat cultivation per hectare 
had declined to 3:1 ($3,600 vs. $1,200); in parallel, the area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had 
fallen by 36 per cent between 2007 and 2009. In subsequent years, the ratio increased again to 4:1 ($3,800 vs. 
$1,000 in 2014), even reaching a proportion of 11:1 in 2011, prompting a strong increase in opium poppy cul-
tivation. During the period 2009-2014 as a whole, the area under opium poppy cultivation rose by 82 per cent.a
Similarly, strong declines in coca prices in Peru after 1994 (from approximately $4.40 per kg in 1994 to $0.50 in 
1996, before rising to $1.60 in 1999), which were a consequence of a policy to stop illegal air trafﬁc between 
Peru and Colombia, prompted a reduction in the area under coca cultivation by 66 per cent during the period 
1995-1999. Subsequent coca price increases (to $3.90 per kg by June 2011), as alternative outlets had been 
found by trafﬁckers, prompted coca cultivation to increase again by 61 per cent between 1999 and 2011.b
The importance of income generation is also reﬂected in the socioeconomic surveys conducted by UNODC 
in individual countries to identify the reasons why farmers cultivate illicit crops. The Afghanistan Opium Survey 
2014, for example, revealed that the main reasons for cultivating opium were the high price of opium (44 per 
cent of all responses), followed by the ability of opium poppy to reduce poverty, i.e. provide “basic food and 
shelter” (20 per cent), and to “improve living conditions” (13 per cent). A UNODC survey conducted in Colombia 
also identiﬁed “source of income” as the main reason for farmers’ engagement in the cultivation of illicit crops 
(71 per cent), followed by arguments of “traditional cultivation” (7 per cent), the problem of “access to 
markets” to sell licit products (5 per cent) and “pressure by armed groups to cultivate illicit crops” (2 per cent).
There have been a few instances in which the income generated by alternative agricultural products (such as 
palm oil in the Andean countries;c saffron and, in some years, black cumin, grapes, apricots, pomegranates and 
almonds in Afghanistan;d and potatoes, red cabbage, tomatoes and Japanese apricots in Thailand)e turned out 
to be higher than that from illicit crops, yet some farmers still opted for illicit cultivation. Possible explanations 
provided by experts and in evaluation documents included the following: (a) farmers were not convinced that such 
price differentials would last for a prolonged period of time; (b) there were risk considerations in taking the licit 
harvest to traders in the next town (as opposed to traders coming to villages and purchasing illicit crops directly 
from the farmers); (c) farmers were forced by the insurgency to continue planting illicit crops; (d) the initial funds 
needed for the investment in licit crops were rather large and yielded returns only after a certain period of time; 
and (e) there was a lack of recognized land titles, which fostered a tendency towards farmers taking a short-term 
approach in their decision-making processes.
a UNODC and Ministry of Counter Narcotics of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production (November 2014).
b UNODC, World Drug Report 2012 and previous years.
c UNODC, Sharing Experiences on Alternative Development from Southeast Asia and Latin America (2009).
d UNDCP, Afghanistan Alternative Development Report #1: On-Farm Income Opportunities in Maiwand, Khakrez and Ghorak (Islamabad, 2000).
e World Drug Report 2000.
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ENVIRONMENTAL SUITABILITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC VULNERABIL-
ITY MODELS FOR OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN
In cooperation with the University of Salzburg (Austria), UNODC has developed an environmental suitability model 
and a socioeconomic vulnerability model for opium cultivation. The former includes four variables: land use (land 
cover), water availability, climatic conditions and quality of soil. The socioeconomic vulnerability model considers 
nine indicators: governance (recognition of governor authority), stability (conﬂict incidents), location (peripheral 
versus central regions), accessibility (travel time to nearest city of more than 50,000 inhabitants), education (access 
to schools), awareness (of agricultural assistance and initiatives designed to convince farmers not to cultivate 
opium poppy), alternative (off-farm) employment opportunities, credit availability and poverty. 
These models were applied to Afghanistan, where a comparison with the actual areas under opium poppy cultiva-
tion in 2014 showed that many of the hotspots for opium poppy cultivation were located in the areas identiﬁed 
as potentially high-risk areas in the resulting environmental and socioeconomic risk maps. At the same time, 
the results of the risk assessment identiﬁed a number of additional areas, particularly in the south-eastern and 
northern parts of the country, that are potentially vulnerable to large-scale opium cultivation but have so far not 
turned out to be signiﬁcant opium-producing regions.
Risk maps and actual opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2014 
 
Source: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production.
Note: The boundaries shown on this maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
The risk maps also show that the risk factors behind opium cultivation vary from region to region, with the principal 
ones being environmental suitability, socioeconomic vulnerability, security/rule of law issues (as insecurity continues 
to be highly correlated with opium cultivation) and opium prices. For example, in selected areas of Badakhshan 
Province (north-eastern Afghanistan), the role played by environmental conditions, particularly climate, in deter-
ring farmers from cultivating opium appears to have had more of an impact than the socioeconomic factors that 
can push farmers to cultivate opium. In selected areas of Nangarhar Province (southern Afghanistan), there was 
a comparatively low risk of opium cultivation resulting from socioeconomic vulnerability, yet there was still an 
increase in opium cultivation in 2014. This implies that other drivers play a role in opium cultivation, thus requir-
ing more of a political response as opposed to purely development-related measures. 
Although certain areas of the Provinces of Farah and Balkh (northern Afghanistan) have similar levels of risk of 
opium cultivation, despite great variations in their levels of socioeconomic vulnerability and environmental suit-
ability, their respective outcomes in terms of opium cultivation are completely different: the area around Balkh is 
poppy-free, while Farah is one of Afghanistan’s main poppy-producing provinces. 
Potential environmental and socioeconomic  
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Republic and Myanmar, opium serves as a means of 
obtaining credit during times of food scarcity.
Relationships between “drivers” and illicit crop cultivation 
are not necessarily linear. This means that a single factor 
can, under specific circumstances, be a driver of increases 
in illicit drug cultivation, although under different cir-
cumstances the very same factor may also turn out to limit 
or even reduce the spread of illicit crop cultivation. 
Improved irrigation can generally be expected to lead to 
an increase in licit cultivation, although, depending on 
the circumstances, it may also contribute to an increase in 
illicit cultivation. For example, assessments of a rural devel-
opment programme in Afghanistan aimed at increasing 
agricultural production, mainly by supporting micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, found that an exclu-
sive focus on expanding the licit economy, without assess-
ing how the combination of different interventions 
targeted in the same geographic location would have an 
impact on different population groups, their household 
assets, and their decision to cultivate opium poppy, may 
have resulted in some of the development investments 
being used to cultivate greater amounts of higher-yielding 
opium poppy.72,73 
UNODC, in close cooperation with research institutes 
and national authorities, has started to engage in the devel-
opment of specific models to identify the suitability and 
vulnerability of illicit drug production (see previous two 
boxes). The resulting risk assessments show that the rea-
sons for cultivating illicit crops are diverse and often spe-
cific to particular areas. They also reveal that illicit crop 
cultivation is linked, on the one hand, to the dynamics of 
cultivation itself and, on the other hand, to underlying 
drivers and root causes related to conditions of vulnerabil-
72 USAID Office of Inspector General, “Audit of USAID/Afghani-
stan’s incentives driving economic alternatives for the North, East, 
and West program”, Audit Report No. F-306-12-004-P (Kabul, 
2012).
73 David Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW on Opium 
Production. Nangarhar: A Case Study (2015).
RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO ILLICIT COCA BUSH  
CULTIVATION IN COLOMBIA
In close cooperation with the Colombian authorities, UNODC has also embarked on a novel approach to identifying 
risks and vulnerabilities related to illicit cultivation of coca bush. Focusing on statistics relating to the dynamics of 
coca cultivation, the UNODC Integrated System for Monitoring Illicit Crops in Colombia has developed an índice 
de amenaza (hazard index) for the presence of coca in municipalities in Colombia. The main logic behind this index 
is the observation that the spread of coca cultivation, though highly dynamic, still tends to be a rather gradual 
process, mainly spreading from existing areas under coca cultivation where accumulated know-how and similar 
socioeconomic and political conditions exist. The factors included in this index are: (a) the affected area (hectares 
of crops plus areas of manual eradication and aerial spraying); (b) persistence; (c) expansion; (d) concentration; (e) 
replanting; and (f) abandonment of coca ﬁelds over the years.
With regard to coca cultivation, the above was subsequently complemented with an índice de vulnerabilidad (vul-
nerability index), with vulnerability being understood as the condition that deﬁnes the degree of exposure to the 
threat of illicit crop cultivation and the actual capacity to prevent, resist and recover from the establishment of such 
illicit crops. It has been measured in terms of governance (tax income, dependence on transfers), social develop-
ment (health, education), economic development (savings, Internet use), availability of justice, security (incidents) 
and human crisis (forced displacement/expulsion). The two indices were then combined into an overall risk map 
of the threats and vulnerabilities to coca cultivation.
Mapping the risk of cultivation on the basis of the two indices reveals that, out of 1,121 municipalities, 280 (roughly 
25 per cent of the total) showed a threat or were identiﬁed to have been vulnerable to the cultivation of illicit crops 
in 2013. This included 45 municipalities (4 per cent of the total) which showed a “high risk” in terms of threats 
or vulnerability and 147 municipalities (13 per cent of the total) which had a “middle-high” risk of being affected 
by illicit crop cultivation. 
The two main areas under illicit cultivation, the Departments of Nariño and Putumayo (bordering Ecuador), are 
among the regions showing the highest index numbers for threats and vulnerabilities.
Similarly, the neighbouring Department of Caquetá and the Departments of Meta and Guaviare (central Colombia), 
which for years have been among the most prominent coca-growing regions, have been identiﬁed as high-risk 
areas. Potential risk areas have been also identiﬁed in several central and northern parts of the country, including 
the Department of Antioquia and the neighbouring regions and departments along the Atlantic coast, all of which 
have shown ongoing coca cultivation and involvement in cocaine trafﬁcking. In addition, there are a number of 
other regions in Colombia that show a high risk potential, notably in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the 
country, which have so far not been among the main coca-producing areas.
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ity found in geographical areas where cultivation takes 
place, such as weak rule of law or a lack of social and eco-
nomic development.
F. STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF  
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
PROGRAMMES
Alternative development is as much about building licit 
alternatives for farmers who engage in illicit crop cultiva-
tion as it is about socioeconomic development and security 
in the creation of an enabling environment to reduce illicit 
cultivation over time. No two alternative development 
projects are the same, yet their general strategic elements 
are often similar, even though their roles may vary in 
importance from project to project and some may not 
feature at all. Based on reviews of successful projects, the 
major components and strategic elements are presented 
below. A summary table can be found in the annex of the 
online version of this report. 
Economic and infrastructural  
component
Economic necessity tends to play an important role in the 
decision of farmers to cultivate illicit crops. That is why 
there is a broad consensus among experts that viable, sus-
tainable income-generating alternatives need to be avail-
able in order to decrease dependence on illicit cultivation 
over time. In many countries, from the Lao People’s Dem-
ocratic Republic to Morocco to Peru, the development 
and promotion of income-generating activities are at the 
heart of alternative development. As section B of the pre-
sent chapter shows, however, a focus on the production 
of alternative crops alone has proved insufficient, which 
is why alternative development projects now contain (or 
are accompanied by) a full range of technical, marketing 
and infrastructural support. 
Part of that support is production-related, with one of its 
most common forms being the transfer of the requisite 
skills for the transition to alternative crops. This support 
Number of municipalities facing threat (presence of coca cultivation)
high medium-high medium medium-low none Total
Number of municipalities 
facing vulnerability
High 2 15 12 10 13 52
Medium-high 4 25 45 59 244 377
Medium 2 13 10 41 288 354
Medium low 5 8 26 228 267
Low 1 2 68 71
Total 8 58 76 138 841 1,121
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may also include the transfer 
of infrastructural elements, such as col-
lection centres, roads and bridges, or pro-
duction-related resources, such as the provision 
of a water supply system or water storage tanks for irriga-
tion, as in UNODC projects in Oudomxay Province of 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic or support for irri-
gation canals in the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan. 
In the highland areas of Thailand, alternative development 
efforts have been accompanied by large-scale investment 
in roads and irrigation projects. 76 This is very similar to 
experiences in Peru, where the Government has invested 
heavily in economic infrastructure (roads and bridges), as 
well as social infrastructure (education and health care).77
Support and credit schemes
Production-related support can also involve the donation 
of livestock and rice banks, as in a project sponsored by 
the European Union in Myanmar,78 or rice banks alone, 
as in Thailand.79 China has donated rice to local authori-
ties in Myanmar to address the food insecurity of former 
opium poppy farmers, while in Indonesia a rice mill was 
established in exchange for voluntary labour by villagers.80 
In 2010, an association of fish farmers in Colombia 
received international support in the form of fish cages, 
juvenile cachama fish and fish food through a call for pro-
posals of the European Union’s third Peace Laboratory.81 
Support also takes the form of seed distribution, as in the 
Helmand Food Zone project in southern Afghanistan.
As discussed in the previous section, lack of access to credit 
can be one of the drivers of illicit crop cultivation. To help 
poor farmers reduce illicit crop cultivation and begin alter-
74 Brombacher and others, Evaluación de medios de vida en poblaciones 
productoras de hoja de coca en el Valle de los ríos Apurímac y Ene,  
p. 28. 
75 David Mansfield, “From Bad They Made It Worse”: The Concentra-
tion of Opium Poppy in Areas of Conflict in the Provinces of Helmand 
and Nangarhar (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 
2014).
76 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 167.
77 UNODC, “The alternative development model in San Martin: a 
case study on local economic development, executive summary”.
78 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/case-studies/myan-
mar_food-livelihood-security_en.pdf.
79 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 139.
80 Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage, Aceh sustain-
able alternative livelihood development project in Aceh Province, 
Indonesia. Information available at www.maefahluang.org.
81 Information gathered through the Administrative Unit for Territo-
rial Consolidation (Colombia).
native income generation, they need to have seed money 
for investment in new products, but remote communities 
often have no access to credit and other services. As bank 
or private loans entail high interest rates that farmers may 
not be able to afford, microcredit (or other forms of revolv-
ing funds) is a necessary component of alternative devel-
opment programmes. Local credit and revolving funds can 
also help farmers to form organizations, to initiate saving 
schemes and to develop their capacity for financial plan-
ning and management. Several programmes in Asia incor-
porate various forms of microcredit, as well as revolving 
funds and assets, including rice banks, seed banks, revolv-
ing community medicine funds, village savings and micro-
credit production groups. The identification and 
exploitation of specialty markets is also a key element in 
Colombian and Peruvian alternative development pro-
grammes, an approach that requires adherence to strict 
guidelines and particular regulations but which yields 
returns on investment that are well worth the effort.82
One principle of alternative development initiatives (as 
opposed to quick-impact projects) is that alternative 
sources of income are meant to be sustainable. This gen-
erally implies that perennial cash crops (e.g. coffee and 
palm oil) are favoured in the selection of alternative crops, 
as they would not be immediately replaced by illicit crops 
should their market price drop temporarily.83 There is also 
an increasing focus on promoting value-added products 
(instead of raw materials) in order to increase the income 
of small-scale farmers. The importance of a market-driven 
approach is increasingly being accepted. Producers of alter-
native development products are encouraged to adapt to 
current and prospective market demand; projects can assist 
them in creating new market niches.84
Marketing support, private sector  
involvement and value chain development
Support for the marketing of products of alternative devel-
opment is now recognized as an important component of 
any project. Yet the marketing aspects have only recently 
grown in importance, with the main focus of alternative 
development still being on production, in order to boost 
productivity, output and quality. Boosting productivity 
tends to be regarded as a measure of success. But while the 
overarching objective may be raising income levels and 
indirectly raising the general living conditions of farming 
families, there is not always a clear marketing strategy for 
such products. 
82 UNODC, Sharing Experiences on Alternative Development from 
Southeast Asia and Latin America (2009).
83 Joint UNODC-Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development expert group meeting on alternative development in 
the framework of preparations for the special session of the General 
Assembly on the world drug problem to be held in 2016 and the 
post-Millennium Development Goals debate, held in Berlin on  
19 and 20 November 2014.
84 See E/CN.7.2013/8, para. 19.
Financial 
services matter and the provision of 
credit is important. A female beneficiary in 
Peru explains: “Credit is a problem: sometimes you 
produce well and at other times you don’t, and if you don’t 
pay, the bank will not spare you.”74 Alternative development 
projects often face situations in which existing informal credit 
systems may give preferential access to households that cultivate 
opium poppy. As one farmer in upper Khogiani, Afghani-
stan, puts it, “Poppy is from God; it has lots of benefits. 
When we go to Jalalabad, shopkeepers now show 
respect, they offer loans and they help 
load our cars.”75
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Despite these challenges, alternative development pro-
grammes have been able to produce added economic value, 
for example, by introducing agro-industry and social enter-
prises such as those related to the processing of macadamia 
nuts and coffee in Thailand and coffee and honey process-
ing in Colombia (where marketing support has been quite 
successful through the establishment of second-tier pro-
ducer organizations such as the Red Ecolsierra in Santa 
Marta). A coffee production plant has been established in 
the municipality of Albán in Nariño, Colombia.
To enhance marketing options and reduce some of the 
vulnerabilities related to illicit cultivation, alternative 
development programmes often try to involve the private 
sector. For example, a recent project in the Amazon region 
of Peru linked cacao production directly with a German 
importer of high-quality cacao, which provided technical 
assistance both pre- and post-harvest.85 In the Region of 
San Martín, national companies that export palm hearts 
to Belgium, France, Germany, Lebanon and Spain, are 
involved in exporting products of alternative development. 
In these alternative development projects, the private 
sector has become an integral component of the strategy, 
not only in terms of implementing alternative develop-
ment, but also through its broader investment in economic 
and social infrastructure.86
85 GIZ, “Informe sobre el control de avance del Proyecto”, report on 
project PER/U87, sect. 2.
86 UNODC, El Modelo de Desarrollo Alternativo de la Región San 
In some regions of Colombia, farmers or farmers’ coopera-
tives have been connected to markets through commercial 
partnerships with businesses such as national supermarket 
chains (with the assistance of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development) or with national or foreign com-
panies.87 Alternative development programmes have 
increasingly incorporated the private sector through, for 
example, joint ventures or public-private partnerships. 
Connected to the growing role of the private sector in alter-
native development programmes, a focus on the develop-
ment of the entire production value chain has become 
common in recent years. The objective of such an approach 
is to increase competitiveness and marketing potential 
through strengthening the economic, technological and 
organizational components of alternative development 
interventions within a single value chain. In Peru, one such 
approach has focused on high-potential crops such as palm 
oil and cacao, and has incorporated all elements in the 
chain, from providing agricultural inputs to technical assis-
tance, and from building business alliances and public-
private partnerships to linking to markets.88 In the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, the focus on the value chain 
Martín: Un Estudio de Caso de Desarrollo Económico Local, chap. II, 
sects. 7 (c) and 7 (d); and chap. VI, sect. III.
87 UNODC, Alternative Development Programme in Colombia:  
independent evaluation, chap. 2 (Vienna, November 2014).
88 USAID/Peru, “USAID/Peru country development cooperation 
strategy 2012-2016”, pp. 21-22.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC  
REPUBLIC: the role of microcredit
In Oudomxay Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNODC is supporting communities through improving 
food security and the increasing licit production of food and cash crops. The project has put in place rice banks, 
a water supply system, small-scale irrigation schemes and access roads, and has introduced improved and high-
yielding crops, provided technical assistance (inputs and training) and conducted regular follow-up at the ﬁeld 
level. This has contributed to an increase in annual household income from agricultural production (corn, rice, 
non-timber forest products, vegetables, fruit, livestock production and other licit crops) in 32 target villages of 
more than 500 per cent, from approximately $360 in 2009 to more than $2,100 in 2014. In the 17 new target 
villages, household income increased by 82 per cent, from $660 in 2011 to $1,200 in 2014.a
An important element contributing to the successes achieved so far has been the microcredit scheme. A village 
savings and credit fund was established by the project in 44 target villages. These schemes are managed by local 
committees, which conduct investment and return assessments, monitor investment records and carry out account-
ing and ﬁnancial reporting. Farmers and production groups develop production and investment proposals, action 
plans and microcredit, and small investment loans are provided through the community cooperative mechanism. 
The total amount of money held by the fund in the project target villages increased by 42 per cent during the 
implementation period of a year and a half. The communities have been able to increase the production of various 
alternative activities, including the cultivation of diverse crops, livestock rearing and ﬁsh farming, and small trad-
ing and handicraft production. A signiﬁcant part of the village microcredit funds was invested in the production 
of corn, which is the most commonly produced cash crop in Oudomxay. Also, women’s weaving groups have 
been supported by establishing revolving funds, which have enabled women to obtain the skills to manage such 
programmes and invest in their handicraft activities.
a UNODC, “Increasing food security and promoting licit crop production and small farmer enterprise development in Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic and Myanmar: project XSPK26”, annual project progress report 2014. Available from https://profi.unodc.org.
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QUICK-IMPACT PROJECTS CASE STUDY: the Food Zone in  
Helmand Province, Afghanistan 
Designed to assist farmers over a three-year period in the transition from an opium poppy-based economy to a licit 
agricultural economy, the Food Zone programme started in 2008. The programme targeted the central, irrigated 
parts of Helmand Province of Afghanistan, where most options for alternative crop cultivation were feasible. The 
area accounted for around 40 per cent of Helmand’s total area under opium poppy cultivation in 2008, based on 
data from Cranﬁeld University (United Kingdom). 
Also intended to restore conﬁdence in the Government, the programme comprised awareness-raising campaigns 
to combat cultivation of opium poppy, the distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer to farmers, and law enforce-
ment activities, including eradication. Farmers who received such assistance were required to sign a declaration 
indicating that they would not cultivate opium poppy. Following the introduction of the Food Zone in 2008, opium 
poppy cultivation within the zone fell by 37 per cent in one year, while the cultivation of wheat nearly doubled. 
Cultivation of opium poppy within the zone continued to decrease until 2011, whereas opium poppy cultivation 
outside the zone increased by 8 per cent in the ﬁrst year, according to data collected by Cranﬁeld University, and 
continued to increase in the following years. Nonetheless, the strong decline in poppy cultivation in the Food Zone 
enabled an overall decline in opium poppy cultivation of 33 per cent in Helmand Province in 2009.a Nevertheless, 
the declines in the area under opium poppy cultivation within the Food Zone were increasingly offset by growing 
cultivation outside the Food Zone, notably in adjacent areas, including new agricultural areas to where members 
of households living in the Food Zone migrated to cultivate opium. In the following years, opium continued to be 
cultivated in the areas outside the Food Zone while it also increased in the Food Zone.
Helmand Food Zone, 2012
Source: Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan Drug Report 2012 (November 2013).
Note: The boundaries shown on this maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
Basically a quick-impact project, the Food Zone was successful in inﬂuencing the decisions of farmers within the 
zone during the period 2009-2012. In the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, farmers in the Food Zone still reported 
having an income that was, on average, about 30 per cent higher than the income reported by farmers outside 
the Food Zone. Yet the project had apparently not succeeded in fundamentally changing the socioeconomic and 
institutional conditions in the province: as assistance declined farmers resumed opium poppy cultivation over the 
2012-2014 period. 
a According to UNODC and Ministry of Counter Narcotics of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009 (December 2009), sect. 2.1.
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enabled the optimization of production, a growing produc-
tive base and a boost in commercialization of products such 
as palm hearts.89 In Thailand, projects involving coffee 
have not only shifted from selling green beans to roasted 
coffee, but have also incorporated the establishment of cafés 
where the coffee is sold.90 In the Department of Urabá, 
the Government of Colombia and UNODC have estab-
lished a commercial partnership with a major European 
supermarket chain, alternative development has been 
linked at the national level with a restaurant chain.91 In 
Afghanistan, the value chain approach is implemented 
widely, from wool to carpets, and grapes to raisins, as part 
of the National Alternative Livelihood Policy, a joint initia-
tive of the agriculture and rural development cluster led by 
the Ministry of Counter Narcotics.
Thailand provides an example of long-term private sector 
involvement from an early stage: six Thai and Japanese 
companies have invested in a business to carry out 
economic forestry development as part of the Doi Tung 
Development Project, and to promote the cultivation of 
coffee and macadamia nuts along the entire value chain, 
up to and including processing and marketing, so as to 
provide farmers with sufficient income to be able to resist 
cultivation of opium poppy. In this case, the partnership 
with the private sector provided access to funding sources, 
technical knowledge, business expertise and marketing.92
89 Plurinational State of Bolivia and UNODC, “The Bolivia country 
program 2010-2015: capacity-building in response to drugs, organ-
ized crime, terrorism, corruption and economic crime threats in 
Bolivia” (La Paz, March 2010), sect. V.2.
90 UNODC, “Doi Tung: thinking outside the box” (14 March 2008).
91 Colombia, Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation and 
Division for Programmes to Combat Illicit Cultivation, “Informe 
ejecutivo: encuentro nacional de desarrollo alternativo—Diciembre 
2013” (Bogotá, March 2014), p. 55.
92 Mae Fah Luang Foundation Under Royal Patronage, “It can be 
done” (n.p., n.d.), p. 4.
However, private sector investment and involvement in 
alternative development programmes does not yield only 
positive results. Sometimes business interests are not fully 
in line with the objectives of a particular programme. An 
example can be found in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Myanmar, where some foreign companies 
working within an “opium substitution” scheme tend to 
favour large-scale monocrop plantations (e.g. rubber) as 
opposed to the crop diversification strategies of the respec-
tive Governments. These commercial plantations have 
been said to reduce the land available to small-scale farm-
ers and increase competition for land labourers. Similarly, 
the value chain approach may not be successful under all 
circumstances. For example, analysts have questioned its 
economics-driven focus, which has not always been able 
to take into account the complexities of fragmented socie-
ties with weak Governments and particular sociocultural 
needs and conditions.93
Market access
In political declarations and the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Alternative Development, countries are 
clearly urged to increase market access to products of alter-
native development. Preferential treatment regarding 
market access is in line with the Political Declaration 
adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth special 
session, in 1998, and its related measures to enhance inter-
national cooperation to counter the world drug problem, 
in which it was underlined that “the international com-
munity should attempt to provide greater access to domes-
93 Holly Ritchie, “Beyond the value chain model: deconstructing insti-
tutions key to understanding Afghan markets” in Snapshots of an 
Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assis-
tance (2001-11), Martine van Biljert and Saria Kuovo, eds. (Kabul, 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012).
Poppy cultivation inside and outside the former Helmand Food Zone, 2012-2014
Note: The Food Zone estimates refer to an area in 10 districts of Helmand (the Food Zone as of 2011), where farmers were provided with fertilizer, 
certified wheat seeds and high-value horticulture seeds in the poppy-planting seasons for the 2009-2012 harvests. See UNODC and Afghanistan, 
Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009 and Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014, methodology section.
One particular challenge the Food Zone had to overcome was the complex issue of labour. Illicit opium cultivation is 
far more labour intensive than, for example, wheat cultivation. It requires more land labourers not only for weeding, 
but also during the harvest. In the Food Zone area, many landless people work as seasonal labourers in illicit opium 
poppy cultivation; with the shift to wheat production and some agricultural mechanization, thousands lost their 
basic livelihoods and moved north of the Boghra canal, thus giving rise to an explosion of cultivation in that area.
Sources: Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan Drug Report 2012 (November 2013); Afghanistan Opium Survey 
2014 (and previous years); and David Mansfield, “Where have all the flowers gone? Assessing the sustainability of current reductions in 
opium production in Afghanistan”, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit briefing paper series (May 2010).
Cultivation 
2012 (ha)
Cultivation 
2013 (ha)
Cultivation 
2014 (ha)
Change  
2013-2014 (%)
% of agricultural 
land with poppy
Inside the Food Zone 24,241 36,244 41,089 13% 22%
Outside the Food Zone 50,935 64,449 62,151 -4% 31%
Total province 75,176 100,693 103,240 3% 27%
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tic and international markets for alternative development 
products”.94 The issue of market access gained even more 
prominence in the final document of the International 
Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development, 
organized by the Government of Thailand, in association 
with the Government of Peru and in close collaboration 
with UNODC, in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
in November 2011. In that document, officially presented 
to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its fifty-sixth 
session,95 it was recommended that Member States, inter-
national organizations and regional organizations “do their 
utmost … to consider measures to enable products of 
alternative development to have easier access to national 
and international markets, taking into account applicable 
multilateral trade rules”.96 A less demanding reference 
regarding market access, in line with the language used in 
the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on Interna-
tional Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced 
Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, is found in 
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative 
Development. In those Guiding Principles, it is pointed 
out that, in designing alternative development pro-
grammes, States “should take into account issues related 
to the establishment of agreements and viable partnerships 
with small producers … and adequate market access”.97 
The latter aspect has also been covered in detail in Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 56/15, in which 
interested Member States were invited to expand their 
94 General Assembly resolution S-20/4 E, para. 15.
95 E/CN.7.2013/8.
96 E/CN.7.2012/8, para. 41.
97 Para. 9.
efforts with regard to the development of “strategies on 
voluntary marketing tools” for products stemming from 
alternative development.
Political component
Significant and long-term investment and 
support
The political component of alternative development is 
based principally on political and financial support by 
Governments to alternative development or to other rural 
development strategies that may directly or indirectly 
affect the driving factors of illicit cultivation. Long-term 
political support is essential to the success of alternative 
development projects, as such support is required to build 
long-term licit alternatives and transfer skills in areas where 
alternative development takes place. Time is needed to 
address not only the economic drivers behind illicit culti-
vation, but also the building of trust with local communi-
ties. As farmers are often involved in activities linked to 
illicit markets on the basis of rational choice, it takes time 
before they can be convinced that licit alternatives can 
provide them with a sustainable and profitable source of 
income. Thailand, among others, provides a good example 
of progress through substantial, long-term investment by 
international donors, non-governmental organizations, 
the private sector and Governments.98 
The political component of alternative development often 
concerns supply reduction in line with national and inter-
national drug control strategies, but in a broader context 
98 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 119.
NON-AGRICULTURAL ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS:  
ecotourism in Colombia
In the Region of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, alternative development has included ecotourisma as a source 
of income to complement that from the cultivation of sugar cane, thanks to the construction of posadas (wooden 
cabins) in several rural settlements. The Government enlisted the support of architects and provided construction 
materials and labour to construct the cabins, but then its support ceased. Although the scheme proved popular 
with international visitors, its main downside is that the tourism sector is cyclical and is not sufﬁcient to create 
a sustainable livelihood. It does at least provide a complementary income, however. Nevertheless, its potential is 
huge, as this region boasts the combination of a coastline, national parks such as Parque Tayrona and the prox-
imity of the popular tourist destination of Santa Marta.
In the Department of Meta, ecotourism is also an alternative livelihood, particularly in the Municipality of La 
Macarena,b where in the past three years 33 tourist guides have been trained. Tourism in this region has the 
potential to grow signiﬁcantly, but the main hindrance is poor accessibility owing to a lack of regional ﬂights. 
Further government support for the local tourism sector is expected over the next few years, with the priority of 
creating access to specialized university courses, distance learning and complementary economic activities (e.g. 
making handcrafted products) off season.
a Ernesto Bassi Arévalo, “El apoyo institucional como factor clave: EMSOLMEC como ejemplo de gestión de alianzas que contribuyen al 
desarrollo económico, social y ambiental de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, in UNODC and Acción Social, Organizaciones que Cambian 
Vidas: Programa Familias Guardabosques y Programa Proyectos Productivos (Bogotá, Impresol, October 2008), pp. 266-293.
b Colombia, Centro de Coordinación de Acción Regional, “Avances 2009: plan de consolidación integral de La Macarena” (December 2009), 
sect. 8.5.
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of increasing stability, security and the rule of law. Law 
enforcement measures such as interdiction or crop eradi-
cation accompany alternative development within a 
broader political strategy to bring down illicit cultivation. 
They attempt to impose order in areas where there is no, 
or limited, rule of law.
Conditionality
One of the most controversial issues in approaches applied 
to alternative development is the application or non-appli-
cation of a so-called “conditionality clause”. This reflects 
the debate about whether the benefits of alternative devel-
opment activities should be in some way conditional on 
the intended results of supply reduction. Discussions of 
the concept of conditionality arise whenever its applica-
tion interferes with the relationship between alternative 
development providers and farmers (and their organiza-
tions). In this regard, there are two conflicting issues: con-
ditionality clauses can harm the relationship, sense of 
ownership and trust that should exist for development 
processes to be successful; and Governments need to have 
a certain degree of reassurance from farmers that, through 
economic and social assistance, illicit crops will actually 
be reduced over time. There is no common approach to 
conditionality, and a review of national strategies shows 
that most countries do not make reference to this issue in 
their strategy documents. In the strategies of Colombia 
and Peru it is specified that prior (voluntary or forced) 
eradication is a precondition to participation in alternative 
development programmes. In the strategy of the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia it is mentioned that no prior eradi-
cation or reduction is necessary, and that public investment 
in infrastructure and social development come first, before 
alternative development programmes are started.
Conditionality is closely linked with issues of sequencing. 
The Political Declaration and Plan of Action on Interna-
tional Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced 
Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem explicitly 
states that Member States should “ensure the proper and 
coordinated sequencing of development interventions 
when designing alternative development programmes” and 
“ensure, when considering taking eradication measures, 
that small-farmer households have adopted viable and sus-
tainable livelihoods so that the measures may be properly 
sequenced in a sustainable fashion and appropriately 
coordinated”.99 In the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Alternative Development it is stressed that countries 
should ensure “the proper and coordinated sequencing of 
development interventions when designing alternative 
development programmes” and that “alternative develop-
ment policies should be implemented alongside efforts 
made by States to strengthen the rule of law and promote 
health, safety and security so as to ensure a comprehensive 
approach to tackling the challenges that may be posed by 
99 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2009, Supple-
ment No. 8 (E/2009/28), chap. I, sect. C., paras. 47 (f ) and 47 (g).
the possible links between drug trafficking, corruption 
and different forms of organized crime and, in some cases, 
terrorism”.100
Organizational component
Experience with alternative development has shown that 
creating, strengthening and supporting farmers’ associa-
tions and community management groups is generally the 
best way to boost rural development processes. In Colom-
bia, for example, such associations have helped to generate 
social capital, promote effective project control measures 
within communities and create better relationships 
between farming communities and local and national gov-
ernments.101 A total of approximately 600 producer 
organizations have been either created or strengthened 
through alternative development programmes in Colom-
bia. In Thailand, a significant number of women’s groups, 
youth groups and vocational groups have been created to 
strengthen “local capacity and initiative”.102 In addition, 
resource management groups, such as village water man-
agement and forestry management committees, effectively 
serve to ensure a sense of joint ownership, responsibility 
and sustainable management of resources by the commu-
nity, and also enhance community self-governance 
capability.103
Establishing or working with existing farmers’ organiza-
tions is common practice in alternative development, espe-
cially in Latin America, where, in contrast to the more 
village-based interventions in Asia, the strategic focus has 
often been on working with first- and second-tier producer 
organizations.104 The main examples are sector or produc-
ers’ committees, cooperatives and farmers’ associations, 
such as a German-sponsored project in Peru that worked 
with existing cooperatives.105 Other projects in Peru have 
helped establish producer associations and cooperatives, 
which is a popular strategy with farmers, as they believe 
this will generate higher profits and more control over the 
marketing of what they produce in the medium to long 
term.106 
 
 
100 Annex, appendix, paras. 9 and 15.
101 Sandro Calvani, La Coca: Pasado y Presente—Mitos y Realidades 
(Ediciones Aurora, Bogotá, 2007), p. 134.
102 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 108.
103 Thai-German Highland Development Programme (TG-HDP), 
“Review of TG-HDP’s agricultural and forestry programmes,  
1984-1998, with special reference to community-based natural 
resource management”, internal paper no. 212 (Chiang Mai,  
Thailand, 1998).
104 UNODC, Alternative Development Programme in Colombia:  
independent evaluation (Vienna, November 2014).
105 Report of GIZ on project PER/U87.
106 Lessons for Future Programming: USAID/Peru’s Alternative Develop-
ment Program (June 2010), submitted by Weidemann Associates, 
Inc., to USAID/Peru, sect. I.3.
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Support to producer associa-
tions is among the most important 
reasons why farmers continue to par-
ticipate in alternative development pro-
grammes, but it is not clear whether this strategy 
always leads to increased income.110 With fluctuating 
sales, in some years the benefits are limited to increasing 
production and the social base of associations.111 Never-
theless, alternative development has been able to contrib-
ute to the creation of social capital, whether in terms of 
commitment to community development or the invest-
ment of community members in farmers’ associations in 
order to improve the production and marketing 
process.112 
Among the downsides of an organizational strategy can 
be a loss of farmers’ independence (as farmers depend 
more on joint strategies, resources and the commitment 
of other farmers) and loss of flexibility, especially in the 
case of large associations or complex decision-making pro-
cedures. Moreover, in some contexts or countries, the con-
cept of “cooperative” may have significant disadvantages 
if it is not supported by the authorities.
Social component
The social component of alternative development is much 
broader than the projects themselves, and tends to involve 
a national or international strategy to boost the socio-
economic development of local communities in drug- 
107 UNODC, “Improving livelihoods and food security through alter-
native development in Lao PDR”, 20 December 2012. Available 
at www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/laopdr/2012/12/
alternative-development/story.html.
108 Daniel Brombacher and others, Evaluación de medios de vida en 
poblaciones productoras de hoja de coca en el Valle de los ríos Apurímac 
y Ene (VRAE) (Madrid, Cooperation Programme between the 
European Union and Latin America on Drug Policies (COPO-
LAD); Eschborn, GIZ, 2012), p. 49. 
109 UNODC and Acción Social, Organizaciones que Cambian Vidas: 
Programa Familias Guardabosques y Programa Proyectos Productivos 
(Bogotá, 2008), p. 92. 
110 Ibid., sect. II.2.
111 DEVIDA and UNODC, “Perú: desempeño comercial de las empre-
sas promovidas por el desarrollo alternativo—2012” (June 2013), 
pp. 17-18.
112 USAID, Lessons for Future Programming, sect. I.2.1.
producing areas. For example, the Thai-
German Highland Development 
Programme (1981-1998) had a 
considerable impact on increasing 
access to education, health care and 
clean drinking water.113 In Morocco, 
alternative development projects focus on 
improving access to basic services (e.g. 
education and health) within the National 
Initiative for Human Development. The 
evaluation of the Peruvian alternative development 
programme clearly states that more impact can be 
generated at the local level if alternative development is 
coordinated better with social and poverty-reduction 
programmes.114 
Social strategy is not only about improving the socioeco-
nomic conditions in which the impact of alternative devel-
opment can be enhanced, but also about the creation and 
strengthening of social organizations and the direct par-
ticipation of beneficiaries in the design, planning and 
implementation of rural development projects, including 
alternative development projects.
Local ownership and community  
participation
There is a general consensus that alternative development 
interventions can work only if they manage to achieve or 
build on the involvement of local communities or benefi-
ciaries. Direct participation by farmers and communities 
plays a key role in the design and planning of alternative 
development activities, especially in areas where no effec-
tive public institutions can fulfil this role. Over the years, 
the emphasis in alternative development has shifted from 
focusing merely on technical and economic aspects to a 
more integrated vision of the problem and a long-term 
perspective regarding development and security of the area 
under consideration. In spite of this progress, considerable 
challenges remain in terms of the articulation of alterna-
tive development and the interaction between governmen-
tal bodies and local communities. The latter is often 
characterized by a lack of State presence in illicit-drug-
growing areas and by a widespread mistrust at the com-
munity level towards government agencies.
In Thailand, the participatory approach has contributed 
to success, based on the creation of “learning organiza-
tions” in local communities that were able to take on board 
new ideas and methods of working.115 In addition, local 
community representatives or volunteers were brought on 
113 Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final Syn-
thesis Report, p. 6.
114 Peru, Office of the President of the Council of Ministers and 
DEVIDA, “Consultoría: evaluación del programa presupuestal 
desarrollo alternativo integral y sostenible—PIRDAIS 2013 – 
informe final” (July 2014), p. 90.
115 Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000, p. 112.
Alternative 
development is not only about hectares, 
competitive advantages, profit and economic sustainabil-
ity. It is first and foremost about its beneficiaries: men, women, 
children and their wider communities. It is about transferring skills and 
knowledge to those beneficiaries to improve lives. A farmer in Naseankham, a 
village in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, says: “We now have the skills, 
knowledge and incentive to cultivate vegetables and fruit trees. This has improved our 
livelihoods — and gives me hope.”107 In addition to providing profitable and sustain-
able alternatives, alternative development is about providing security, State protection, 
social acceptance, a better future for farmers’ children and access to basic services such as 
health and education. A villager in Qarhuapampa, Peru, stresses the importance of 
improving education, improving schools and having high schools so that the young 
people are better educated and can have more opportunities.108 A beneficiary 
in Tumaco, Colombia, explains: “We know we are not looking for wealth 
here, but it has been a more rational use of the forest involving a 
larger number of families that benefit from the work and 
the developments in education and health 
care.”109
CHAPTER II
Strategic elements of alternative development programmes 105
WORLD 
DRUG 
REPORT2015
board from the beginning to serve as a two-way link 
between projects and the community to ensure effective 
communication in the local languages, and to ensure that 
community members were fully engaged throughout the 
project and that the local representatives received first-
hand experience, enabling them to be at the heart of their 
community’s development process.116 In Aceh, Indonesia, 
local communities have begun to take ownership of vari-
ous initiatives at the Sustainable Rural Development 
Centre, overseeing and operating the activities themselves 
after having received sufficient capacity-building.117
In Pakistan, one of the common elements of success in 
Dir District was community participation in the first phase 
of project implementation, when priorities were estab-
lished and interventions selected.118 To create more own-
ership, in Afghanistan, UNODC supported infrastructure 
projects that had been identified as priorities by the local 
communities themselves, such as canal rehabilitation in 
Jowzjan and Badakhshan Provinces. In the latter province, 
a 22-km road was also constructed to connect 12 villages 
to markets and basic services, again on request from the 
local community development council. These Afghan pro-
jects can be considered “quick-impact” alternative devel-
opment projects, which not only addressed problems of 
water delivery and irrigation but also were meant to build 
trust among stakeholders. 
Land governance
Land governance can be defined as the “rules, processes 
and structures through which decisions are made about 
access to land and its use, the manner in which the deci-
sions are implemented and enforced, and the way that 
competing interests in land are managed”.119 As a norma-
tive concept, it is aimed at establishing guidelines for sus-
tainable land policies, including complex issues such as 
access to land, land rights, land use and land develop-
ment.120 At the global level, it has been recognized that 
secure and equitable rights to land and natural resources 
are central to achieving sustainable development.121
116 Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage, “It can be 
done”, pp. 6-7.
117 Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage, Aceh sustain-
able alternative livelihood development project in Aceh Province, 
Indonesia. Information available at www.maefahluang.org.
118 UNODC, World Drug Report 2000, sect. 3.3.
119 David Palmer, Szilard Fricska and Babette Wehrmann, Towards 
Improved Land Governance, Land Tenure Working Paper 11  
(September 2009), sect. 2.2.
120 Stig Enemark, Robin McLaren and Paul van der Molen, Land Gov-
ernance in Support of The Millennium Development Goals: A New 
Agenda for Land Professionals (Copenhagen, International Federation 
of Surveyors, 2010).
121 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development, Agriculture at a Crossroads: Synthesis 
Report, Beverly D. McIntyre and others, eds. (Washington, D.C., 
2009); United Nations High-Level Task Force on the Global Food 
Security Crisis, “Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action” 
(September 2010); and Committee on World Food Security, Global 
Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (second ver-
Lack of access to land can be one of the drivers of illicit 
cultivation, so land tenure and the sustainable manage-
ment and use of land are crucial elements for the long-term 
success of alternative development. Expert meeting discus-
sions in 2013 highlighted that: “Most alternative cash 
crops require long-term engagement of farmers, since they 
require several years to produce yields. Without access to 
land, farmers are not willing to engage in cultivating long-
term cash crops.”122 Furthermore, a recent technical brief-
ing paper stated that land rights “empower people and 
provide a sense of dignity. They enhance food security and 
are fundamental to achieve the right to food and increase 
the productivity of small-scale food producers.” Land 
rights also have broader social implications, such as pro-
moting more inclusive and equitable societies, specifically 
the participation and empowerment of women.123
Lack of access to land is also an important component in 
countries where landless people work as seasonal labourers 
during the very labour-intensive opium harvest. In 
Afghanistan, one of the UNODC pilot projects in Herat 
Province helps rehabilitate farm production, including by 
land stabilization in areas that are in the process of becom-
ing desert, by irrigation development, agricultural diver-
sification and community enterprises. The objective is to 
prevent people who can no longer meet their basic liveli-
hood needs by working as seasonal labourers in opium 
poppy fields and as small-scale drug traffickers. 
In the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative 
Development, it is recommended that countries “take into 
account land rights and other related land management 
resources when designing, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating alternative development programmes, includ-
ing those of indigenous peoples and local communities, 
in accordance with national legal frameworks”.124 
While there is broad agreement that alternative develop-
ment should address the issue of land tenure, very little 
research has been conducted into the linkage between these 
two issues.125 The preliminary findings of a study com-
missioned by the Government of Germany in 2013 into 
the nexus between illicit drug cultivation and access to 
land suggest that, so far, land rights have hardly been 
included in alternative development programmes at all. 
The study confirms the dual relationship between alterna-
tive development and land tenure: restricted access to legal 
land titles often leads to illicit cultivation, while secure 
sion, October 2013).
122 E/CN.7/2014/CRP.7, p. 4.
123 Action Aid International and others, “Secure and equitable land 
rights in the post-2015 agenda: a key issue in the future we want” 
(January 2015).
124 Annex, appendix, para. 18 (kk).
125 “The role of alternative development in drug control and develop-
ment cooperation: international conference, 7-12 January 2002, 
Feldafing (Munich), Germany”, Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (Germany), German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation and German Foundation for International 
Development, eds. (2002), p. 18.
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access to land seems to offer the best chances for sustain-
ably transitioning to legal livelihoods. The research states 
that secure land rights increase the willingness of farmers 
to invest in the long term in the establishment of a licit 
livelihood and improve their access to credit. Based on 
experiences, especially in the Andean region and South-
East Asia, there are many potential benefits of considering 
land tenure concerns in alternative development 
programmes.
A special case of linking alternative development with land 
ownership can be found in Colombia, where land used by 
farmers, mostly to grow coca leaf, was acquired for the 
ethnic Kogui indigenous people in the Sierra Nevada de 
Santa Marta and added to their reservation. The Kogui 
indigenous people are involved not only in coffee produc-
tion but also in the environmental protection of the lands 
they control. In general, under Colombia’s Forest Warden 
Families Programme, the acquisition of land is important 
for preventing illegal crops from reappearing after the end 
of a programme. The idea behind this strategy is that ben-
eficiaries will be more attached to their land and will fear 
losing it if illicit crops are found. It also has additional 
LAND TITLING/LAND OWNERSHIP 
The granting and/or enforcement of individual and collective land titles has proved a successful alternative devel-
opment strategy in several areas in the Andean region. However, in some countries in South-East Asia, such as 
Myanmar, strong population growth, in combination with land titles being conﬁscated or granted to outside 
investors, has meant that the traditional system of shifting agriculture, in combination with a “slash and burn” 
approach, in the highlands may no longer work. This approach leaves local communities with ever smaller plots 
per capita and with ever more degrading soil (as farmers can no longer move to new plots), which are not suf-
ﬁcient to guarantee food security for their communities. As a consequence, some of these communities have 
started to cultivate opium poppy in order to generate additional cash to purchase food.a
In many of the countries where illicit crops are cultivated, poverty is associated with a lack of land for generating 
sufﬁcient income from the cultivation of licit crops. In Afghanistan, data collected during the UNODC opium survey 
revealed that the landholdings of opium-growing farmers were on average almost 40 per cent smaller than those 
of farmers who produced licit crops in 2014. Opium production was far more common among farmers with 2 ha 
or less than among farmers with larger holdings. Even among opium poppy farmers themselves, data show that 
smaller landholders dedicated a higher proportion of their land to illicit opium production than larger landown-
ers did. The average land area dedicated to opium production amounted to 0.45 ha, which was equivalent to on 
average 35 per cent of the 1.3 ha of total land available to an opium poppy farmer. Even smaller landholdings 
of an average of less than 1 ha were reported for sharecroppers and tenants who were cultivating opium poppy. 
Landholdings in Afghanistan, farmers of licit crops versus opium poppy farmers, 2014 
 
Source: UNODC, data from the socioeconomic survey of farmers in Afghanistan (based on interviews with 680 farmers of opium 
poppy and approximately 4,000 farmers of licit products). 
a Transnational Institute, Bouncing Back: Relapse in the Golden Triangle (June 2014), p. 14.
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benefits for the sustainability of legal economic activities, 
as it enables the acquisition of productive loans and gen-
erates incentives for investing in the land. As people grow 
attached to their own land, it also prevents migration. As 
such, promoting land acquisition may be one of the most 
effective ways of preventing the return of illicit cultivation 
to areas where alternative development is implemented.
In another project in Colombia, the component of for-
malization of land ownership had the objective of facilitat-
ing the acquisition of land ownership titles through notarial 
or administrative procedures led by the Instituto Colom-
biano de Desarrollo Rural (INCODER). In the framework 
of this component, more than 1,000 land ownership titles 
were issued to farmers, families of African descent and dis-
placed families, for more than 18,000 ha of land (approxi-
mately 3,000 ha of which were bought) in the Departments 
of Antioquia, Putumayo and Córdoba. The component of 
land titling was recognized as a precursor to the task of 
formalizing land tenure within the framework of alterna-
tive development projects in Colombia.126
It should be noted that the promotion of land rights is a 
strategy that goes beyond alternative development pro-
grammes. It is normally part of national development 
plans or strategies, such as the national development plan 
of Mexico for the period 2013-2018, which can indirectly 
help to prevent illicit cultivation. An evaluation of a pro-
ject in the Plurinational State of Bolivia mentions that the 
Ministry of Rural Development and Land is making pro-
gress with land titling in the Department of La Paz, and 
expects to complete the process by 2017.127
126 UNODC, “Alternative Development Programme in Colombia: 
independent evaluation”.
127 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and  
Environmental component
The Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 
for 2005 stated that environmental concerns had become 
“virtually inseparable” from illicit crop cultivation.128 The 
environmental impact of illicit drug production and traf-
ficking has been broadly documented,129 with significant 
attention to the way in which illicit crops cause the deg-
radation and destruction of primary forests in Latin Amer-
ica and South-East Asia. In addition to the negative 
environmental impact of illicit cultivation, there has been 
increasing attention paid to the role alternative develop-
ment can play in environmental protection. The United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development 
state that: “Alternative development programmes should 
include measures to protect the environment at the local 
level, according to national and international law and poli-
cies, through the provision of incentives for conservation, 
proper education and awareness programmes so that the 
local communities can improve and preserve their liveli-
hoods and mitigate negative environmental impacts.”130
Thus, alternative development has both a component of 
“do no harm”, trying to minimize the environmental 
impact of alternative development interventions, and a 
proactive component, in which programmes directly or 
indirectly contribute to the protection of the environment 
Development, progress report on project BOLI79 (Sustainable  
and Integrated Management of Natural Resources in the Tropics  
of Cochabamba and the Yungas of La Paz) (December 2013),  
sect. 5.3.
128 Para. 32.
129 Francisco Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 196-199. 
130 Para. 11.
POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF LINKING ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT WITH 
PROCESSES OF LAND TENURE AND LAND ACQUISITION
• Contribution to a culture of legality and willingness to abandon illicit cultivation
• Increase in commitment to and ownership of alternative development projects 
• Generation of incentives to invest in the land and licit livelihoods
• Increase in access to formal credit for investing in licit livelihoods
• Prevention of migration, as people grow more attached to their land
• Prevention of environmental harm if less migration reduces pressure on the expanding agricultural frontier 
• Protection of the environment and biodiversity if individual or communal land rights lead to better  
management and restoration of forests 
• Increase in the attraction of alternative development programmes or alternative livelihoods in general  
to farmers, given the benefits associated with land tenure
• Decrease in social tension around local land disputes
• Voluntary resettlement from protected or unsuitable areas if farmers can be offered land tenure in other  
areas
• Increase in number of farmers investing in perennial crops and cash crops that only become profitable in the 
long term
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and biodiversity and the mitigation of climate change. The 
latter has been one of the most recent additions to alter-
native development programmes. In Colombia, the 
BIOREDD+ programme,131 sponsored by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
is one of the first projects operating in communities where 
alternative development programmes take place to link 
sustainable agricultural production at the local level to the 
international market for carbon credits.
A more common element of alternative development has 
been the focus on agroforestry and sustainable forest man-
agement in general. Such projects can be found in virtually 
all countries where alternative development programmes 
have been implemented, from the Chapare Region in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia to Chiang Rai Province in 
Thailand. Reforestation and countering soil erosion are 
131 For more information, see www.bioredd.org/projects.
part of the objectives under this strategy, and are often 
addressed through agroforestry, including the combination 
of tree crops such as coffee and cacao with reforestation 
(e.g. in order to provide shade and improve the soil), as 
well as oil palm, rubber and peach palm cultivation.132 
The agroforestry projects in Thailand balance livelihood 
development and environmental sustainability objectives 
through the promotion of proper zoning practices. Specific 
forest areas are designated for conservation, for limited 
daily use and for economic use in the form of high-value 
crops such as coffee and macadamia nuts. The land and 
forest management model of the Doi Tung project has 
increased the forest area from 30 to 85 per cent.133 
132 Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final  
Synthesis Report, p. 7.
133 Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal Patronage, “It can be 
done”, p. 13.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, REFORESTATION AND  
AGROFORESTRY: the example of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
In the tropical lowlands of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, integrated forestry management and agroforestry 
projects started in 1994a to provide farmers with sustainable livelihoods to reduce illicit coca cultivation. Despite 
deforestation as a result of illicit coca cultivation, enough forests remained, but they had never been managed 
sustainably. The initial projects had two central components: developing forest management plans for the sus-
tainable production of wood and non-wood products; and introducing agroforestry systems of tree and legume 
crops, interplanted with annual and perennial crops.b It was intended that the latter component would provide 
additional income to farmers, as well as increase food security, through food crops, vegetable gardens and the 
breeding of livestock. 
Within the current strategy, reforestation, sustainable extraction of forest resources and agro-forestry reinforce 
each other.c Income generation goes hand in hand with forest preservation: “in order for these practices to be 
fully adopted by growers, … [they] must guarantee economic beneﬁts. In other words, in order to preserve tropical 
forests, it is necessary to make use of its timber, and to preserve cultivatable soil, agro-forestry must generate real 
income”.d One of the projects in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Jatun Sach’a project, resulted in positive 
change in terms of strengthening producers’ organizations, capacity-building, reducing unsustainable exploitation 
and introducing new crops and agro-industry (e.g. portable sawmills).e 
This project has particularly beneﬁted women, who were trained to use local plants and vegetables to create 
products that enhance food security and improve nutrition in farming communities. In terms of agroforestry and 
reforestation, the sustainable and integrated management of natural resources in the tropics of Cochabamba 
and the Yungas of La Paz project showed considerable results: between 2006 and 2013, 4,900 ha of agroforestry 
systems were established based on coffee, cacao, rubber and other tree crops, while 3,000 ha were reforested 
with various tree varieties and 12,800 ha of primary forest received sustainable management, including proper 
marketing of wood products.f
a The Jatun Sach’a project began in 1994. Another Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) project, financed through 
UNDCP, started in 1997.
b FAO, “FAO helps Bolivia in fight against cocaine trade”, news release (30 March 2000). Available at www.fao.org/News/2000/000307-e.
html.
c Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ministry of Rural Development and Lands, “Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Integral con Coca 2011-2015” 
(June 2011), p. 50.
d Plurinational State of Bolivia, Vice-Ministry of Alternative Development; UNODC; and FAO, “Proyecto Jatun Sach’a: 10 años construyendo 
una cultura forestal” (2005), p. 9.
e Ibid., p. 39.
f UNODC, Annual progress report for 2014 on project BOLI79 (sustainable and integrated management of natural resources in the tropics of 
Cochabamba and the Yungas of La Paz).
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Morocco also includes forest management, reforestation 
and the protection of biodiversity in one specific environ-
mental pillar of alternative development. Finally, a study134 
conducted in Colombia revealed that, during the imple-
mentation of the Forest Warden Families Programme 
(between 2003 and 2010), more than 75 million tons of 
carbon were stored in 546,000 ha of preserved forest. 
During the same period, agroforestry systems, promoted 
under the Alternative Productive Projects Programme in 
23 municipalities, captured more than 37,000 tons of 
carbon. 
The above strategies require the delicate balancing of envi-
ronmental concerns and commercial objectives. Indeed, a 
structural problem related to alternative development 
could be described as the “alternative development/envi-
ronmental protection trade-off ”. For example, illicit coca 
cultivation leads to deforestation, but legal alternatives 
such as livestock may actually lead to more deforestation. 
This can be seen in areas such as the Department of Meta 
in Colombia, where livestock is used as an alternative live-
lihood and efforts are made to mitigate the negative impact 
on the environment, for example, through environmental 
guidebooks related to livestock, cacao, poultry, fishing and 
other alternative livelihoods.135 More generally, the use of 
harmful pesticides can have very negative consequences 
for the environment, whether used on licit or illicit crops. 
Similarly, alternatives such as ecotourism can have nega-
tive effects on the protection of biodiversity or the envi-
ronment, while the construction of infrastructure may also 
have an environmental impact.136 To increase the sustain-
able use and management of forests and territory, Colom-
bia has developed some guidelines containing best 
environmental practices, under its flagship Forest Warden 
Families Programme,137 which has, for example, increased 
the use of organic fertilizer, crop rotation and stump-reten-
tion practices.
A focus on women
Many alternative development programmes have a specific 
focus on women and their empowerment. The recent pro-
ject in the Municipality of La Asunta, in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, was specifically aimed at strengthening 
the role of women in both the production and marketing 
134 Colombia, Administrative Unit for Territorial Consolidation, 
Research Center on Ecosystems and Global Change and UNODC, 
Contribución de los Programas Familias Guardabosques y Proyec-
tos Productivos a la Mitigación del Cambio Climático: Captura y 
Almacenamiento de Carbon en sistemas Prodcutivos y Bosque Neutral 
(Bogotá, 2012).
135 Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Evaluación del 
Programa Familias Guardabosques y Grupo Móvil de Erradicación: 
Informe Final (Bogotá, December 2012); and UNODC, “Alterna-
tive Development Programme in Colombia: independent evalua-
tion”.
136 See E/CN.7/2013/8.
137 Colombia, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Evaluación del 
Programa Familias Guardabosques y Grupo Móvil de Erradicación, 
sect. 4.1.5.
of alternative crops.138 In Afghanistan, associations and 
enterprises involving women have been established, for 
example, concerning saffron, mint and dairy products in 
the Provinces of Ghor and Herat, among others,139 while 
UNODC has supported a small-scale project in Herat 
Province to train women in tailoring. 
The 2010, USAID-sponsored Alternative Development 
Programme in Peru found that women played a critical 
role in increasing the impact of alternative development. 
They played an important role in the decision-making 
process, whether in relation to the decision to maintain a 
coca-free licit livelihood or management and investment 
decisions on farms. Focusing on the leadership of women, 
networking and empowerment in general was also seen to 
contribute to the promotion of broader public issues, lead-
ing to an enabling environment in which communities 
could sustainably reduce illicit coca cultivation.140 In the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam, 
UNODC projects worked through the respective women’s 
unions, ensuring the participation of women in village 
development committees, and created special microcredit 
funds for women. This was supplemented by adult educa-
tion, literacy classes and the development of numerical 
skills.141 Women became more empowered when they had 
a regular income, and this helped them become more 
involved in decision-making processes and, in the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, even to be elected as village 
head and district chiefs. 
G. MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF 
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Challenges in the evaluation of  
alternative development interventions
In its resolution 45/14 of 15 March 2002, the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs urged Member States to facilitate 
“a rigorous and comprehensive thematic evaluation for 
determining best practices in alternative development 
by assessing the impact of alternative development on 
both human development indicators and drug control 
objectives and by addressing the key development issues 
138 Daniel Brombacher, “Informe final: asesoría de proyecto—recomen-
daciones para el establecimiento de una línea de base”, report on 
project BOLI79 (sustainable and integrated management of natural 
resources in the tropics of Cochabamba and the Yungas of La Paz) 
dated 28 April 2011, sect. 1.3.
139 The project “Afghanistan: research in alternative livelihoods fund”, 
was supported by the Department for International Development 
of the United Kingdom and implemented between 2004 and 2007. 
See r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Project/60544.
140 USAID/Peru, “USAID/Peru country development cooperation 
strategy 2012-2016” (Lima, 2012), p. 31.
141 Leik Boonwaat, “Achievements and lessons learned from the bal-
anced approach to opium elimination in the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic (2001-2004)”, paper presented at the Alternative 
Development Meeting on Removing Impediments to Growth in 
Doi Tung, Thailand (13-19 November 2004).
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of poverty reduction, gender, 
environmental sustainability and 
conflict resolution”. In the resulting 
report, the decline in illicit crop cultivation 
achieved over the previous 15 years in areas where 
alternative development had taken place in both the 
Andean region and South-East Asia were described, 
although it was acknowledged that “the precise impact of 
its contribution is not always known”.145
In that evaluation it was also pointed out that baseline 
studies rarely existed at the project level, often making it 
impossible to monitor impact at the household and other 
levels. At that time, the reduction in illicit cultivation was 
used in most alternative development projects as a measure 
of impact and changes in human development indicators 
were not measured. For example, documents on UNODC-
supported alternative development project in the 1990s 
included outputs on infrastructure and agricultural sup-
port, social and health services and capacity-building, but 
the main achievement indicator was usually the reduction 
of illicit cultivation. 
At the national level, the ultimate success of alternative 
development has often been seen in its contribution to the 
overall reduction in the area under illicit crop cultivation, 
although, given its localized nature, its contribution to 
national cultivation trends is not known. Alternative devel-
opment constitutes only one of the national strategies 
applied within a broader package, which contains elements 
ranging from eradication, conflict resolution and strength-
ening of the rule of law to overall socioeconomic develop-
ment. As mentioned earlier, alternative development is not 
generally an objective in itself, but rather a means to an 
end: it is aimed at contributing to an enabling environ-
ment for long-term rural development without illicit cul-
142 UNODC, “Thai alternative development projects showcased at 
international workshop”, 2 December 2011. Available at www.
unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2011/12/alternative-develop-
ment-chiang-mai/story.html. 
143 Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final  
Synthesis Report, p. 10.
144 UNODC, “Coffee instead of coca: Peruvian farmers reap the fruits 
of their labour”. Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/alternative-
development/peru---success-stories.html. 
145 Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation—Final  
Synthesis Report.
tivation. This is partly why measuring the 
coverage, quality and effectiveness of alter-
native development interventions and ser-
vices with regard to addressing the drug 
problem is challenging. 
The long-term nature of alternative devel-
opment interventions is another factor in the 
complexity of measuring their success. Experi-
ence has shown that the success of alternative 
development in terms of reducing illicit crop cultiva-
tion should only be determined after several years of inter-
vention, and attempts to measure success over shorter 
periods have been found to be counterproductive, par-
ticularly when such information is used for immediate 
action. 
The fact that projects take place at the local level but are 
often evaluated at the national level can also affect percep-
tions of whether an alternative development programme 
has been successful or not. A prime example of this is the 
so-called “balloon effect”, which is the shift that may occur 
when alternative development projects trigger the displace-
ment of illicit cultivation from the area targeted by alter-
native development to other geographical areas: households 
may migrate to other areas in order to continue illicit 
cultivation, or other households may start illicit cultiva-
tion to fill the supply gap triggered by the alternative devel-
opment intervention. 
From the point of view of alternative development pro-
jects, which are local in nature, the balloon effect caused 
by this type of displacement is not necessarily a sign of 
failure. But from a broader national perspective, it can be 
argued that the balloon effect reduces the effectiveness of 
alternative development, at least in the short term, as the 
long-term benefits in terms of creating a new institutional 
and developmental paradigm may not yet be visible.
Balloon, or displacement, effects have been observed at 
different levels. For example, the displacement of illegal 
cultivation to other subnational locations and/or other 
countries, or the replacement of illicit cultivation with 
other illegal activities. As when successful law enforcement 
operations hinder trafficking routes, which may force traf-
fickers to switch to new routes, success in alternative devel-
opment projects is bound to trigger a certain degree of 
displacement to areas not targeted by such projects, as long 
as the conditions that enable illicit cultivation are not 
addressed in broader geographical terms (whether at the 
national level or the regional level) and the root causes of 
illicit cultivation, such as poor developmental infrastruc-
ture, governance and rule of law, are not comprehensively 
tackled.
Broadening the set of indicators  
used to measure success in alternative 
development
In the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on Inter-
national Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced 
What do the 
beneficiaries say about the impact of alter-
native development projects? A woman in Huay Nam 
Koon, a village in northern Thailand, says: “My life is stable and 
secure now and I see a positive future for my children.”142 Similarly, 
another project beneficiary in Thailand explains: “We feel more secure here 
now because we are in a position to negotiate with the Government. Officials don’t 
come and threaten us any more.”143 In the former coca-growing areas of Peru, where 
drug traffickers were highly influential in the 1980s and 1990s, local farmer coop-
eratives have become successful coffee producers. A member of one such farmers’ 
cooperative, which also runs an organic coffee programme, says: “I do not have 
to hide any more,” he says, “I am proud of what I produce. I pay taxes and 
I can now provide my whole family with health insurance. Before, 
I had to hide from the police and I did not feel proud at 
all, I felt ashamed, because I knew I was doing 
something illegal.”144
CHAPTER II
Measuring the succes of alternative development 111
WORLD 
DRUG 
REPORT2015
Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, it is stated 
that Member States with the necessary expertise should 
assist affected States in designing and improving systems 
to monitor and assess the qualitative and quantitative 
impact of alternative development with respect to the sus-
tainability of illicit crop reduction and socioeconomic 
development, and that such assessment should include the 
use of human development indicators that reflect the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (paragraph 43 (d) of the Plan 
of Action). In paragraph 45 (d) of that text, it is recognized 
that “poverty and vulnerability are some of the factors 
behind illicit drug cultivation and that poverty eradication 
is a principal objective of the Millennium Development 
Goals”. Similarly, in the United Nations Guiding Princi-
ples on Alternative Development, the coupling of human 
development and crop reduction indicators to measure 
the success of alternative development efforts is suggested. 
In paragraph 18 (v) of the Guiding Principles, Member 
States, international and regional organizations, develop-
ment agencies, donors, international financial institutions 
and civil society are asked to “apply, in addition to esti-
mates of illicit cultivation and other illicit activities related 
to the world drug problem, indicators related to human 
development, socioeconomic conditions, rural develop-
ment and the alleviation of poverty, as well as institutional 
and environmental indicators, when assessing alternative 
development programmes in order to ensure that the out-
comes are in line with national and international develop-
ment objectives, including the Millennium Development 
Goals”. The extent to which such broader human devel-
opment indicators have been used to assess the success of 
alternative development varies. 
Based on their experiences, alternative development 
experts identified, in an alternative development expert 
questionnaire administered by UNODC, three essential 
indicators for measuring the success of alternative devel-
opment interventions.146 The most mentioned indicators 
were: (a) the generation of alternative income from licit 
activities; (b) strengthened community or producer organi-
146 See the methodology section in the online version of this report.
NEXUS BETWEEN ILLEGAL MINING AND COCA CULTIVATION IN  
SAN GABÁN, PERU
Illicit coca cultivation has made a steady comeback in the District of San Gabán, in the Peruvian Region of Puno, 
since a substantial eradication campaign in 2004 and 2005, with a 7.36 per cent increase in coca cultivation 
between 2011 and 2013.a The expectations at that time were that there would be a signiﬁcantly greater increase 
in illicit cultivation, predominantly because of its location on the so-called “inter-oceanic highway”, which links 
Peru with Brazil. Interestingly, however, it was illegal mining, which has been booming in San Gabán since 2012, 
that provided competition for labour and prevented illicit coca cultivation from increasing further. 
In 2013, satellite images were used to investigate the links between illegal gold mining and illicit coca cultivation. 
While illegal mining increased by 100 per cent between 2012 and 2013 (from 500 to 1,000 ha) on both sides of 
the Inambari river, illicit cultivation remained relatively stable over the same period. Moreover, it was found that 
part of the illicit coca cultivation had been replaced by illegal mining, creating substantial direct competition for 
scarce labour.b While coca cultivation pays about $6 per day, illegal mining pays roughly $13.c
The example of San Gabán shows that alternative development interventions in such areas would have to address 
the opportunities and vulnerability of communities to engage in all types of illicit activities.
a UNODC and Government of Peru, Perú: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2012 (September 2013), p. 16.
b UNODC and Government of Peru, Perú: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013 (June 2014), p. 21.
c Ibid, p. 49.
Illegal mining (shown in red; 2005) Illegal mining (shown in red; 2013)
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ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND REDUCTION IN NATIONAL ILLICIT 
CULTIVATION
Thailand
The area under opium poppy cultivation in Thailand 
increased from around 300 ha in 1917 to some 12,100 ha 
by 1961-1962. Despite eradication efforts, cultivation 
increased further in northern Thailand in the initial years 
of the Viet Nam war, to some 17,900 ha by 1965-1966.a 
The upward trend in opium production ended with the 
implementation of alternative development efforts by 
the authorities of Thailand, starting in the second half 
of the 1960s (with, notably, the Royal Project in 1969, 
followed by the Doi Tung Development Project) and 
gaining in intensity as of the early 1970s, when those 
efforts were also assisted by the international community, 
including bilateral donors and the United Nations. The 
ﬁrst phase, in the 1970s, focused on cash-crop substi-
tution, the second phase, in the 1980s, on integrated 
rural development and the third phase, in the 1990s and 
subsequent years, on community development and the 
active participation of the hill tribes concerned. The use 
of alternative development, supported by eradication 
efforts (which for several years concerned more than half 
of the area under poppy cultivation), as well as the suc-
cessful economic development of Thailand as a whole, 
helped to reduce the area under opium poppy cultivation 
in Thailand by almost 99 per cent, from 17,900 ha during 
the period 1965-1966b to 265 ha in 2013.c Successful 
economic development, with an average annual growth 
of GDP of 6 per cent per year during the period 1965-
2013 (compared with a global average of 3.3 per cent),d 
helped the hill tribes to beneﬁt from the overall progress 
made and provided them with alternative sources of 
income. Importantly, the exceptional leadership provided 
by King Bhumibol and the late Princess Srinagarindra, 
who initiated the Royal Project and the Doi Tung Devel-
opment Project, respectively, in northern Thailand, built 
trust among the ethnic hill tribe communities, convincing 
them to shift to a new, legal economy.
Pakistan
Alternative development also appears to have played 
a crucial role in reducing opium poppy cultivation in 
Pakistan, particularly in Dir District, located in the North-
West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Opium 
poppy cultivation in Pakistan, which had increased in the 
1970s, declined thereafter by almost 99 per cent, from a 
peak of some 80,500 acres (32,600 ha) during the period 
1978-1979 to 493 ha in 2013. Within this smooth overall 
trend there were different dynamics at the subnational 
level. Following successes in reducing the area under 
poppy cultivation in Buner District, which was linked to 
investment into crop substitution during the period 1976-
1987, opium poppy cultivation shifted to the adjoining 
Malakand Agency and the Gadoon Amazai area and, 
following successful alternative development efforts in 
these regions, it shifted to Dir District. In 1978-1979, 
the area under opium poppy cultivation in the (then) 
North-West Frontier Province accounted for more than 
60 per cent of the total area under poppy cultivation in 
Pakistan, and Dir District alone accounted for 50 per cent 
of total opium production in 1985. 
By 1999, following some 15 years of heavy investment 
into alternative development, opium poppy cultivation in 
Dir District had largely disappeared, and there were no 
indications of a signiﬁcant revival of the opium sector in 
subsequent years. In a ﬁeld study conducted in 2000 to 
assess the impact of the Dir District Development Project, 
it was suggested that the government of the North-
West Frontier Province, with the assistance of UNDCP 
Opium poppy cultivation in Thailand (in  
hectares), 1961-2013 and gross domestic product 
index (1965=100) in Thailand and globally, based 
on constant United States dollars 
Sources: Ronald D. Renard, Opium reduction in Thailand 1970-
2000: a Thirty-year Journey (Chiang Mai, Thailand, Silkworm 
Books, 2001) (for data for the period 1961-1984); UNODC, 
Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2013 and previous years (for data 
for the period 1984-2013) and World Bank, Data, Indicators, GDP 
(constant 2005 US$). 
a Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000.
b Ibid.
c UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2013.
d World Bank, Data, Indicators, GDP (constant 2005 United States 
dollars), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
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zations; and (c) the reduction of illicit crop cultivation. 
These indicators were mentioned in combination with 
indicators related to human development, social capital, 
institutional capacity and political and financial commit-
ment, among others. Indeed, project evaluation docu-
ments demonstrate that a multitude of indicators have 
been used to measure the success of alternative develop-
ment interventions. But, with the exception of “the area 
under illicit crop cultivation”, which is often still used as 
the main success indicator, the others tend to differ sub-
stantially from project to project, so the final results are 
not easily comparable across projects or countries.
In the San Martin Region of Peru, alternative development 
interventions succeeded in increasing the area under licit 
agricultural cultivation by 80 per cent, from 252,000 ha 
in 2001 to 454,000 ha in 2010, which helped San Martin 
to emerge as the largest producer of oil palm (79 per cent 
of national production), cacao (33 per cent) and rice 
(19 per cent), the second-largest producer of bananas and 
papayas, and the third-largest producing region of coffee 
(19 per cent) in Peru in 2010. In 2010, the region showed 
the best economic and social indicators in Peru, including 
the greatest reduction in poverty: during the period 2001-
2010, poverty decreased from 70 per cent to 31 per cent, 
a reduction of more than half.147
The main effects of the Thai-German Highland Develop-
ment Programme (1981-1998) on households included 
increased access to education, health services and potable 
water, with a resulting decline in water-borne infections 
and diseases such as malaria and smallpox. In addition, 
new cash crops and a growing agricultural economy in the 
north doubled or even tripled many household incomes. 
Alternative development projects in Wa Special Region 2 
of Myanmar resulted in gains on the health front: children 
under 3 years of age were vaccinated, thus reducing infant 
mortality, and leprosy, which had previously been three to 
four times higher than the average rate in Myanmar, was 
eliminated. Also as a result of the projects, electricity was 
brought to one township, 10 primary and 2 middle schools 
were built and potable water was brought to two 
townships. 
147 “The alternative development model in San Martin”.
and through the implementation of the Dir District Devel-
opment Project, had generally succeeded in curbing the 
cultivation of poppy in the project area. In accomplishing 
the primary objective (eradication of poppy cultivation), 
the effective government enforcement “stick” was the 
overriding factor, while the “carrot” of development inter-
ventions had acted as a catalyst to the process. According 
to the study, farmers felt that, generally, the project inter-
ventions had had a positive impact. The construction and 
the improvement of roads had improved accessibility to 
social services and had reduced the distance to market 
of farm inputs, agricultural output and other consum-
able commodities. The introduction of high-value crops, 
higher production packages and improved animal breeds, 
improvements in irrigation-related infrastructure and the 
introduction of rotational grazing had improved farm 
productivity. Similarly, provision of drinking water supply 
infrastructure and an effective immunization programme 
had had a positive impact on the quality of life.
Colombia
Alternative development also appears to have played a 
role in the decline in the area under coca cultivation in 
Colombia, which amounted to 71 per cent during the 
period 2000-2013. Most of the decline in the initial years 
can be linked to eradication efforts, but in recent years 
the extent of eradication has fallen. Nonetheless, cultiva-
tion has continued to decline, and the number of villages 
covered by alternative development quintupled during the 
period 2007-2013, from 1,365 to 7,734. Those villages 
were located in 361 municipalities across the country. This 
points towards alternative development as having played 
a tangible role in the further reduction of the area under 
coca cultivation, particularly during the period 2007-2013, 
when it declined by 52 per cent. 
Area under coca cultivation in Colombia;  
eradication and villages covered by alternative  
development, 2000-2013 
Sources: UNODC and Government of Colombia, Colombia: Moni-
toreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013 (and previous years) and UNODC, 
World Drug Report 2014 (and previous years).
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The success indicators used in the Phongsaly alternative 
livelihood and food security project in the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic included the creation of a stable food 
security situation in target households through the 
introduction of improved agricultural development linked 
to markets, increased productivity in the cultivation of 
licit crops by former opium-growing families, the 
establishment of reliable social and economic support 
services and improved project management to empower 
local participation.148
In Thailand, the Mae Fah Luang Foundation under Royal 
Patronage has taken the assessment of the success of alter-
native development some steps further by evaluating its 
projects based on long-term, “people-centred” human 
development, socioeconomic and environmental indica-
tors, including per-capita income, education level and 
environmental regeneration. 
Efforts have been undertaken to consolidate the set of 
indicators that can monitor the impact of alternative devel-
opment into a unique summary measure. In Colombia, a 
set of indicators was developed and then combined into 
an overall composite índice de consolidación (consolidation 
index) to measure the success of the National Policy for 
Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction. This policy 
includes alternative development programmes that go 
beyond mere crop substitution or provision of alternative 
livelihoods and include a broad range of state-building 
interventions in areas which, due to insurgency, drug traf-
ficking and large-scale illicit crop cultivation, were, until 
recently, beyond Government control. 
The development of such a consolidation index appears 
to have gone back to suggestions made in the evaluation 
of Plan Colombia,149 in which the authors proposed devel-
oping a multi-year composite index to measure the success 
of alternative development that should include the follow-
ing: (a) the number of hectares cultivated with illicit crops; 
(b) the number of hectares eradicated; (c) the number of 
municipalities free from illicit crop cultivation; (d) the 
percentage of the size of the illicit economy per GDP and 
per the size of the economy in every subnational region; 
(e) human development indicators of illicit crop farmers 
and populations vulnerable to illicit crop cultivation (such 
as level of income per family, levels of literacy and life 
expectancy); and (f ) the availability to illicit crop farmers 
of comprehensive licit livelihoods resources necessary for 
legal livelihoods (technical assistance to grow legal crops, 
irrigation systems, seeds, microcredit, roads that lead to 
markets, appropriate participation in production value 
chains, community access to schools, health clinics, etc.).
148 Final Independent Project Evaluation of the Phongsaly Alternative 
Livelihood and Food Security Project.
149 USAID, Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Gov-
ernments’ Support for Plan Colombia’s Illicit Crop Reduction Compo-
nents (Washington, D.C., April 2009), p. 30.
The consolidation index is used to measure, among other 
issues, some of the basic elements of alternative develop-
ment derived from sub-indices describing: (a) the institu-
tionalization of the territory; (b) citizen participation and 
good governance; and (c) regional integration. These areas 
were identified by the authorities as the policy’s main pil-
lars for the reconstruction of territories that were previ-
ously under the influence of groups involved in large-scale 
illicit crop cultivation, drug manufacture, drug trafficking 
and insurgency.
Irrespective of ongoing differences in the various regions, 
the results emerging from the approach of Colombia show 
clear improvements in all of the main regions where alter-
native development interventions took place during the 
period 2011-2013 (see figure 5). The overall positive out-
come, however, should not mask the fact that the situation 
did not improve across the board. Some areas, such as the 
Department of Putumayo, improved in some areas (e.g. 
justice and human rights), while suffering declines in others 
(e.g. connectivity to rural centres and the provision of 
social services). The consolidation index was used to meas-
ure the scope of the National Policy for Consolidation and 
Territorial Reconstruction in 58 municipalities. A detailed 
analysis of this kind across regions provides policymakers 
with highly relevant information on the successes and fail-
ures of alternative development interventions and can help 
to fine-tune interventions and government responses. 
H. POINTS OF FUTURE INTEREST
Drug control may be one of the objectives of alternative 
development, but it is certainly not the only one. When 
viewed holistically, alternative development is meant to be 
FIG. 81. Results from alternative development 
interventions measured in terms of the 
consolidation index in key areas where 
alternative development activities took 
place in Colombia, 2011-2013
 
Source: Colombia, Department for Social Prosperity, Administra-
tive Unit for Territorial Consolidation.
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part of a nationwide strategy for poverty elimination. The 
discussion in this chapter has shown how alternative devel-
opment, within this broader meaning, has contributed to 
economic development (mostly in rural areas) in order to 
target the underlying factors and root causes of illicit drug 
economies. The new Sustainable Development Goals (the 
post-2015 development agenda) could bring a new vision 
and provide alternative development with a new theoreti-
cal framework, adding to socioeconomic development 
— its “traditional” pillar. New elements such as the rule 
of law and the development of “effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions”, as described in Goal 16 in the 
report of the Open Working Group of the General Assem-
bly on Sustainable Development Goals,150 are, in part, 
already addressed by alternative development. These ele-
ments have been more prominently recognized as part of 
sustainable development in the Sustainable Development 
Goals. This section discusses alternative development in 
the context of this broader vision of development by high-
lighting some of its key elements. 
Impact of illicit drug production and 
alternative development interventions
At the national level, the income made by farmers from 
selling narcotic crops is not substantial in relation to over-
all national economies: the total farm-gate income from 
illicit opium and coca production amounted to some 
$2.6 billion in the six main opium and coca-producing 
countries (Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), 
Colombia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar 
and Peru) in 2013, ranging from less than 0.2 per cent of 
GDP in Colombia to about 0.9 per cent in the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia, 1 per cent in Myanmar and 4 per 
cent in Afghanistan. The economic value of illicit crop 
cultivation can, however, be far more significant for com-
munities living in the main opium-producing and coca-
producing areas than at the national level. For example, 
150 A/68/970.
the Province of Helmand in Afghanistan holds just 
3.4 per cent of the country’s total population but accounts 
for close to 50 per cent of the total area under opium 
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. About 27 per cent of 
the total agricultural area in Helmand was under opium 
poppy cultivation in 2013 and the farm-gate value of 
opium production there may have reached more than one 
third of the province’s licit GDP.151
In general, the economic development of rural communi-
ties affected by the illicit cultivation of crops depends heav-
ily on illicit sources that do not foster a “healthy” process 
of economic development. In the long run, areas where 
large-scale illicit crop cultivation takes place tend to per-
form less well than other areas as they are often deprived 
of productive private and public investment, often because 
of high levels of insecurity. Thus, the International Nar-
cotics Control Board, reviewing the relationship between 
illicit drugs and development, pointed out that there was 
a negative correlation between illicit drug production and 
the economic growth of a country.152 The World Bank 
reported that in Afghanistan “opium is becoming ‘capital-
ized’ in the economy and society, affecting agricultural 
sharecropping and tenancy arrangements, land prices, 
urban real estate, bride prices in opium-producing areas, 
etc.” and that “this entrenchment of the opium economy 
and long-term dependence on it will discourage the sus-
tainable development of other economic activities. For 
example, with rents and sharecropping arrangements 
increasingly based on opium in many rural areas of the 
country, it becomes virtually impossible for other cash-
earning agricultural activities to take hold.”153
151 See the methodology section in the online version of this report.
152 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002  
(E/INCB/2002/1).
153 William Byrd and Christopher Ward, Drugs and Development in 
Afghanistan, World Bank Social Development Papers, Paper  
No. 18, December 2004.
FIG. 82. Impact of illicit drug production and of alternative development interventions
Source: UNODC.
Strengthening of 
organized crime 
and increasing  
violence
Rising illicit 
drug production
Reduction of  
investment into 
licit sectors   
Reduction in 
overall growth 
of the licit 
economy
Weakening of 
the rule of law
Vicious
circle
Virtuous 
circleAlternative development
Falling poverty 
and strengthening 
of the rule of law
Increase in 
overall growth 
of the licit 
economy 
Increase in
investment into 
licit sectors 
Weakening of 
organized crime 
and falling 
violence
Falling illicit
drug production
116
All of this impacts on the growth of the licit economy and 
thus on the living conditions of farmers residing in illicit 
crop cultivating areas, where they are trapped in a vicious 
cycle. Illicit cultivation provides them with the necessary 
short-term economic means to survive but it does not 
allow the area to develop its licit economy and institutional 
environment. Alternative development can break this 
vicious cycle if it effectively addresses the factors hindering 
a sustainable licit economy, which in the long run can 
attract investment and help to develop the necessary infra-
structure, thus changing and sustaining the livelihood of 
rural communities (see figure 6). 
From Millennium Development Goals to 
Sustainable Development Goals
The link between alternative development and the Mil-
lennium Development Goals was made explicit in the 
Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy 
to Counter the World Drug Problem, in which it is stated 
that Member States should “tackle alternative development 
in a larger development context through a holistic and 
integrated approach, taking into account the Millennium 
Development Goals, with the priority of eradicating pov-
erty” (paragraph 47 (a) of the Plan of Action).
The proposed Sustainable Development Goals are much 
broader in scope and do not only cover socioeconomic 
development (which was the primary focus of the Millen-
nium Development Goals); they also recognize a broader 
dimension of development, which encompasses the envi-
ronment, participatory and representative decision-mak-
ing, security and the rule of law.154
In the discussions on the post-2015 development agenda 
there is recognition that illicit markets are a great con-
straint to sustainable development. In its report, the High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda recommended that Member States 
and the international community “stem the external stress-
ors that lead to conflict, including those related to organ-
ized crime”.155 It called upon Member States to pay greater 
attention to reducing risks and improving outcomes by 
strengthening the licit sector and focusing on areas where 
illicit sectors pose significant risks to development and 
governance outcomes.156 Similarly, in its report,157 the 
Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sus-
tainable Development Goals recognized that the illicit 
sector is an element to be addressed in the context of 
154 See A/68/970.
155 A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Econo-
mies through Sustainable Development: The Report of the High-Level 
Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (New 
York, 2013).
156 See also Tim Midgley and others, Defining and Measuring the Exter-
nal Stress Factors that Lead to Conflict in the Context of the Post-2015 
Agenda, Saferworld Reports Series (London, Saferworld, 2014).
157 A/68/970.
the post-2015 development agenda and included, within 
Goal 16, the target of significantly reducing illicit financial 
and arms flows, strengthening the recovery and return of 
stolen assets and combating all forms of organized crime 
by 2030. In the synthesis report on the post-2015 sustain-
able development agenda entitled “The road to dignity by 
2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting 
the planet”, the Secretary-General also highlighted that 
“providing an enabling environment to build inclusive and 
peaceful societies, ensure social cohesion and respect for 
the rule of law will require rebuilding institutions at the 
country level to ensure that the gains from peace are not 
reversed.”158
Alternative development within the 
framework of land governance
As discussed in section F above, the granting and/or 
enforcement of individual and collective land titles has 
proved a successful alternative development strategy. 
Experts have stressed the need for a clear legal framework 
in which alternative development interventions incorporate 
proper land tenure rights.159 The Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations provide an interesting set of recommendations on 
how to improve land governance with the overarching 
objective of achieving food security. Directly linked to 
efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty, the promotion of 
secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries 
and forests is also very relevant for the planning and imple-
mentation of alternative development programmes.
Alternative development within the 
international trade regime
In section F above, issues related to market access are 
discussed, notably the requests made at the international 
level to increase the market access of alternative 
development products. In the context of the international 
trade regime, governed by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which determines what States are permitted to 
do in terms of market intervention and market support, 
the role of alternative development subsidies was not 
specifically considered, but some agreements granted 
preferential treatment to illicit drug-producing countries. 
One could argue that the limited size and scope of most 
alternative development projects would hardly distort 
international markets in any way, but the objective at the 
heart of many alternative development projects is, 
nevertheless, to ultimately be competitive in international 
markets. The question remains as to whether the latter 
objective requires free market access or preferential trade 
158 A/69/700, para. 52.
159 E/CN.7/2014/CRP.7, p. 4.
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agreements that distinguish “alternative” from “regular” 
products and if alternative development products should 
receive preferential treatment. 
Within the international trade regime, bilateral or multi-
lateral trade agreements have been established to assist 
farmers in some of the illicit drug-producing countries. 
The Andean Trade Preference Act provided duty-free treat-
ment for a wide range of export products from Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of ), Colombia, Ecuador and Peru with 
access to the United States market. The Act was amended 
in October 2002 by the Andean Trade Promotion and 
Drug Eradication Act. Intended to open up new markets, 
support crop substitution and generate viable alternatives 
to illicit cultivation, the Act targeted countries with illicit 
drug production, although it was not directly related to 
alternative development products. Indeed, some of the 
products of Andean farmers were not included in the act. 
The act expired in February 2011 but was extended until 
31 July 2013 and  has not been extended since. Both 
Colombia and Peru signed bilateral free trade agreements 
with the United States. 
In 1990, the four countries of the Andean Community 
(Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru) were granted special arrangements  under the Euro-
pean Union’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences to combat 
drug production and trafficking. Later, the special arrange-
ments were extended to a few other countries.160,161
While it provides some illicit drug-producing countries 
with access to Europe’s internal market for a range of agri-
cultural and industrial products, trade support is generally 
not directly related to alternative development or the 
(potential) export of alternative development products 
(similar to the Andean Trade Preference Act and the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act). But 
by including products such as coffee, beneficiaries of alter-
native development programmes could potentially benefit. 
Similarly to the bilateral trade relationship with the United 
States, the European Union has also agreed bilateral free 
trade agreements with a number of countries, which could 
make the Generalised Scheme of Preferences system irrel-
evant in the future.
The Generalised Scheme of Preferences was changed in 
2005 after a WTO legal case in 2002.162 The WTO ruled 
that tariff advantages under the Special Arrangements to 
Combat Drug Production and Trafficking  were inconsist-
ent with article I.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, on general most-favoured-nation treatment. 
This meant that the European Union could not grant 
160 European Commission, The European Union’s Generalised System of 
Preferences GSP, 2004.
161 European Commission, “Practical guide to the new GSP trade 
regimes for developing countries” (December 2013).
162 Dispute Settlement, European Communities—Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, Dispute 
DS246 (20 July 2005).
preferential treatment to illicit drug-producing countries, 
unless it granted the same treatment to other Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences beneficiaries with similar “develop-
ment, financial and trade needs”.163 According to WTO, 
this could have been avoided if the preferential treatment 
of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences had included 
objective criteria to allow other developing countries that 
are similarly affected by the drug problem to be included 
as beneficiaries of the scheme.164 The 2005 WTO ruling 
has further limited the possibilities for giving special 
market treatment to countries affected by illicit drug 
cultivation. 
Alternative development and  
environmental protection
As illicit cultivation often takes place in national parks, 
protected forests or protected territories, it can put pres-
sure on, or move, the agricultural frontier. Although alter-
native development is not generally possible within 
protected areas (except for livelihoods related to the pro-
tection of such areas), the reach of alternative development 
programmes can include both the area where agricultural 
or agroforestry activities take place and the area beyond 
the agricultural frontier. This could be done through gen-
eral forest protection policies, implemented by the min-
istries in charge of environmental policies, reinforcing the 
notion that alternative development is embedded into 
broader sustainable development and environmental pol-
icies. Alternative development can also be implemented 
in areas adjacent to illicit cultivation areas, which could 
encourage farmers to move, as well as reduce pressure on 
protected areas. 
In taking such a holistic approach, there will always be 
compromises to be made in alternative development 
between boosting rural development (providing jobs and 
income through alternative livelihoods) and the protection 
of the environment and biodiversity in an area affected 
(or threatened to be affected) by illicit crop cultivation or 
by the crops or livelihoods chosen to replace them.
I. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented in the present chapter shows that 
the international definition of alternative development 
agreed at the twentieth special session of the General 
Assembly, held in 1998, is still valid today. Yet alternative 
development is in a constant state of flux and its success 
is a result of the piloting of new and often more 
sophisticated approaches by Member States. National 
alternative development strategies vary considerably, but 
almost all address food security and quality of life in terms 
of broader socioeconomic indicators, in line with the 
163 European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff  
Preferences to Developing Countries.
164 Ibid.
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general evolution from the limited crop substitution 
approach of the 1960s and 1970s to the comprehensive, 
multifaceted approach of today. 
Success in alternative development is still viewed in the 
context of reducing illicit cultivation, but the impact of 
programmes is now more broadly assessed, in terms of the 
eradication of extreme poverty and in terms of human 
development, gender equality and women’s empowerment, 
and environmental sustainability. The United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Alternative Development have 
pushed the international agenda further, emphasizing a 
multidimensional approach and the need to focus on 
improving land governance, strengthening the justice and 
security sectors, promoting human development and pro-
tecting the environment. Some countries are already 
addressing these issues and experimenting with new 
approaches. 
The Sustainable Development Goals, as proposed by the 
Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sus-
tainable Development Goals, could provide the framework 
for developing such initiatives further and provide a new 
impetus for alternative development, adding elements of 
rule of law and governance to the “traditional” pillars of 
socioeconomic development. Experiences in Afghanistan, 
Colombia and Peru have shown that minimum levels of 
rule of law and of security need to be established for sus-
tainable results in alternative development to be achieved. 
The Sustainable Development Goals point to the crucial 
role of environmental protection. This underlines the 
importance of continuing to develop new alternative 
development approaches to environmental conservation 
and protection, such as linking sustainable agricultural 
production at the local level to the international market 
for carbon credits. To fully embrace environmental pro-
tection, alternative development needs to be embedded 
into broader sustainable development and environmental 
policies that enable a compromise to be made between 
rural development and the protection of the environment 
and biodiversity. The Sustainable Development Goals 
could also provide the framework for linking land tenure 
more firmly with alternative development. The granting 
and/or enforcement of individual and collective land titles 
has proved a successful strategy in a number of alternative 
development projects and the Sustainable Development 
Goals recognize that secure and equitable rights to land 
and natural resources are central to the achievement of 
sustainable development. 
Much of the innovation in improving the effectiveness of 
alternative development programmes is done at the local 
level, and a process of connecting “local to global” is cur-
rently taking place, in which best practices and lessons 
learned from local experiences within national strategies 
are exchanged. This reinforces other efforts by UNODC, 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other entities to 
further foster South-South cooperation.
More than 40 years of alternative development experience 
have led to the conclusion that alternative development 
works when it has a long-term vision, adequate funding 
and the political support to integrate it into a broader 
development agenda. As the present chapter has shown, 
sustainable results in reducing illicit cultivation in differ-
ent communities around the world can be obtained when 
the socioeconomic development of communities and the 
livelihood of rural households are improved. 
Despite the amount of attention given to alternative devel-
opment at the international level, there is a disconnect 
between international rhetoric and funding. Alternative 
development features prominently in documents of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the special sessions 
of the General Assembly on the world drug problem, but 
the funding for it has decreased considerably in the last 
few years. The twentieth special session of the General 
Assembly in 1998 triggered renewed impetus in funding 
alternative development in the spirit of “shared responsi-
bility”, but overall gross disbursements of alternative devel-
opment funds from OECD countries have declined by 
71 per cent since the adoption of the 2009 Political Dec-
laration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter 
the World Drug Problem. In 2013, these disbursements 
accounted for just 0.1 per cent of global development 
assistance. By contrast, investment by national authorities, 
particularly in Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Colombia 
and Peru has increased over the last few years, often com-
pensating for decreased donor support. Alternative devel-
opment continues to focus on illicit cultivation of the coca 
bush and opium poppy, and although countries have 
expressed an interest in engaging in alternative develop-
ment to combat the illicit cultivation of cannabis, current 
programmes targeting cannabis are very limited, despite 
its widespread illicit cultivation. 
Market access for alternative development products is 
essential, and free trade agreements may have an impact 
on the marketing of alternative development products. 
Support for development-oriented supply reduction poli-
cies often takes the form of subsidies, which, although 
they may constitute a negligible part of overall trade, may 
not be in line with the obligation to prevent trade 
distortions.
As demonstrated by different national experiences, there 
seem to be opportunities for the alternative development 
approach to be extended beyond the context of illicit drug 
cultivation into other illegal markets. Alternative develop-
ment could support communities affected, for example, 
by illegal mining, wildlife and forest crimes, and drug traf-
ficking. This broadening of alternative development could 
go well beyond the already existing preventive alternative 
development strategy, which targets areas at risk of becom-
ing illicit crop production areas.
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Country Cultivated (ha)
Eradicated 
(ha)
Harvestable 
(ha)
Yield  
(kg/ha)
Production 
(tons)
Plants 
eradicated
Sites  
eradicated
Algeria 4,831.00 1,400
Armenia 1.10 2.20 0.00 50
Austria 2.00 2.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 23.95 23.95 0.00 649.89 308 8,469 151
Belgium 575.00 396,758 1,212
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina
185 4,288
Brazil 37.84 900,744
Bulgaria 5.00 5.00 0.00 17,479 130
Colombia 326.00
Costa Rica 8.74 8.74 0.00 1,461,747 199
Czech Republic 73,639 276
Ecuador 3,816 28
Egypt 20.00 12,166
El Salvador 1.00 1.00 0.00 38,000 1,634 53
Germany 107,776
Greece 23,008
Hungary 100.00
Iceland 6,652 323
Ireland 28,851 391
Italy 894,874 1,722
Latvia 14,579 18
Lithuania 5
Malta 27
Mexico 5,364.16 1,200.00
Mongolia 15,000.00 4,000.00 11,000.00 4,000 4,000
Morocco 47,196.00 5,000.00 42,196.00 812.87
New Zealand 126,523 783
Nigeria 850.00 847.46 2.54
Panama 10.50 10.50 0.00 78,670 4
Philippines 51.55 2,013,678 451
Poland 1.80 69,285 13
Russian Federation 5.40 7,047.00 1,974
Sierra Leone 190.00 190.00 190 3
Trinidad and Tobago 10.28 10.28 0.00 500.00 597,100 117
Ukraine 166.90 483,000
Uzbekistan 0.40 0.40 0.00 613
Viet Nam 1.00
Cannabis
Cannabis cultivation, production and eradication, 2013
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Global illicit cultivation of coca bush, 2002-2013 (hectares)
Source: Bolivia (Plurinational State of): 2002: CICAD and United States Department of State, INCSR; since 2003: national illicit crop  
monitoring system supported by UNODC. Colombia: National Illicit Crop Monitoring System supported by UNODC. Peru: national illicit 
crop monitoring system supported by UNODC."
"Note: An account of different area concepts and their effect on comparability was presented in the World Drug Report 2012 (p. 41-42). Efforts  
continue to improve the comparability of estimates between countries: since 2011, the net area under coca bush cultivation at the reference date of 
31 December has been estimated for Peru, following the same concept used for the Colombia estimations. The estimate presented for the Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of ) represents the area under coca cultivation as seen on satellite imagery.      
a Net area on 31 December. Estimates from 2009 on were adjusted for small fields while estimates for previous years did not require such  
an adjustment. 
b  Net area on 31 December.           
c  Area as interpreted from satellite imagery.       
d The global coca cultivation figure in 2011 was calculated with the "area as interpreted from satellite imagery" for Peru.   
Cocaine
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bolivia  
(Plurinational 
State of)
24,400 23,600 27,700 25,400 27,500 28,900 30,500 30,900 31,000 27,200 25,300 23,000
Colombia a 102,000 86,000 80,000 86,000 78,000 99,000 81,000 73,000 62,000 64,000 48,000 48,000
Peru b 62,500 60,400 49,800
Peru c 46,700 44,200 50,300 48,200 51,400 53,700 56,100 59,900 61,200 64,400
Total 173,100 153,800 158,000 159,600 156,900 181,600 167,600 163,800 154,200 155,600d 133,700 120,800
Potential production of sun-dried coca leaf, 2005-2013 (tons)
Sources: For Bolivia (Plurinational State of) – Potential production of sun-dried coca leaf available for cocaine production was estimated 
by the national illicit crop monitoring system supported by UNODC. Source of estimates for leaf yield is UNODC for Yungas de la Paz, 
and United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for Chapare (DEA scientific studies). The estimated amount of coca leaf pro-
duced on 12,000 hectares in the Yungas de la Paz, where coca cultivation is authorized under national law, was deducted (ranges: upper 
and lower bound of 95 per cent confidence interval of the estimated coca leaf yield). For Peru: Potential production of sun-dried coca 
leaf available for cocaine manufacture was estimated by the national illicit crop monitoring system supported by UNODC. A total of 
9,000 tons of sun-dried coca leaf production was deducted, which, according to Government sources, was the amount used for tradi-
tional purposes (range: upper and lower bounds of the 95 per cent confidence interval of the estimated coca leaf yield. 
Note: The estimates for 2011 and 2012 are not directly comparable; for a discussion of the different concepts, see World Drug Report 2012 (pp. 
41-42). Estimates from 2012 onwards are comparable.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
state of)
28,200 33,200 36,400 39,400 40,100 40,900 33,500 30,400 24,300
Range
34,200-
38,300
37,300-
41,800
37,900-
42,300
 38,600-
43,100 
 31,900-
35,400 
 28,900-
31,900 
 20,600-
28,400 
Peru 97,000 105,100 107,800 113,300 119,000 120,500 126,100 119,700 112,200 
Range
85,400-
108,600
91,000-
119,200
93,200-
122,000
97,600-
127,800
102,400-
134,200
103,000-
136,300
110,300-
142,100
103,300 
- 136,100
102,180-
123,180
iv
Potential production of fresh coca leaf, 2005-2013 (tons)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Colombia 555,400 528,300 525,300 389,600 376,700 334,900 281,800 241,400 208,200
Range
346,900-
406,400
334,900- 
349,600
229,800-
333,800
179,200- 
284,200
178,900- 
237,500
Potential production of fresh coca leaf in oven-dried weight, 2005-2013 (tons)
Source: National illicit monitoring system supported by UNODC. 
Notes: Owint to the introduction of an adjustment factor for fields that are productive for only part of the year, estimates since 2009 are 
not directly comparable with those of previous years.
Notes: Owint to the introduction of an adjustment factor for fields that are productive for only part of the year, estimates since 2009 are not directly 
comparable with those of previous years. The ranges express the uncertainty associated with the estimates. In the case of Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of) and Peru, the ranges are based on confidence intervals and the best estimate is the mid-point between the upper and lower bound of the range. 
In the case of Colombia, the range is estimated based on the area under coca cultivation in the two previous years. The methodology used to calcu-
late uncertainty ranges for production estimates is still under development and figures may be revised when more information becomes available.
Potential manufacture of 100 per cent pure cocaine, 2005-2013 (tons)
Sources: For Bolivia (Plurinational State of): UNODC calculations based on coca leaf yield surveys by UNODC (Yungas de la Paz) and 
United States DEA scientific studies (Chapare). For Colombia: national illicit crop monitoring system supported by UNODC and DEA  
scientific studies. Owing to the introduction of an adjustment factor for fields that are productive for only part of the year, estimates  
since 2009 are not directly comparable with those previous years. For Peru: UNODC calculations based on a coca leaf to cocaine conver-
sion ratio from DEA scientific studies. 
Notes: Owing to the ongoing review of conversion factors, it has not been possible to provide a point estimate of the level of cocaine production since 
2009. Detailed information on the ongoing revision of conversion ratios and cocaine laboratory efficiency is available in the World Drug Report 2010 
(p. 249).
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
state of)
80 94 104 113 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Colombia 680 660 630 450 488 424 384 333 290
Range 240-377 249-331
Peru 260 280 290 302 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 1,020 1,034 1,024 865 842-1,111 788-1,060 776-1,051 714-973 662-902
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Colombia 164,280 154,130 154,000 116,900 113,000 100,500 84,500 72,700 62,500
Range
100,500-
104,880
Reported cumulative eradication of coca bush, 2005-2013 (hectares)
Source: UNODC annual report questionnaire and database on estimates and long-term trend analysis (DELTA); Government of Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Colombia and Peru. 
Totals for Bolivia (Plurinational State of) since 2006 include voluntary and forced eradication. Totals for Peru include voluntary and forced eradication.  
Two dots indicate that data are not available. Cumulative eradication refers to the sum of all eradication in a year, including repeated eradication of the same 
fields.          
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
manual  6,073  5,070  6,269  5,484  6,341  8,200  10,460  11,044  11,407 
Colombia manual  37,523  41,346  66,392  96,003  60,565  43,804  35,201  30,487  22,127 
spraying  138,775  172,026  153,134  133,496  104,771  101,939  103,302  100,549  47,053 
Peru manual  7,605  9,153  10,188  11,102  10,091  12,239  10,290  14,235  23,947 
Ecuador manual  18  9  12 12  6  3  14 .. ..
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic 
of)
manual  40 0 0 0 0 .. .. .. ..
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Global potential production of opium and manufacture of heroin of unknown purity, 2004-2014 (tons)
Notes: For Afghanistan, the proportion of potential opium production that was not converted into heroin within the country could only be estimated. 
For all other countries, for the purposes of the above table, it is assumed that all opium potentially produced was converted into heroin. If total poten-
tial opium production in Afghanistan in 2014 were to be converted into heroin, total potential heroin production would be 670 tons in Afghanistan 
and 788 tons globally. The estimates for 2006 to 2009 were revised owing to the revision of opium production figures for Afghanistan. 
The amount of heroin produced in Afghanistan is calculated using two parameters that may change each year: the distribution between opium that 
was not processed into heroin and opium that was processed into heroin; and the conversion ratio between opium and heroin. From 2004 to 2013 
the conversion ratio used was 7:1; in 2014, it was modified to 9.6:1, based on recent results (see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and Min-
istry of Counter Narcotics of Afghanistan, Afghan Opium Survey 2014). Up until 2013, global potential production of heroin of unkown purity was 
estimated without applying an estimated purity factor, but in 2014 a purity factor of 52 per cent was assumed and reflected in the estimate for 
Afghanistan. For this reason, an updated conversion ratio from opium to heroin of export quality (set at 52 per cent) was used for Afghanistan in 
2014. Thus, the global total of estimated heroin of unknown purity produced includes a large proportion of heroin of export purity produced in 
Afghanistan. Recent reports point to higher purities on specific trafficking routes, which would have an inpact on the calculation if considered.  
Figures in italics are preliminary and may be revised when updated information becomes available.  
Reported opium poppy eradication in selected countries, 2003 to 2014 (hectares)
Sources: UNODC annual reports questionnaire, Government reports, reports of regional bodies, and the United States International  
Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
Notes: In this table, only eradication reported in terms of area is considered. Eradication reported in terms of number of plant seizures can be found in 
the annex on seizures of the electronic version of the World Drug Report located at https://www.unodc.org/wdr/
a Although eradication took place in 2004, it was not officially reported to UNODC.
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Afghanistan  21,430 a  5,103  15,300  19,047  5,480  5,351  2,316  3,810  9,672  7,348  2,692 
Algeria  2,721 
Bangladesh  8  22 
Colombia  3,266  3,866  2,121  1,929  375  381  546  711  299  319  514 
Egypt  34  65  45  50  98  121  89  222  1  3 
Guatemala  489  720  449  536  1,345  918  1,490  590  2,568 
India  494  167  12  247  8,000  624  2,420  3,052  5,746  1,332  865 
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
 4,134  3,556  2,575  1,518  779  575  651  579  662  707  397 
Lebanon  4  67  27  8  21  4 
Mexico  20,034  15,926  21,609  16,890  11,046  13,095  14,753  15,491  16,389  15,726  14,662  11,683 
Myanmar  638  2,820  3,907  3,970  3,598  4,820  4,087  8,268  7,058  23,718  12,288  15,188 
Nepal  19  4  1  21  35 
Pakistan  4,185  5,200  391  354  614 0 105 68 1053 592  568 
Peru  57  98  92  88  28  23  32  21 
Thailand  767  122  110  153  220  285  201  278  208  205  264 
Ukraine  28  436  39 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of)
0  87  154 0 0 0
Viet Nam 100  32  38  99  31  38  35  25 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total potential  
opium production  4,850  4,620  5,810  8,091  6,841  4,953  4,730  6,983  4,831  6,810  7,554 
Potential opium not  
processed into heroin
 1,197  1,169  1,786  3,078  2,360  1,680  1,728  3,400  1,850  2,600  2,400 
Potential opium  
processed into heroin
 3,653  3,451  4,024  5,012  4,481  3,273  3,002  3,583  2,981  4,210  5,154 
Total potential  
heroin manufacture  529  472  553  686  600  427  383  467  377  555  526 
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This report uses a number of regional and subregional 
designations. Not official designations, they are defined 
as follows:
East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethio-
pia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania. 
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South 
Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia.
Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.
West and Central Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bermuda, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Gre-
nada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and 
Tobago.
Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
North America: Canada, Mexico and United States of 
America. 
South America: Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of ), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of ).
Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan and Uzbekistan.
East and South-East Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Indonesia, 
Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mon-
golia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singa-
pore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam. 
South-West Asia: Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of ), 
and Pakistan. 
Near and Middle East: Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian 
Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka. 
Eastern Europe: Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian 
Federation and Ukraine.
South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey.
Western and Central Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San 
Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland.
Oceania: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micro-
nesia (Federated States of ), Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and small island territories.
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GLOSSARY
amphetamine-type stimulants — a group of substances com-
posed of synthetic stimulants that were placed under inter-
national control in the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances of 1971 and are from the group of substances 
called amphetamines, which includes amphetamine, meth-
amphetamine, methcathinone and the “ecstasy”-group 
substances (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine 
(MDMA) and its analogues)
amphetamines — a group of amphetamine-type stimulants 
that includes amphetamine and methamphetamine
annual prevalence — the total number of people of a given 
age range who have used a given drug at least once in the 
past year, divided by the number of people of the given 
age range, expressed as a percentage
coca paste (or coca base) — an extract of the leaves of the 
coca bush. Purification of coca paste yields cocaine (base 
and hydrochloride)
crack cocaine — cocaine base obtained from cocaine hydro-
chloride through conversion processes to make it suitable 
for smoking
new psychoactive substances — substances of abuse, either 
in a pure form or a preparation, that are not controlled 
under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 
or the 1971 Convention, but that may pose a public health 
threat. In this context, the term “new” does not necessar-
ily refer to new inventions but to substances that have 
recently become available
opiates — a subset of opioids comprising the various prod-
ucts derived from the opium poppy plant, including 
opium, morphine and heroin
opioids — a generic term applied to alkaloids from opium 
poppy (opiates), their synthetic analogues (mainly pre-
scription or pharmaceutical opioids) and compounds syn-
thesized in the body
poppy straw — all parts (except the seeds) of the opium 
poppy, after mowing
problem drug users — people who engage in the high-risk 
consumption of drugs, for example people who inject 
drugs, people who use drugs on a daily basis and/or people 
diagnosed with drug use disorders or as drug-dependent 
based on clinical criteria contained in the International 
Classification of Diseases (tenth revision) of the World 
Health Organization and the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (fourth edition) of the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, or any similar criteria or defi-
nition that may be used

